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     This thesis analyzes the nature of ethnic Germans’ self-identities and nationalisms in interwar  
Slovenia. Slovenia’s German minorities’ reactions to domestic social policies and world events 
that impacted them are examined primarily through locally-based German-language newspapers. 
Germans in Slovenia had had multiple identities and nationalisms, and these were shaped by 
social policies and domestic and foreign  events, especially after the National Socialists’ seizure 
of power in Germany in 1933. Pan-German nationalism was strong and widespread, and viewed 
Slovene minority policies as being purposeful attempts to eradicate the very existence of 
Germandom. This type of nationalism competed with other types of German nationalisms and 
identities which sought to integrate into and contribute to Slovene society without compromising 
their uniquely Germanic culture. National Socialism’  appeal was so strong because it promised 
a reunion of Slovenia’s Germandom with the wider Volk and a restoration of the minorities’ 
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I wrote this thesis to answer three main questions about the German-speaking 
minority1 of interwar Slovenia: What was the nature of their r action to domestic social 
policies and world events throughout the period? What can this reaction tell us about the 
nature of their identity and nationalism? How and why did the Nazis and the Third Reich 
influence these minorities? The answers to these questions can, I hope, tell us much about 
the impact of nationalism on ethnic relations, the appeal of National Socialism and 
fascism, and the ways in which self-identity is shaped and formed. 
Prior scholarship has documented the social, politica , and cultural developments 
of the German minority in the interwar period,2 noting the ways German cultural 
                                                          
1 I use the terms “German” and “German-speaking” interchangeably to denote that language was not 
necessarily a signifier of belonging to that ethnicity, as the national activists would have liked it to be. As 
well, simply using “German” can be, at times, too ambiguous: does “German” mean a citizen of the 
German Reich or the Federal Republic of Germany? Were Austrians German? In what sense were the 
“Germans” of Bohemia, Hungary, Latvia, or Slovenia actually German? It would be clearer if the term 
“Germanophone” was widely-used, as it is in the French Sprachraum. But as it is not, I will stick with the 
terms “German” and “German-speaking.” The area that is the focus of this study, namely the current 
Republic of Slovenia, had two main language-groups located in them, and as such, the regions and cities 
themselves had a Slovene-language and a German-language designation. Though it is somewhat awkward 
to do so, I will be using both names of these cities, with the German-language version one succeeded by the 
Slovene-language one, so as to disassociate the “nationalities” of these places from what activists claimed 
them to be – it is not my intention to endorse or refute national activists’ notions of whether 
Marburg/Maribor was a “German” or a “Slovene” city, etc. “What people in central or eastern Europe 
meant when they described themselves as ‘German’ [in the nineteenth century] varied greatly from place to 
place, and many of them could scarcely understand one another because regional dialects were so 
strong…’The majority of Austrian peasants do not even know that there is a Germany and that it is their 
fatherland!’ Waking Germans up to the truth of nationalism was the self-imposed mission of a minority of 
troublemakers…” Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2008), 17. For more on the methods of German national activists for national “awakening”, see Peter 
Haslinger, ed., Schutzvereine in Ostmitteleuropa: Vereinswesen, Sprachenkonflikte und Dynamiken 
nationaler Mobilisierung 1860-1939 (Marburg, Germany: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2009). 
 
2 See Stefan Karner, Die Deutschsprachige Volksgruppe in Slowenien: Aspekte ihrer Entwicklung, 1939-
1997 (Klagenfurt, Austria: Hermagoras/Mohorjeva, 1998); Helmut Rumpler and Arnold Suppan, eds., 
Geschichte der deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Sloweniens, 1848-1941 (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte 
und Politik, 1988); Dušan Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien (1918-1955): Kurzer Abriß (Ljubljana: 
Znanstveni inštitut Filozofske falkutete, 1998); Harald Heppner, ed., Slowenen und Deutsche im 
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institutions were impacted and how Germans in Slovenia responded through political 
means to social policies that affected them. Historians, who have almost exclusively been 
Austrian or Slovene historians, have in recent years also examined the diplomatic and 
political impact of the shared regions between Slovenia and Austria without confronting 
enough what the minorities themselves felt, said, or perceived of their own situation.3 
These historians have debated the extent to which te German minority group of Slovenia 
became Nazified,4 which was partly a result of institutional infiltration from the Third 
Reich, and participated in the crimes of the Nazi occupiers during World War II, noting 
that National Socialism caught on quicker and lasted longer among Slovenia’s Germans 
than elsewhere in Yugoslavia.5   
                                                                                                                                                                             
gemeinsamen Raum: Neue Forschungen zu einem komplexe  Thema (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 
2002).  
 
3 See Arnold Suppan’s monumental Jugoslawien und Österreich, 1918-1938: Bilaterale Aussenpolitik im 
europäischen Umfeld (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996). 
 
4 Slovene historians have tended to argue that a clear majority, though not all, German minorities in 
Slovenia were staunch National Socialists, which would give Yugoslav reactionary measures in the 1930s 
legitimacy. See Nećak (who himself relies upon Slovene historians for much of his argument) Die 
“Deutschen” in Slowenien, 11-19. Austrian historians have acknowledged that some nazification did occur, 
but have tried to show that this was more due to institutional reach from the Third Reich, not ideology, and 
that in any case, it was not as widespread as Slovene historians have asserted. A form of this argument is 
present in Karner, Die Deutschsprachige Volksgruppe in Slowenien, n Rumpler and Suppan, eds., 
Geschichte der deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Sloweniens, and Heppner, ed., Slowenen und Deutsche 
im gemeinsamen Raum. Slovene historians had for a long time regarded any Austrian scholarship on the 
subject to be veiled attempts at revisionism, as several books had been written about the German minority 
by ethnic Germans from Yugoslavia who had themselve been expelled after the war. Examples of these 
works include Sepp Janko, Weg und Ende der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien (Graz, Austria: 
Stocker, 1982); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Nationalitätenpolitik in Jugoslawien: Die deutsche Minderheit, 1918-
1978 (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980); and Hans Rasimus, Als Fremde im 
Vaterland: der Schwäbisch-Deutsche Kulturbund und die ehemalige deutsche Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien 
im Spiegel der Presse (Munich: Arbeitskreis für donauschwäbische Heimat- und Volksforschung in der 
Donauschwäbischen Kulturstiftung, 1989). For the most part, I have not utilized these sources, though, in 
any case, they are mostly concerned with the German-speaking minority in Yugoslavia outside of Slovenia. 
 
5 Though Yugoslavia's diverse and geographically-spread German population was split between an older 
group who came of age in the Austrian Empire and disliked National Socialism and a younger, more pan-
German generation (the so-called Erneuerungbewegung), Slovene historians have noted that this pro-Nazi 
sentiment caught on quickest and more enthusiastically among Slovenia's German population than 
elsewhere in the Kingdom. Dušan Nećak, Boris Jesih, Božo Repe, Ksenija Škrilec, and Peter Vodopivec, 
eds., Slowenisch-österreichische Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert (Ljubljana: Historia, 8, 2004), 174-176. 
3 
 
While historians have noted that not every German in Slovenia was supportive of 
the Nazis, they have not identified what kind of German was against the Nazis – in short, 
who were these other Germans? What was their identity? Who counted as being German, 
or part of the German community? Everyone had different ideas and measures. German 
national activists would have liked anyone who spoke the German language to be 
considered German, while the Slovene government did not consider a person “truly” 
German if they also spoke Slovene or had a non-Germanic name.6 What prior scholarship 
has not explained well enough is why this was the case: What was different about 
Slovenia's Germans? Why did they seem to latch onto National Socialism quicker and 
hold on longer than other ethnic-German groups? What was the nature of their identity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Philip Lyon, in his dissertation (written at the University of Maryland, College Park) "After Empire: Ethnic 
Germans and Minority Nationalism in Interwar Yugoslavia", mainly focuses on German-speakers in 
Croatia-Slavonia and Vojvodina, using the comparison of Slovenia's Germans simply to note that they were 
"different" or "unique" from the rest of Yugoslavia's German community. Lyon notes that Slovene-German 
ethnic tension had been “particularly intense” in the later decades of the Habsburg Empire, only getting 
worse after the end of the Great War.  But he does n t elaborate on why this interwar ethnic tension should 
have been different from that of other majority-minority group relationships, whether involving German-
speakers or not. While his dissertation focuses on Yugoslavia’s German minorities, he does not include the 
Germans of Slovenia in his scope. Nonetheless, Lyon’s research found a persistence of a nationally-
indifferent identity among German-speakers in that area, despite fervent attempts by German national 
activists to “awaken” them to their ethnicity. Philip Lyon, “After Empire: Ethnic Germans and Minority 
Nationalism in Interwar Yugoslavia”, PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park (2008), 15-
16. 
 
6 Slovenes today still refer to anyone who speaks German as “German”, whether they are from Austria, 
Germany, or any other country with German as an official language. Nećak, “Waren ‘die Deutschen’ 
Fremde in Slowenien nach 1945?”, in Österreichischer Zeitgeschichtetag 1995: Österreich – 50 Jahre 
Republik (Innsbruck, Austria: Studien Verlag, 1996), 187. Such ambiguity in designating identity led to 
instances of “fluidity" in daily life; that is, one could be considered a certain ethnicity at one tim, 
according to the census or neighbors or community, while at a different time and place be considered a 
different one.  This was not only the case for German-speakers, but Slovene-speakers as well. See Christian 
Promitzer, Klaus-Jürgen Hermanik, Eduard Staudinger, eds., (Hidden) Minorities: Language and Ethnic 
Identity between Central Europe and the Balkans (Vienna: LIT Verlag, 2009). For more on language and
nationalism, see Tomasz D.I. Kamusella, “Language as an instrument of nationalism in Central Europe”, in 
Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2001), 235-251. 
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and nationalism?7 How did they view Yugoslavia and Slovenia?8 How did they view 
Austria and Germany? 
                                                          
7 Nationalism can be defined as “a movement to defend the interests of a nation, to defend or secure its 
political independence.” Stephen Barbour and Cathy Carmichael, eds., Language and Nationalism in 
Europe (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4. Benedict Anderson posited that a 
nation can be “imagined” or invented if its adherents all believe that they are part of this nation. Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin andSpread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1991). After the collapse of the multi-ethnic empires that ruled the peoples of Eastern Europe after 1918, 
the successor states maintained the region’s national diversity but changed the status of the state from a 
somewhat impartial imperial apparatus to aggressive nation-state. Thus, the new national minorities in 
Eastern Europe were faced with a “triadic configuration”: contending with political and economic 
reconfiguration, the “nationalizing” nationalisms of their new states, and the “homeland” nationalisms of 
the cultural/ethnic states that they allegedly (or presume to be) belong to. See Rogers Brubaker, 
Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55-78. With nationalism in Eastern Europe tending to be 
organized around ethnicity and language, one could ften “choose” (or be chosen) to be part of a certain 
ethnic group by choosing to speak in that language. For more on language and nationalism in Europe, see 
Barbour and Carmichael, eds., Language and Nationalism in Europe, 1-17; and in East  Central Europe, 
182-220. Pieter Judson, in his book Guardians of the Nation, traces the contours of German nationalism 
and its organization in the Habsburg Empire, including in Slovenia, through the end of World War I but
stops at 1914. Judson found that, despite attempts by national activists on both the Slavic and German side 
to portray the situation in Central Europe as one of “wins” and “losses” for one side or the other after 
“gaining” Germans or Czechs or Slovenes (i.e., people claiming to speak those languages), many remained 
indifferent to these appeals – they had not yet “awakened” to their national identity which the activists were 
fervently trying to convey to them that they held. Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the 
Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006).  For 
more on the issue of identity and nationalism in Habsburg East Central Europe, see Pieter Judson and 
Marsha Rozenblit, eds., Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2005). 
 
8 Yugoslavia had no single ethnic majority, unless one grouped together the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
under one designation as “Yugoslavs.” Due to differing historical experiences under the Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires, different areas of Yugoslavia had varying experiences with the German community. The 
relationship between the Serb, Croatian, and Slovene populations of Yugoslavia was complex and had a 
long history. A major problem for this newly-christened Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes lay in the 
fundamental idea of what Yugoslavism meant; each different ethnicity had large portions of the population 
who held a different conception of how a united Yugoslav state would function and in what manner it could 
be run. Slovenia largely wished to be part of a larger South Slavic state to protect itself and the etnic 
Slovenes that lived outside its immediate borders from Austrian and Italian irredentism. See Dejan Djokić, 
Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2003). See also Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1984). Yugoslavia ws an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse 
country: The 1921 census gave a combined population of almost 12 million in the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes; almost 40% were Serbian (Orthodox Christianity), with about 24% Roman Catholic 
Croatians, 8.5% Roman Catholic Slovenes, 6.3% Muslim Bosnians, 5.3% Macedonians, 4.3% Germans 
(Catholics and Protestants), 4% Albanian, 4% Hungarian, and almost 5% Turkish, Romanian, and Italian. 
John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 129.  
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With this thesis, I seek to understand the nature of Slovenia's ethnic-German 
community; that is, this thesis will be a political history in that I will trace how German-
speakers in interwar Slovenia reacted to minority policies that affected them, whether 
from the regional government in Ljubljana, the federal government in Belgrade, or the 
international treaties fostered by the League of Nations.9 I seek to understand how these 
ethnic Germans saw themselves and their place in the world; why they reacted the way 
they did to the policies that affected them, and what t e nature of this reaction was.  I am 
hopeful that this thesis will contribute to an understanding of the history of Germans in 
Eastern Europe in the twentieth century,10 the complexities of German identity,11 and the 
                                                          
9 Prior to the ratification of a formal constitution, there was a provisional Slovene National Council that
administered the formerly-Austrian crownlands of Lower Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. The 1921 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, would establish the country as a unitary state 
with 33 administrative districts, whose “prefects were appointed from Belgrade.” A multi-party political 
system was set up for elections in a national parliament (called the Skupština) in Belgrade, though there 
were also municipal and local governments in cities. Contemporaries colloquially called the Kingdom 
“Yugoslavia” and the districts that comprised the Slovene lands “Slovenia”, and will be referred to as such 
in this thesis. See John Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 89-97. 
 
10 For Eastern Europe’s large ethnic German population and the rise of the National Socialist state, the 
question of the Germans’ loyalty to their state of citizenship has been put forth; that is, were the Germans 
of Eastern Europe a fifth column? What was their relationship with their home country and their ancestral 
homeland of Germany? What was the nature of their id nt ty? In what sense were they German?  What was 
the influence of National Socialism on the German mi orities? What was or was not appealing about 
National Socialism for the ethnic Germans (part of a broader question about the appeal of National 
Socialism and fascism)? These questions are addresse  in Anthony Komjathy and Rebecca Stockwell, 
German Minorities and the Third Reich: Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the Wars (New 
York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), in Krista O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal, and Nancy Reagin, eds., The
Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 
2005), Charles W. Ingrao and Franz A. Szabo, The Germans and the East (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 2008), and Mariana Hausleitner and Harald Roth, eds., Der Einfluss von Faschismus und 
Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa (Munich: IKGS Verlag, 2006). For a 
recent analysis of Germans’ understandings of Eastern Europe through time and space, see Vejas Gabriel 
Liulevicius, The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
 
11 Language and national identity are closely linked in German-speaking Europe, though this poses certain 
problems as the German language itself is very diverse. See Barbour, “Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Luxembourg: The Total Coincidence of Nations and Speech Communities?”, in Barbour and Carmichael, 
eds., Language and Nationalism in Europe, 151-167. For more on the ways German emigrants and their 
descendants in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and Oceania formed unique German identities 
6 
 
impact of nationalism in East-Central and Southeastern Europe.12 This is a study of self-
identity, nationalism, and their impact upon policy and violence.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
based on language, culture, and history, see O’Donnell, Bridenthal, and Reagin, eds., The Heimat Abroad: 
The Boundaries of Germanness; ee also Mathias Schulze, James M. Skidmore, David G. John, Grit 
Liebscher, and Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach, eds., German Diasporic Experiences: Identity, Migration, and 
Loss (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008); and David Blackbourn and James 
Retallack, Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: G rman-speaking Central Europe, 1860-
1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). Much has been written about German identity and 
nationalism in Bohemia, in particular. See Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local 
History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002); Scott 
Spector, Prague Territories: National Conflict and Cultural Innovation in Franz Kafka’s Fin-de-Siècle 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000); and Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival: 
Germans in Prague, 1861-1914 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
 
12 Eastern Europe was the site of the majority of the brutality, carnage, horrors, and death in the first half of 
the twentieth century. See Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: 
Basic Books, 2010). Historians have sought answers to the following questions: Why did the situation in 
this region become so volatile between 1914 and 1945, after relative peace and stability for centuries prior 
to that? What made ethnically-diverse areas go fromindifference or ambivalence to nationalism before the 
late-nineteenth century to the ethnic cleansing and expulsions of World War II? What caused the violence 
in the borderlands to be so intense? What can we learn from the failure of East, Central, and Southeastern 
Europe to peacefully incorporate its minorities into s able, democratic states? Alexander Prusin, The Lands 
Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870-1992 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010). The rise of nationalism and the nation-state h s usually been given the dominant role in causing 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe’s political instability and ethnic violence. See Joseph Rothschild, East 
Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974),  Prusin, The 
Lands Between, and Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 2011). Under imperial rule, the region’s various ethnic groups were afforded relative 
tolerance and economic stability without overtly favoring one group over another. Whereas historically 
different groups in Eastern Europe had shared identities based in religion, language, culture, or geographic 
area, the spread of nationalism divided these loyalties and increased the majorities’ anxiety over the loyalty 
of potentially-hostile ethnic minorities’ relationships with their “mother” country.  As the nationalizing 
state became stronger, so too did state-led attempts to make a reality of a pure instead of diverse “nation-
state.” Prusin, The Lands Between, 6. Others have stressed the economic difficulties faced by East-Central 
European states in the aftermath of the Great War and into the 1930s as a major cause for those countries’ 
tensions, while not necessarily discounting the rolof nationalism and the state in facilitating ethnic 
conflict. See Dejan Djokić, Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007). Eastern Europe’s history of violent nationalism and ethnic cleansing still resonates 
today, as can be seen in the Balkan wars of the 1990s and ongoing language/cultural issues in the border 
regions of Austria, Slovenia, and Italy. For more on ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and in Europe, se Paul 
Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Cathie Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the
Destruction of Tradition (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-20; and Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: 




Germans and Slovenes in Interwar Europe 
In the 1910 Austrian census, Germans made up almost 10% of the population of 
what would become the modern Republic of Slovenia.13 More than 100 years later, this 
large German-speaking population has virtually disappe red. In the interwar period, 
Slovenia, and the larger Kingdom of Yugoslavia of which it was a part, was the home of 
more than 500,000 ethnic Germans.14 This population comprised part of the millions of 
other Germans who lived outside the borders of the German Reich. Together, these 
German minorities constituted almost one-quarter of the German-speaking population in 
Europe.15 Protecting the rights of these minorities and ensuri g their peaceful existence 
within the nation-states that had been created in the aftermath of the Great War was 
absolutely vital to the stability of Europe.16 
                                                          
13 This amounted to about 100,000 German-speakers. Slovenes made up 80% of the rest of the population, 
making up the overwhelming majority of the surrounding areas outside of the cities. There were five major 
centers of German-speakers in 1910: 22,635  in Marburg/Maribor (81% of the city’s population); 4,625 in 
Cilli/Celje (67% of the city’s population); 6,742 in Ljubljana (14.5% of the city’s population); 17,016 in 
Gottschee/Kočevska (almost 89% of this predominantly-rural region); and 3,672 in Pettau/Ptuj (79% of the 
town’s population). Mitja Ferenc and Božo Repe, “Die eutsche Minderheit in Slowenien in der 
Zwischenkriegzeit”, in Slowenisch-österreichische Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert, 162-163. 
 
14 Toussaint Hočevar, “Linguistic Minorities of Yugoslavia and Adjacent Areas during the Interwar Period: 
An Economic Perspective”, in Nationalities Papers (November 1984), 219. German-speakers in interwar 
Yugoslavia were clustered in large numbers in the Banàt, Bačka, and Vojvodina in Serbia. These were the 
so-called Danube Swabians (Donauschwaben). There were also smaller populations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia. Lyon, “After Empire”, 1-3. 
 
15 Ingrao and Szabo, The Germans and the East, 1. 
 
16 On average, the post-Versailles countries of Eastern Europe held between 20% and 29% national 
minorities, many of whom bordered nation-states comp sed of that minority’s ethnic group who struggled 
over possession of those territories. Raymond Pearson, National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 147-149. The minorities issue was a key reason for the 
destabilization of the interwar period. When speaking of the German minorities, the use or exploitation of 
their presence factored into Hitler’s expansionist a ms. How did Germany’s concern for Germans abroad 
affect international relations? How did the German mi orities affect the domestic and foreign policy of 
Eastern Europe’s nation-states. See Ronald Smelser, Th  Sudeten Problem: Volkstumpolitik and the 
Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933-1938 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1975).  See also Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich and Norman Rich, 
Hitler’s War Aims, volume I: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion (New York: W.W. 
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Slovenia’s German-speaking population17 was, unlike the rest of Yugoslavia’s 
ethnic German population, predominantly urban, industrialized, relatively affluent, and 
more nationally conscious of their German identity.18 The 10% of Slovenia’s population 
that was German-speaking was a much higher rate than in Croatia, Serbia, or Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Ethnic tension between Slovenes and Germans was also more intense than 
that of Germans and Serbs or Croatians.19 This resulted in, from the German perspective, 
harsher minority social policies that closed German-language schools, removed the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Norton, 1973).  The role of the League of Nations in enforcing the minorities treaties, which many 
countries did little if anything to follow in the interwar period, has come under scrutiny for several r asons: 
the Allied Powers seemed little inclined to apply the same rigor to accommodating their own minority 
groups, but had no problem interfering in these same issues in Eastern, Central, and Southeastern Europe; it 
was difficult to bring cases to the League’s attention, and even more so to try and successfully navigate 
these cases through the League’s system; the League also did little to placate the various minority groups’ 
irritation at what they perceived as the League’s indifference to their plight, causing tension in those 
countries. See Mark Mazower, “Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe”, in Daedalus, 
Vol. 126, No. 2 (Spring 1997), 47-63. See also Martin Scheuermann, Minderheitenschutz contra 
Konfliktverhütung? Die Minderheitenpolitik des Völkerbundes in den zwanziger Jahren (Marburg, 
Germany: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2000).  
 
17 Why Slovenia? It is among the lesser-studied groups of ethnic Germans in the interwar period, with the 
Germans of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary taking precedence.  Even Hausleitner and Roth’s Der 
Einfluss von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, which 
deals specifically with Southeastern Europe, focuses on Romania, Hungary, and Croatia. Slovenia is an oft-
overlooked part of the three ethnic groups that made up Yugoslavia, where issues between Serbs and 
Croatians often takes precedent. Slovenia was, however, more industrialized than Croatia and Serbia and,
unlike the other two, belonged to the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. 
 
18 In Lower Styria, for example, 25.9% of Germans were involved in trade and transport, 21.7% in 
commerce, 17.9% in the “free professions”, and only 14.1% in agriculture. These were all much higher 
rates than the Slovene majority. See Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 11.  On the eve of World War 
I, Slovenia’s German-speaking population generally enjoyed predominance in such prominent societal 
positions as the courts, the banks, big business, politics, and large landed estates. Ferenc and Repe, “Die 
Deutsche Minderheit in Slowenien in der Zwischenkriegzeit”, 162. As well, the German language 
dominated the upper echelons of society in the region, meaning that often native Slovene-speakers had to 
learn German in order to economically and socially dvance. Hočevar, “Linguistic Minorities of 
Yugoslavia”, 215.  
 
19 Germans and Slovenes had, by 1918, been living in the same region for decades. Beginning in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century and continuing up to 1914, the two ethnic groups struggled over political, and 
with it, societal and cultural control of the Slovene lands. Such political, cultural, and social conflicts 
centered around language use, education, and political representation, becoming increasingly tense as both 
groups’ sense of national identity increased. For me, see Martin Moll, Kein Burgfrieden: Der deutsch-
slowenische Nationalitätenkonflikt in der Steiermark, 1900-1918 (Vienna: Studien Verlag, 2007). In the 
middle of WWI, news broke out in Austrian newspapers of the so-called “May Declaration” of 1917 that 
declared the South Slavic population of the empire to “no longer believe in the continued existence of the 
state in which it exists.”  The German-language press in Lower Styria reacted angrily to this, accusing the 
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German language from public life, and generally sought more aggressively to assimilate 
or overwhelm the German-speaking community. Slovenia shared a border with Austria, 
but not Germany, who did not have any territorial cl im on the ethnically-mixed border 
regions. After invading and occupying Yugoslavia, the Nazis annexed the parts of 
Slovenia under its control and administered it as apart of the Greater German Reich, 
despite its non-German ethnic majority.20 
The treaties that ended the First World War in Europe and finalized the 
continent’s borders resulted in a German nation-state but left almost a quarter of Europe’s 
German-speaking population outside of the new Weimar Republic’s borders. These 
ethnic German minorities were citizens and minorities of proclaimed nation-states, whose 
protection was supposed to be guaranteed by international treaties signed by their home 
countries. Following the horrors and violence of the Great War, Europe’s political and 
social stability relied in large part upon the peaceful incorporation of these ethnic German 
minorities into the new states of East, Central, and Southeastern Europe. With the rise of 
the National Socialist movement in Germany and the Nazis’ occupation policies that 
were employed across the continent, these ethnic Germans that had lived outside of 
Germany’s borders were seen as “fifth columns” who had helped Nazi Germany in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Slovenes and other South Slavs of being “traitors” and purposefully trying to sabotage the war effort.  
Needless to say, such words did not engender reconciliation either during or after the war between Germans 
and Slovenes. See Gregor Jenuš and Darko Friš, “Die Reaktion der Deutschen der Untersteiermark auf die 
Mai-Deklaration”, in Studia Historica Slovenica, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2008), 141-170. German Austrians during 
the Great War suspected ethnic Slovenes of inherently being traitorous, and treated them in a repressiv  
manner. See Janko Pleterski, “The Southern Slav Question”, in Mark Cornwall, ed., The Last Years of 
Austria-Hungary: A Multinational Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe (Exeter, United 
Kingdom: University of Exeter Press, 2002), 119-148.  For more on the period of nationalities politics in 
the Habsburg Empire, see Gary B. Cohen, “Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society 
in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914”, in Central European History, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2007), 241-
278. 
 
20 See Timothy Kirk, “Limits of Germandom: Resistance to the Nazi Annexation of Slovenia”, in The 
Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 69, No. 4 (October, 1991) 646-667.   
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invading, occupying, and ravaging Eastern Europe; this view was used in part as 
justification for the mass expulsion of millions of ethnic Germans from lands they had 
lived in for centuries.21 Views of Slovenia’s Germans being from the state’s inception 
against its existence and staunch supporters of National Socialism contributed to the 
reasoning behind their expulsion after the war.22  But were they disloyal? Were they all in 
favor of National Socialism and the occupation? If not, then what was their view of 
Slovenia, Slovenes, Germany, Germandom, and National Socialism and its impact? 
 
Methodology 
The main sources that I rely upon for my analysis are several German-language 
newspapers based out of the cities in Slovenia that had a majority German-speaking 
population, Cilli/Celje and Marburg/Maribor.23 The newspapers are analyzed in the 
                                                          
21 Komjathy and Stockwell, in German Minorities and the Third Reich,  tackle these questions on a state-
by-state basis, and come to various answers.  Sometimes, the German minorities were exploited by the 
Third Reich for its own expansionist aims while in other cases, there was a substantial involvement on the 
side of the German minorities with the Nazi occupying forces. Valdis Lumans, in Himmler’s Auxiliaries: 
The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German Nation l Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), mostly endorses the view that the majority of 
ethnic Germans outside of Germany were complicit and guilty of collaborating with the Nazis and their 
occupation policies. R.M Douglas takes issue with these justifications for the expulsion of the Germans 
from Eastern, Central, and Southeastern Europe in Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans 
after the Second World War (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012), as does Alfred M. de 
Zayas in A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of the East uropean Germans (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006).  
 
22 The Slovene historian Tone Ferenc, in a brief chapter about interwar Slovenia and the Slovenes' 
subsequent resistance to Nazi aggression after 1941, discusses Slovenia's interwar ethnic-German 
population as if they were a homogenous group of like-minded individuals, the entirety of whom were 
ardent nationalists and proponents of National Socialism. Tone Ferenc, “The Austrians and Slovenia during 
the Second World War”, in F. Parkinson, ed., Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 207-33. 
 
23 These newspapers were accessed through the Digitalna knjižnica Slovenije, part of the National and 






context of their editorial stance and their readership; the Deutsche Wacht/Cillier 
Zeitung/Deutsche Zeitung was generally conservative nationalist, while the 
Marburger/Mariborer Zeitung tended to be more centrist.24  Despite this, their editorials 
and articles did more than just relate the days’ events – they also expressed and reflected 
the opinions of a socially-elite German perspective, whose differing and contrasting 
opinions are able to be discerned.  The newspapers r  understood to be at times 
expressing widely-held opinion as well as urging or imploring a certain viewpoint upon 
portions of its readership who feel different about a topic.25 I have also used primary 
documents from the United States National Archives, with reports in the Records of the 
Department of State and captured Records of the German Foreign Office. All translations 
from German-language sources are, unless otherwise noted, my own.  
Chapter One, “Adjusting to the New Kingdom, 1918-1924”, analyzes the first 6 
years of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after the end of the Great War 
and how the German minority community of Slovenia adjusted to new social policies 
impacting them and their new lives as national minorities.  The German minority 
community’s views of Slovenes and Yugoslavia, their identity, as well as the nature of 
their reactions to social policies impacting their language, culture, and education will be 
analyzed.  I will argue that some German minorities w re reluctantly accepting of 
becoming part of the new Yugoslav state, but did take steps to try and integrate insofar as 
                                                          
24 The newspapers changed their names at various points throughout the interwar period, but these changes 
were in name only. 
 
25 See Michael Nagel, “Deutschsprachige Presse ausserhalb des Deutschen Sprachraumes: Entwicklungen, 
Perspektiven, Forschungsansätze”, in Andrei Corbrea-Hoişie, Ion Lihaciu, and Alexander Rubel, eds., 
Deutschsprachige Öffentlichkeit und Presse in Mittelost- und Südosteuropa (1848-1948) (Konstanz, 
Germany: Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 2008), 15-44. For moe on the German-language press in Slovenia, see 
Tanja Žigon, Deutschsprachige Presse in Slowenien (1707-1945), three volumes (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 2004).  
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it was possible for them to while policies that closed German-language schools, outlawed 
German cultural associations, and banned the German language in public were enacted; 
some German nationalists and nationalist activists were openly resistant and hostile to the 
nature of the South Slav kingdom; while others were somewhere in between; as such, I 
argue that there were multiple and contested German identities and nationalisms in 
Slovenia at the time.  
 Chapter Two, “Of Democracy and Dictatorship, 1925-1932”, deals with the 
middle of the 1920s, through the so-called Royal dictatorship of 1929 in Yugoslavia and 
up to the eve of the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. I will argue that some German 
minorities were optimistic and loyal citizens, still willing to contribute to the Yugoslav 
state, while others became annoyed and remained hostile as minority policies did not 
much change in their favor.  I will show how identity changed to more political action, 
and then weariness with politics – greeting the royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia as a 
positive event while leaving the door open to possible German intervention in the future. 
The Slovene Germans’ views of National Socialism as its electoral fortunes change and 
improve will be examined, as well as the community’s views of other fascist movements 
during this time. The mixed reaction to the increased electoral power of the National 
Socialists and the re-election of Hindenburg as Reichspräsident support the argument of 
contested and multiple identities and nationalisms. 
 The third chapter, “In the Shadow of the Third Reich, 1933-1941”, analyzes the 
reaction of Slovenia’s Germans to events after the seizure of power by the National 
Socialist German Worker’s Party in the German Reich. Despite the pro-Nazi editorial 
stance of the Deutsche Zeitung, I will argue that there is still evidence that some Germans 
13 
 
in Slovenia were skeptical or disapproving of the NSDAP and events in Germany, and 
what this might mean for interpretations of German identity. The appeal of the Nazi 
movement to its German supporters in Slovenia will be analyzed over the course of 
events through the 1930s and up to the German invasion nd occupation of Yugoslavia in 
the spring of 1941. 
 Finally, I conclude by briefly reviewing the Nazi occupation of Slovenia and its 
impact upon the German and Slovene population. The plans for population transfers and 
summary executions and expropriations of ethnic Slovenes leads to partisan resistance 
against the Nazi forces and reprisals against ethnic Germans from 1944-1945; the 
expulsion of Slovenia’s ethnic German population in 1945 marks the end of a long, 
shared history of these two people and demonstrates the perception that the pro-Nazi, 












Chapter One – Adjusting to the New Kingdom, 1918-1924 
The end of World War I saw the formation of a new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes, emerge out of the crumbling Habsburg Empire. In the aftermath of 
the war, Slovenia’s stability depended in large part upon placating and peacefully 
integrating its German-speaking minority. For the first several years of life in the new 
Slovenia, Germans had their rights and cultural institutions restricted. How did they react 
to these policies? What was the nature of this reaction? How did they view the new 
Slovenia, and how would this factor into how they integrated into Slovene society as a 
distinct ethnic minority? This chapter will address these issues. 
On November 11, 1918, the same day of the ceasefire that ended the First World 
War and only a short while after the Austrian Empire had effectively dissolved,26 the 
Club of Slovene Professors met in Ljubljana to recommend to the newly-formed Slovene 
regional government that the German-language Gymnasien (secondary schools) in 
Ljubljana, Gottschee/Kočevje, Pettau/Ptuj, and Görz/Gorica should be closed down, as 
they were understood to be “establishments of Germanization.” In addition, the Club of 
Slovene Professors also recommended that the Gymnasium in Cilli/Celje should be 
converted into a Slovene institution and that German-language parallel classes should 
only be established if a certain amount of students who were not proficient enough with 
the Slovene language had registered.27 
                                                          
26 For more on the collapse of the Austrian Empire, se  Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Austrians: A 
Thousand-Year Odyssey (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2002), 199-229. 
 




At the same time that these German-language schools and classes were shut down 
and transformed into Slovene-language ones, the “slovenization” of those parts of society 
previously dominated by German-speakers also commenced. The director of the 
Landesgymnasium in Pettau/Ptuj, Dr. Karl Schöbinger, was replaced by another professor 
by the name of Father Bajda on order of the Slovene national assembly.28 The Pettau/Ptuj 
city council, previously composed overwhelmingly of Germans, was dissolved in the 
name of the Ljubljana national government.29 Meanwhile, the district attorney, civil 
lawyers, and other functionaries in the city of Marburg/Maribor were removed from their 
positions by the Yugoslav government for having been sworn in by the German-Austrian 
state.30 
The government in Ljubljana removed ethnic Germans from the Post and 
Telegraph Office in Cilli/Celje,31 as well as the German district school inspector in 
Marburg/Maribor.32 The German Volksschule (primary school) in Kartschowin/Krčevina 
was transferred to a Slovene school despite there being more German-speakers in the 
district than Slovenes, a fact noted by the German-language newspaper Deutsche 
                                                          
28 DW, “Um Landesgymnasium in Pettau”, December 7, 1918. 
 
29 DW, “Der Pettauer Gemeinderat Aufgelöst”, December 7, 1918. 
 
30 DW, “Die Slowenisierung des Gerichtswesens”, Decemb r 7, 1918. 
 
31 DW, “Slowenisierung des Postamtes Cillis”, December 13, 1918. 
 




Wacht.33 In Marburg/Maribor, the district court was ordered to no longer plead cases in 
the German language.34 
The “slovenization” of the southern half of the former imperial Austrian 
crownland of Styria represented a complete reversal of power relations in the area, 
seeming to happen overnight. The symbolic transformation for German-speakers in 
Slovenia from privileged majority in a multi-ethnic state to perceived second-class 
minority in a nation-state became a lived reality as they were stripped of their prestigious, 
well-paid positions and contended with a new context in which the German language and 
culture no longer dominated society.35 
The initial reaction of Slovenia's German community to these developments was 
political. On November 12, 1918, the city council of German-majority Marburg/Maribor 
convened to discuss the occasions of both the newly-proclaimed German Republic and 
the Republic of German-Austria. The council, with “great joy” and “full-throated” 
agreement with both Austria's desire to connect with Germany (Anschluss), declared that 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
 
34 DW, “Die Deutsche Sprache den Rechtsanwälten Verbot n?”, December 13, 1918. 
 
35 The Habsburg crownland of Styria counted, in 1910, one million Germans and 400,000 Slovenes. The 
part of Styria that became part of Yugoslavia completely reversed this demographic ratio. Martin Moll, 
“The German-Slovene Language and State Border in Southern Austria: from Nationalist Quarrels to 
Friendly Co-Existence (19th to 21st Centuries)”, in Steven G. Ellis and Lud’a Klusáková, eds., Imagining 
Frontiers, Contesting Identities (Pisa, Italy: Pisa University Press, 2007), 207. Indeed, Education Minister 
Pribitchevitch “began his policy of suppression of all these institutions [German schools] beginning i 
Slovenia. The parents were informed that a Slavonic state could not tolerate German ideals and language 
continuing to prevail in families which had under the previous regime been ‘forced to become Germans’.” 
John Dyneley Prince to Frank B. Kellogg, January 25, 1927. United States National Archives (hereafter to 
be signified by “NARA”), Record Group 59 (Records of the Department of State). “Slovenization” also 
impacted German cultural institutions, such as the theater. 1919 saw theaters that had been run by German 
cultural associations in Ljubljana, Marburg/Maribor, Pettau/Ptuj, and Cilli/Celje transformed into Slovene 
ones. As a result, the ethnic German employees – musicians, electricians, directors, etc., - lost their jobs 
and the flow of money that had previously gone to “German hands” then went to Slovene ones. Reinhard 
Reimann, “’Für echte Deutsche gibt es bei uns genügd Rechte’. Die Slowenen und ihre Deutsche 
Minderheit 1918-1941”, in Harald Heppner, ed., Slowenen und Deutsche im gemeinsamen Raum, 139. 
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the German population of Marburg/Maribor “wholeheart dly...celebrates this...purposeful 
step” for “our liberated people”, now free from any “foreign pressure.” Furthermore, the 
council proclaimed that the Germans of Marburg/Maribor considered themselves to be an 
“organic, inseparable constituent part of the Republic of German-Austria”, and expected 
that Austria (and therefore Germany) would make sur that the “affiliation of our German 
city to the great body of our German Republic will be guaranteed forever.”36 
The turbulence and disruption of the war was, for some Germans, not enough to 
convince them that the Austrian Empire they had grown up in was never again going to 
exist. “The Czechs, Poles, and South Slavs [had] been preparing for years” for the 
dissolution of the Habsburg dynasty, while the Germans of the empire, whose failings of 
“birth and upbringing” were inherent to their race, were completely surprised by how 
events had unfolded after the end of the war.37 Affiliation with the other ethnic Germans 
of the former Austrian Empire initially had a strong sway over Slovenia’s German-
speaking community, as the emerging republic called G rman-Austria was an 
“ethnically-related” state, whose citizens “had over c nturies united in necessity and 
death” and who shared a “common blood[,] language[, and] a common history.”38    
                                                          
36 DW, “Eine Kundgebung der Stadt Marburg”, November 16, 1918. At the time, German-Austria claimed, 
as part of the principle of self-determination, to be a part of the German Reich. Affiliating Lower Styria and 
other parts of the linguistic borderland areas of Austria and Slovenia with a “Greater Germany” was one
way that nationalist activists attempted to portray the region as naturally German. These activists especially 
focused on the rural landscape, sometimes as a means of ttracting German-speaking settlers to the area so 
as to maintain the dominance of the German culture. Se  Pieter Judson’s article “Land of Sun and 
Vineyards: Settlers, Tourists, and the National Imagin tion on the Southern Language Frontier”, in 
Blackbourn and Retallack, Localism, Landscape, and Ambiguities of Place, 236-258. See also Julia 
Schmid, “Im Geiste Bismarcks zu nationaler Einheit. D e deutschnationale Erfahrungsgemeinschaft in 
Österreich und dem Deutschen Reich zwischen 1890 und 1914”, in Haslinger, Schutzvereine in 
Ostmitteleuropa, 28-41. 
 
37 MZ, “Die Wirkung Alter Sünden”, November 21, 1918. 
 
38 MZ, “Keinen Zerfall!”, November 26, 1918. 
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The declaration by the Marburg/Maribor city council demonstrates a political as 
well as cultural affiliation with the German nation-states of Austria and Germany. For 
Austria's German-speaking population, formation of a separate political entity meant 
“liberation” from having to contend with the Habsburg Empire's other large ethnic 
groups, Slavs and Magyars, who had for decades clashed with Germans over political, 
cultural, and societal matters.39 But there was more than just language and a shared 
history that connected Slovenia's Germans with German-Austria or the new German 
Republic. Being an “organic” part of the German Volk denotes that it is blood and not just 
language that makes one German, whether one lives in Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, or 
any other part of Europe. 
For a particular strand of ethnic German identity, language was intimately 
connected with culture.  For some, the German languge itself had a distinctive essence 
that was inseparable from the German culture; by its very nature, the German language 
was superior, advanced, aggressive, and otherwise contained those same characteristics 
that the German culture possessed.  Thus, by learning the German language, one 
“became” German and accrued all the benefits that came with “belonging” to a 
“superior” nation and culture, while the opposite would occur were one to lose the 
German language or “join” an “inferior” culture.40  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
39 See Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974), 422-451. 
 
40 This blending of language and culture in German natio lism is what Andreas Gardt calls 
Sprachnationalismus and Sprachpatriotismus. Andreas Gardt, “Sprachnationalismus zwischen 1850 und 
1945”, in Andreas Gardt, ed., Nation und Sprache: Die Diskussion ihres Verhältnisses in Geschichte und 




By declaring their “inseparability” from the German people in neighboring 
German-Austria and Germany, the Marburg/Maribor city ouncil believed they were 
speaking on behalf of the rest of Slovenia's German-speaking population, and were 
therefore making a political declaration by means of a cultural one. For, in declaring 
themselves indissolubly German, the councilors were thereby declaring that they would 
and could never culturally lose their German identity even if, politically, they became 
part of Slovenia and Yugoslavia. This was made true even for the city itself, which had a 
German-speaking majority at the time, but was expected to be guaranteed to belong to the 
spiritual body of Germandom for all time regardless of any potential demographic 
changes. Some Germans acted with their feet on this point, actively moving from their 
homes in Slovenia to German-Austria to gain that country’s citizenship.41 
 
Violent Struggles for Control and the Marburger Blutsonntag 
In the immediate post-ceasefire period, however, Gemans and Slovenes in the 
area took more than just political action – there were also violent confrontations between 
armed groups of men, sometimes composed of enlisted soldiers, who were fighting to 
gain control over certain areas for their respectiv ethnic nations.42 On November 16, 
1918, the German-controlled Marburg/Maribor city council called upon all men between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
41 DW, “Wie Werde Ich Deutschösterreichischer Staatsbürger?”, January 18, 1919. 
 
42 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 112.  Violent clashes over borderlands was not unique to Austria and 
Yugoslavia, however.  Armed militias battled in theBaltic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Ukraine ad 
elsewhere in East and Central Europe, leaving behind a trail of death and destruction. See Prusin, The





the ages of 18 and 50 who were “capable of using a weapon” to, as part of their “duty”,  
enter the city’s Schutzwehr, or armed militia.43 While the Serb-dominated Yugoslav 
delegation conferred over peace negotiations in Paris, Slovene and Serb troops advanced 
as far as Klagenfurt, attempting to gain territorial leverage over competing Austrian 
claims of the ethnically-mixed borderland between Slovenia and Austria. The territorial 
debate would eventually make its way to the negotiati ns in Paris, and would be decided 
by plebiscite.44   
For Slovenia's German community, the first several months of life after the new 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed on December 1, 1918 carried on 
much as it had in the period immediately following the end of the war. In February 1919, 
the Yugoslav government ended the teaching of the German language as a requirement 
for all primary and secondary schools in the entire kingdom, making it an elective from 
the fourth grade on at these schools only under the condition that parents asked for it and 
the class had more than 15 students. For minority schools throughout the kingdom, 
including German ones, knowledge of the “state language” of Slovene was made a 
requirement in order to teach.45 
                                                          
43 DW, “Marburger Schutzwehr”, November 16, 1918. 
 
44 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 112-113. For an exhaustive look into the demographic details of the 
borderlands in Styria and Carinthia, see Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich, 470-493. While German-
Austria desperately wished to maintain control over Lower Styria, including Marburg/Maribor, in early 
1919 their army was depleted and exhausted after years of grinding war. Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 
234. 
 
45 DW, “Das Deutsche aus den Schulen Beseitigt”, February 1, 1919. It was also “forbidden to all Germans 
in Yugoslavia to import any German teachers from abro d, and, since there (was) no German school for the 
training of teachers in (Yugoslavia)…the condition of German education” was dire indeed. John Dyneley 





By November 1, 1918, weeks before the end of the war, Slovene nationalist Major 
Rudolf Maister had led Slovene militias to seize th German-majority cities of 
Marburg/Maribor, Cilli/Celje, and Pettau/Ptuj.46 On January 27, 1919, a demonstration of 
several hundred German-speakers took place in Marburg/Maribor, at a time when the 
surrounding Styrian countryside was occupied by Yugoslav troops under now-General 
Maister. The protest, which occurred on the same day th t an American delegation led by 
Sherman Miles was received by General Maister, was violently broken up when the 
Yugoslav troops opened fire on the ethnic Germans; 8 civilians were killed and 20 
wounded.47   
It is difficult to understand the exact impact of what came to be called “Marburg’s 
Bloody Sunday” upon the German community, as there was still a censor in effect upon 
the German-language press.  As such, the Deutsche Wacht’s report on the “bloody 
demonstration” was placed on the last page of the February 1 edition, just before the 
advertisements.  The report claimed that there had been 10,000 protestors at the 
demonstration, with the police having fired 50 shot, killing and wounding many – 
“including women and children”, as the Deutsche Wacht emphasized. It is clear that, had 
the censor not been in place, the German-language press would have reacted much more 
angrily than they were able to do, but the focus on the “women and children” who were 
shot upon and killed indicates the German view of the situation: the demonstrators were 
legally and peacefully exercising their democratic rights as citizens and were thus 
                                                          
46 Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 236. 
 
47 Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich, 530. General Maister had, in addition to occupying German-
majority cities by force, had also fired ethnic German railway workers on strike and replaced them with 
ethnic Slovenes, fired German public servants, requisitioned their homes, and even taken some captive. 
Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 237. For his part, the American Miles had difficulty distinguishing 
between Germans and Slovenes in the area, as so many residents were bilingual. Ibid. 
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illegally and brutally shot upon by nationalist Slovene government forces.48 German-
Austria officially protested, calling out the Yugoslav occupation of “German settlement 
areas” and describing the event as resulting from acts of “perpetration” by the Slovenes in 
Marburg as against an “until now free people.”49 
More Germans were removed from administration posts at he district court50 and 
in primary and secondary schools in Cilli/Celje.51 In May, all street signs in Cilli/Celje 
not written in Slovene were ordered to be so, thus changing well-known and familiar 
landmarks and meeting places in the city for monolingual German-speakers into strange 
and confusing ones.52 Barely two weeks after German parallel classes were r duced while 
Slovene ones were increased at primary and secondary schools in Cilli/Celje in late 
February, 1919,53 the Slovene regional government abolished altogether German-
language parallel classes at the German secondary school in Cilli/Celje due to 
“insufficient students.” The Deutsche Wacht indignantly reported how German students 
were suggested to attend German Gymnasien in Pettau/Ptuj or Marburg/Maribor, both 
more than 30 miles away.54 
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The reaction of the Deutsche Wacht to the closing of this Staatsgymnasium in 
Cilli/Celje, the second-oldest secondary school in the kingdom, demonstrates the extent 
to which Slovenia's German community were alarmed at the social policies that were 
impacting them and so rapidly changing their lives. Noting that the presence of the censor 
made it “naturally impossible to appreciate” the “full meaning” of “this heavy blow to 
Cilli/Celje's Germandom”, the Deutsche Wacht deplored the fact that the “closing of the 
school” would now make “poor German students and their parents” the “hardest hit”, 
surely resulting in “many existences” falling victim to this “reprimand.” For the Deutsche 
Wacht, the dissolution of German parallel classes at the city's Staatsgymnasium was, just 
like the removal of German civil servants, nothing more than a “purification measure”, 
whose goal was to “accelerate” the “eradication” of Slovenia's Germandom. “The Styrian 
lowlands have”, angrily declared the Deutsche Wacht, “lost a time-honored cultural site, 
at which distinguished scholars had been active: This institution had, during its more than 
one-hundred-fifty-year existence, kept the intellectual standard [of the city] at the most 
prominent heights.”55 
As Slovenia's German minority group witnessed its cultural community, shown 
here in the example of a school, decline and be remov d from public life, it struggled to 
understand why this was being done. The Deutsche Wacht's editorial reflects one way that 
the German minority viewed the Slovene majority andits government's actions. 
Mentioning the censor on the press in combination with the word “reprimand”, it is clear 
that for some Germans, the Slovene majority was not acting out of any rational pursuit of 






good public policy but rather due to an irrational desire to conduct revenge or retribution 
upon the minority community for sins committed some time previously.56 The perceived 
“eradication” of Slovenia's Germandom through these typ s of “purification measures” 
was, for certain Germans, more than just the loss of cultural institutions and symbols – 
the fear was also that the physical and spiritual exist nce of Slovenia's Germandom itself 
would be erased through the actions of a vengeful, tyrannical Slovene-majority 
government.  
The interpretation of the Slovene majority's actions as constituting a purposeful 
attempt to completely remove any trace of Germans' exi tence from the region was one 
way through which some German minorities saw their world in this situation as part of a 
culture war. This war, in which no military weapons were fired or physical deaths were 
witnessed, was instead fought by two cultures and peoples whose spiritual wills battled 
against each other, through the use of political power, to gain the upper hand and 
dominate society in Lower Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola.57  
                                                          
56 Germans and Slovenes had had a contentious previous several decades, marked by rising ethnic tension 
and battles over the region’s public life in terms of culture, society, and politics. See Moll, Kein 
Burgfrieden, 46-80. Indeed, a large reason behind the Slovene gov rnment’s minority social policy was out 
of “fear of further indignities through the previous alleged ‘Herrschervolk’ (ruling class, i.e., Germans)” 
that had occurred during the First World War. Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 11. 
 
57 This “culture war” perspective was enhanced by the idea of fighting over “the soul of every individual”; 
that is, a Slovene could be “won over” to “become” German and vice-versa. Such a view was held not only 
by nationalist activists but by the political elites, who felt that there could be no reconciliation between the 
two ethnic groups. At the level of daily life, however, there was still space for coexistence and cooperation, 
at least until 1914. Janez Cvirn, “Deutsche und Slowenen in der Untersteiermark: Zwischen Kooperation 
und Konfrontation”, in Heppner, ed., Slowenen und Deutsche im gemeinsamen Raum, 111-112. In the 
nineteenth century, German nationalist activists and their allies in the German-language media “framed 
daily life in the region in terms of ongoing battles among nations. They attributed local incidents of 
violence to nationalist animosities and portrayed the local world in terms of nationalist conflict.” Pieter 
Judson, “Changing Meanings of ‘German’ in Habsburg Central Europe”, in Ingrao and Szabo, The 
Germans and the East, 109. 
25 
 
A culture war being fought between Germans and Slovenes was just one way the 
German minority understood its situation, however. The last section of the editorial in the 
Deutsche Wacht betrays the way in which this traditionally-nationalist German identity 
was actually in tension with and contested by other ypes of German nationalisms and 
identities. Not only did the German presence in Slovenia have a long history, since the 
school had been open for over 150 years, but it was a prestigious one, and this prestige 
had been brought and developed through Germans.  
The “Styrian lowlands”, inclusive of both Slovene- and German-speakers, 
however, had lost an important cultural site - not simply Slovenia's German community. 
A sense of pride among the Germans in cultural accomplishment can be seen in the 
Staatsgymnasium in Cilli/Celje. These German accomplishments reflect well upon the 
German community in Slovenia, but also upon the region as a whole. Some Germans in 
Slovenia thus felt that they had brought culture and prestige to the region, in a type of 
paternalistic way, but some as well felt that by utilizing these unique skills and 
institutions of the German minority, the minority community itself could positively 
contribute to Slovene and Yugoslav society. Such pride and participation would help 
every member of society, Slovene and German alike, but this participation was being 







The Deutsche Wacht turns into the Cillier Zeitung 
The pride felt by the Germans in Slovenia can be seen in the last edition of the 
Deutsche Wacht in late May, 1919, as it was ordered by the governmnt to change its 
name.58 Recognizing that the newspaper's name signified an “outward symbol” from “a 
different time”, the Deutsche Wacht gave service to the time when they “lay on the main 
artery of a great empire”, whose “thousand strings had not yet broken with our previous 
homeland (Stammland)” and when the paper was able to “accompany much progress and 
cultural achievements” with its voice. The paper looked back on a time when it “came 
forward step by step in industry and trade, that produced competent tradesmen in 
combination with a general rise of good and fair labor”; a time when one could tell others 
that they “live, in natural complement, in peace and friendship”; a time when one could 
“proudly declare” that schools “became better and better”, that after the “second largest 
city school and the new secondary school were finished”, Cilli/Celje became the 
renowned, premier city for schools in all Styria.59 
The past, present, and future are all included in the Deutsche Wacht's farewell. 
Recognizing the explicitly ethnocentric and German n tionalist overtones of the name 
Deutsche Wacht (German Watch), the paper accepts that the time when those themes 
were more important has long passed. A reminiscent look back on the time when 
Slovenia's Germandom enjoyed being part of a privileged caste and helped to socially, 
culturally, and economically cultivate a massive empire nonetheless gives way to an 
                                                          





acknowledgment that times had changed, and the “old” homeland of Austria had 
presently been replaced by the “new” one of Yugoslavia nd Slovenia.  
The Deutsche Wacht's fondness for the time when business was booming, schools 
were the envy of the region, and Slovenes and Germans lived in ethnic harmony 
represents simultaneously a memory, a critique of the present, and a hopeful optimism for 
a better tomorrow. A description of pre-1918 Slovenia as a time of “peace and 
friendship” indicates that not all Germans either in the past or present viewed Slovenia's 
society in terms of a cultural war or battle of nations. 
The final edition of the Deutsche Wacht displays the contrasting reactions and 
identities found among Slovenia's German minority community. The typical German 
nationalist can feel pride at having been an important cog in the wheel of a grand empire, 
while also being responsible for making the economy and society thrive through business 
acumen and superior cultural education. Other Germans c n reminisce of times past when 
ethnicity and language were not stressed so vehemently and residents of Styria were 
simply Styrians, not narrowly Slovenes or Germans. Still others, some who were strongly 
aware of their German identity and some who were less so, can be unhappy about the 
particular anti-German policies being implemented but still accept the political fact of the 
South Slav Kingdom and hope for an improvement in the future. Unable to appeal to 
simply one of these identities and nationalisms, the Deutsche Wacht attempts to please all 




The “Slovenization” of German Cultural Institutions   
As time went on, the social, political, and cultural situation of Slovenia's Germans 
did not much improve. “Slovenization” measures such as removing German civil 
servants, teachers, and bureaucrats resulted in themm diate economic impoverishment 
of 30,000 people, most of whom then left the country.60 Such a loss not only substantially 
reduced the sheer numbers of ethnic Germans in Slovenia, but also meant a massive 
reduction in linguistic, social, and cultural terms. Cultural associations became 
impossible to form without legal approval from Slovene government authorities, while 
gatherings in closed rooms were only allowed after an earlier request to the political 
authorities had been approved.61  
The Cillier Zeitung ran an ad in late May, 1919, for an “extraordinary” general 
assembly at the Deutsches Haus in Cilli/Celje.62 The Deutsches Haus had long been a 
symbolic and physical representation of the German culture, presence, and for Slovene 
nationalists, domination, in the city.63 The cultural association affiliated with the 
Deutsches Haus urgently reminded its readers in the advertisement that “attendance from 
30 members” was necessary to have a quorum, and if this requirement were not fulfilled, 
then a second meeting would take place half an hour later which would not be held to the 
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same 30-member standard for decisions made.64 The “extraordinary” urgency with which 
the Cillier Zeitung urged members of the Deutsches Haus to attend the meeting was due 
to the impending expropriation of this German cultural site by the Slovene government 
on grounds that it was no longer abiding by a law recently put in place that stated that 
cultural associations must have Slovene representatio  in them.65  
Unfortunately for the German-speaking supporters of the Deutsches Haus, their 
best legal efforts were not enough to overcome those of the Slovene majority. On 
September 20, the Verein Deutsches Haus in Cilli/Celje was dissolved by the regional 
government. “Rarely before”, lamented the Cillier Zeitung in response, “has a 
governmental measure induced such a deeply-felt enrag ment.”66 The Deutsches Haus, 
which evoked such strong reactions among certain segments of the Slovene majority for 
its perceived representation of German socio-cultural dominance, was, at least in the 
changed context of a Slovene-majority state, “not a political club, but rather a purely 
social one” for Cilli/Celje’s German population.67 From the point of view of the Germans 
who used the Deutsches Haus as a place of social gathering and relaxation among 
friends, the “slovenization” of the building was a “type of decree” that “must arouse the 
highest level of nervousness and bitterness.” Such actions by the “members of the 
                                                          
64 CZ, “Verein Deutsches Haus in Cilli”, May 31, 1919. 
 
 
65 The Deutsches Haus would have fallen under the ownership of the Austro-German nationalist 
organization Südmark had its legal process of being sold been successfully implemented. Arnold Suppan, 
“Zur Lage der Deutschen in Slowenien zwischen 1918 und 1938: Demographie, Recht, Gesellschaft, 
Politik”, in Rumpler and Suppan, eds., Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des Heutigen Slowenien, 185-
186. 
 







Ljubljana government…stand in glaring opposition to [the] freedom, justice, and equality 
of all nations”, and would therefore “destroy the barely-spun threads of understanding 
and reconciliation.”68  
Such actions against German cultural associations, notably with the Deutsches 
Haus in Cilli/Celje, were received with outrage by some G rmans in part due to their 
dubious legality in regards to the international trea ies that Yugoslavia had signed.69 
“According to Act 49 of the Peace Treaty”, intoned theCillier Zeitung, “the property of 
Austrian documents in former imperial lands cannot be part of sequestration or 
liquidation.”70 For the Germans of this perspective, these illegal xpropriations of 
German cultural property were the actions of a disor erly, unorganized, and even anti-
democratic state, without any clear mechanisms of hindering it, that threatened the socio-
cultural existence of Germans in Slovenia. Without being able to politically voice their 
opinions, these Germans instead sustained resentment and fear alike at what they viewed 
as an irrational, vengeful Slovene nationalist majority government. 
But the transformation of the Deutsches Haus into the Celjski Dom signified more 
than just an illegal act that went against international law and the spirit of liberal 
democratic freedoms. A strand of outraged German rection to the attacks on German 
cultural associations was tied up as well in the German affiliation for the Heimat that they 
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felt so strongly about. This regional identity, as opposed to a more Pan-Germanist one, 
had certain tensions and nuances that were brought t in the case of the Deutsches Haus.  
That the Deutsches Haus was, for some Germans, being unfairly characterized as 
a “meeting place for any person who had years ago thrown stones at Slovene guests”, was  
an “invention” and “distortion” of the true nature and history of the German presence in 
Cilli/Celje. The Deutsches Haus was a “domestic club…whose members are natives” of 
the South Slav kingdom.71 While indignantly refuting the claim that the Slovene lands 
had been and were now only for ethnic Slovenes, the Cilli r Zeitung also exposes that 
this belief was actually controversial in the German community. “Since 
the…motherland…has fallen, we have soberly learned to think and without contradiction 
fit ourselves into the new national order.” Despite having “declared that we want to be 
loyal citizens of the new state”, the German minority nonetheless felt that it had been 
“treated unworthy and illegal, unworthy of the culture of the ruling nations” of 
Yugoslavia.  
While appealing to the vanity of Slovene and Slavic nationalism with regards to 
their own cultures, the Cillier Zeitung then states that “so long as national chauvinism” 
reigns, then “the trust and love of the Germans [can]not grasp stronger roots to the new 
fatherland.” In the same breath, however, as deploring ethnocentric-inspired policy, the 
article admits that the Germans of Slovenia “do not want to go back to the old issues”, 





and therefore “think that it is better, in light of these recent events, to leave the past in 
peace.”72 
The multifaceted German reaction to the closing of the Deutsches Haus by the 
Slovene government betrays the different ways in which the various German identities 
and nationalisms conflicted with each other as the minority community attempted to 
maintain cultural unity while adjusting to its new socio-political reality of inclusion in the 
Yugoslav state. A Pan-German nationalist would have viewed the Slovene takeover of 
the Deutsches Haus as the illegal action of a tyrannical, culturally-inferior ethnic Slovene 
government bent on exacting retribution on the German community as part of a 
chauvinist desire to completely erase Slovenia’s Germandom. 
 Other Germans, less strongly-inclined to associate themselves with the notion of 
European-wide Germanic cultural superiority, saw the loss of the Deutsches Haus as an 
unfair and lamentable end to an important part of the region’s history, as German-
speakers and the German culture had contributed in large part to the culture of the area. 
For these Germans, the German language and identity was equally as important as the 
Slovene one, but not in such a paternalistic way tht t e more Pan-German nationalist 
perception was. The German regional identity was a type of German nationalism, unlike 
the fervently Pan-Germanic nationalism, that was proud of the cultural achievements of 
the past and sought to contribute to contemporary Slovenia in a way that respected its 
cultural contributions and unique characteristics. 




The closure of German-language schools and classes represented, from the 
German perspective, a dire and serious threat to the continued existence of the German 
culture in Slovenia.  
Despite such social policies overwhelmingly restricting and taking away certain 
former rights and privileges of the Germans, the German community reacted in multiple 
ways. One reaction to these policies is what can be considered German nationalist or Pan-
German,73 whereby the German-speaking population of Yugoslavia constituted an 
organic component of the greater German Volk and therefore should be politically as well 
as culturally included within German-Austria or the Weimar Republic while excluding 
itself from the ethnic South Slavic state of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 
For  Germans of this worldview, the German culture was “highly-developed”, the 
Germans themselves capable of “sustaining a state” whose “cooperation the state cannot 
permanently do without.”74 
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culminating in the Linz Programme in 1882. Pan-Germanism in Austria, argues Thorpe, was not so black 
and white as radicals like Schönerer wished. The traditional “camps” in Austria – Christian Socials and 
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before the Great War were “fuelled by local resentment towards Slovenian-speakers”, where local 
“German-language newspapers portrayed ethnic tensions in other parts of the empire as a threat to German-
speakers of Styria.” See Julie Thorpe, Pan-Germanism and the Austrofascist state, 1933-1938 (New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2011), 16-38.  
 




Slovenia’s Germans and the Yugoslav Constitution 
Another reaction, similar in some ways but crucially different in others, can be 
seen on the occasion of the crown prince Alexander I's visit in June of 1920 to Cilli/Celje. 
Calling him the “new Regent of our Heimat (homeland)”, the Cillier Zeitung declared 
that “almost everything” the city's “high guest” would look at on his visit “attests to the 
past, attests to centuries of labor and accomplishments of the Germans in the cities of this 
region.” The paper went on to describe how  
these undestroyed features of previous efforts and sorrows and of prior joy of 
developing [the] well-being of the local community, these [form] the background 
out of which we step...[Upon the prince's visit] everyone will turn their gaze on 
us...in order to see what we do and say...No accusation can make us guilty of 
being troublesome, and no argument can accuse us of being unwilling. [It] is 
unswervingly certain, however, that we want to remain German in our ways and 
our culture...As our cities stand on Yugoslav ground, so stand German people 
with their homes and with their labor as well on the same ground...There will also 
be there all those with their hearts, if justice retu ns to them: and we all expect 
justice from the new dynastic house.75 
 
What do Slovenia's Germans mean by “justice”? “The non-Slavic people of this 
kingdom”, states the Cillier Zeitung, “have been repeatedly promised justice by high and 
unaccountable positions”, by which they expected complete “protection for our ethnic 
(völkisch) life and for our labors.”76 
                                                          





In other words, Slovenia's ethnic German minorities wanted the local and federal 
government to fulfill the international minority treaties they had signed that should have 
been protecting the German language, German cultural associations, and continued usage 
in schools. Justice, for these minorities, was not the restoration to their previous positions 
of privilege and societal dominance. Rather, it meant equality with the Slovene majority 
in social, political, and cultural life. The component regions of Slovenia – Carinthia, 
Carniola, and Lower Styria – had been developed and progressed due to the efforts of 
Germans, who considered it their homeland as much as t e Slovene majority who had 
benefited from their labors did. Without justice - that is, without full, legal and cultural 
equality - then Slovenia's Germans could never fully integrate into the society of their 
new country. But they were ready and willing to do so, if only given those same rights 
they felt that they deserved but were being purposefully kept from them. 
Slovenia’s ethnic Germans’ desire for equality befor  the law was based not only 
in a reading of the international treaties that Yugoslavia had signed, but also in the very 
legislation and constitutions that the Yugoslav state itself wrote. When a rumor that the 
Slovene regional government was going to close German iddle schools as a reaction to 
the exclusion of Slovene students from Austrian Hochschulen in Graz and Vienna, the 
German community responded with the “greatest unease.”77 “We would have considered 
such a measure…impossible”, cried the D utsche Wacht with alarm. The paper argued 
that the authorities’ actions in Austria were against “Staatsfremde”, not German-Austrian 
citizens; the closing of German schools in Slovenia, however, would be against citizens 
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Such school closings “must be impossible”, wrote the 
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Deutsche Wacht, since the constitution of January 30 guaranteed all citizens of 
Yugoslavia equality before the law.78 The closing of these German middle schools would 
“threaten the existence of thousands of local Yugoslav citizens.”79 
 German dedication to the principles of the Yugoslav constitution held important 
ramifications in three ways. First, in claiming that the Slovene government was acting 
against the express rights enshrined in the constitution owed to them as Yugoslav 
citizens, the German minority was thus calling out the Slovene majority government as 
an illegal, unconstitutional, and therefore undemocrati  institution. Secondly, the inverse 
of the Slovene majority acting against the constitution was that the Germans were 
alleging that they themselves were model, law-abiding, and loyal Yugoslav citizens who 
deserved to be treated the same way that the Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes themselves did. 
But the Germans were unknowingly doing more than just j xtaposing their own 
perceived justified, law-abiding stance as opposed to the unfair, illegal Slovene one; by 
endorsing the German-Austrian view of that country’s ethnic Slovene minority as being 
Staatsfremden, Slovenia’s own ethnic German minority were displaying their own 
hypocrisy when it came to a situation in which it benefited them to be hypocritical. If 
Austria’s Slovenes were not true citizens by virtue of their Slavic ethnicity, then what 
would stop Yugoslavia’s Slovene population from making the same conclusion about 
their own German minority? 
                                                          
78 The Yugoslav constitution of January 30, 1919 was a temporary measure, based off of the 1903 Serbian 
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Such a reaction by the German community reflected th  uncertainty they faced in 
adapting to their new socio-political context as a national minority. In dismissing Slovene 
claims of citizenship in Austria while also endorsing their own claims in Yugoslavia, 
Slovenia’s Germans were trying to have it both ways. For the German nationalist in 
Slovenia who held a paternalistic and possibly racist opinion of Slovenes as being 
inferior to the German race, designating Austria’s Slovene minority as Staatsfremden was 
simply a matter of course, an obvious reality not wrth quibbling over. But there is 
another type of German nationalism at work in this situation, the type of nationalism that 
took pride in an age-old German myth of a “civilizing mission” in the East, where the 
German presence brings law, order, and cleanliness to a backwards and dirty place.80 The 
conservative nationalism on the one hand, and the mor  legalistic nationalism on the 
other, demonstrates a certain tension between two strands of German identity that were at 
odds in the minority’s transition from majority in Slovenia. 
The minority treaties signed but not enforced by Yugoslavia caused outrage 
among Germans, who viewed this is as the height of ypocrisy. “We are allowed to and 
want to finally appreciate what [freedom] can have in store for our lives…This past 
November the first government had spoke of equal rights and freedoms for all citizens 
and nations and then something entirely different came about”, raged the Cillier 
Zeitung.81 The strong German belief in the constitution meant tha  they viewed the 
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Slovene government’s non-enforcement of its legal obligations as cynical and self-
serving. In contrast with the South Slavic peoples of the country, Yugoslavia’s  
citizens of the German tongue, at least in Slovenia, are going without national  
freedom  and equality. Our communities and public corporation are partly broken 
up, partly restricted in their rights…[Our] commitment to the German nation is 
subject to government examination; mixed-language married couples must forgo 
the natural right to decide the nationality of their children…The equality of 
German citizens was repeatedly [and] celebratorily announced by the government 
but depends on bureaucrats…[There are] double standards…in approving middle 
schools and technical schools [and] for the construction of [German] school 
departments. 82 
Germans’ “natural rights” and alleged equality as Yugoslav citizens are, in this depiction, 
being dictated and perverted by a national government that is purposefully attempting to 
turn them into Slovenes. No longer can Germans decide for themselves or their children 
that they are German, but this power resides solely in the hands of the Slovene majority 
government. 
The view of the regional government in Ljubljana as being run by a minority of 
rabid Slovene nationalists was, for some Germans, evidence that the Slovene “national 
character” was so different from that of the Germanic o e that it was inevitable for the 
state to be an undemocratic, disorderly mess.83 The opinion that the Slavic national 
character meant that they could never hope to have an organized, well-run government or 
society only gained credence from the nature of Yugoslav politics, which were riven by 
ethnic conflicts between Serbs and Croats.84 On the same day that the Cillier Zeitung ran 
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a one-column article on the sinking of the German fleet,85 they also ran a total of five 
other articles of varying length on current domestic political events,86 which were quite 
hectic at the time.87 
 
German Desire for Inclusion in Yugoslav and Slovene Society 
Germans’ negative reactions to “slovenization” measure , such as schools closing, 
monolingual-Slovene tax forms,88 or the introduction of “Slavic” liturgy into church 
services,89 were grounded in part out of a fear of losing their Germanic identity. The 
closing of German-language schools and parallel courses meant that it was becoming 
harder, and might someday be impossible, for Germans to educate their children in their 
native language.90 If the German language were removed from schools, public 
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86 See CZ, “Ministerkrisis”, “Föderalismus”, “Das Ende er Koalitionsregierung”, “Nationalversammlung 
in Belgrad”, and “Ministerkrise in Belgrad”, all from July 5, 1919. 
 
87 The kingdom’s two largest ethnic nationalities, Serbs and Croats, had largely different ideas about the 
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administration, and even religion, how would they rtain their identity, let alone their 
nationality?91 Learning the Slovene language, now that the region was governed by a 
Slavic majority, could be seen as necessary and beneficial to inclusion in the state and 
society, but not at the expense of their own mother tongue. Equating German culture and 
identity with the German language highlights the essential primacy of language to 
nationality in Slovenia. While some German-speakers may have Slavic names or inter-
marry with ethnic Slovenes, if they spoke German, affiliated with German cultural 
organizations, and considered themselves Germans, then that is what made them, in their 
own eyes and in others’, German. In this way, the legis ated decline and removal of the 
German language from the Slovene public sphere was also a legislated decline and 
removal of the German culture, history, and spirit in Slovenia. In short, German-speakers 
in Slovenia interpreted social policies affecting their native language as an attack on their 
physical and cultural existence.  
While Germans held a sincere fear of losing their language, culture, and possibly 
even their very ethnic character, some of them nonethel ss came to gradually accept their 
political inclusion in Yugoslavia and wished to complement that fact by becoming 
socially included as well. The Deutsche Wacht reported that, in celebrating May Day in 
1919, Germans and Slovenes participated together “without signs of hostility”, a fact that 
was “glossed over” by the “radical” Slovene press.92 Such friendly relations between the 
two major ethnic groups in Slovenia represented an open rebuttal of the “ruthless 
nationalist policy” that had imposed “deprivation ad menace” upon the German 
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minority community.93 Clearly distinguished in this celebration of inter-ethnic peace and 
cooperation is the separation between the Slovene gov rnment and the Slovene people.  
The German and Slovene peoples came together to celebrate this holiday, displaying how 
a majority of the two groups can work in tandem to pr vide a peaceful, stable society 
without antagonizing each other.  In contrast, the “radical” Slovene press, in combination 
with the Slovene government which had produced “ruthless nationalist” policies, 
constituted a minority of ultra-chauvinist ethnic Slovenes who desired nothing more than 
to remove the German presence altogether from Slovenia.  
Desire for inclusion in Slovene and Yugoslav society came rather gradually, 
however. The Cillier Zeitung wished the king well on his birthday in 1919, declaring that 
“we Germans do not wish to stay resentful” on the sid lines of Yugoslav society, but that 
the “suffering of the recent period” had made them “fill up” with “anxiety over our 
future.”94 Such anxiety was due to being “eliminated” from a society in which Germans 
had previously “pursued their historical mission” ad “played the dominant role” with 
their numbers and culture. In the same breath as lamenting their fall from the heights of 
societal and cultural dominance, however, the paper pealed to the king’s “love of 
justice” for addressing the “suffering that [the Germans] sustained and continue to 
sustain”95 and noted that the birthday celebrations on buildings in Cilli/Celje were “rich” 
with the Yugoslav national colors.96  
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This appeal to King Peter I displays the contested and confused nature of German 
identity as the community adapted to its new life in Yugoslav Slovenia. Mentioning the 
“historical mission” of the Germans who had “played the dominant role” is at once 
lamenting those  days gone by where the German minority had enjoyed such an 
overwhelmingly privileged position vis à vis the Slovene majority, while at the same time 
expressing regret over their previous societal role that came at the expense of ethnic 
Slovenes.  Juxtaposing complaints of suffering with celebrating Yugoslavia shows how 
conflicted the German community was. On the one hand, the Germans’ anger and 
resentment is seen in how they perceive themselves to have been treated, while, on the 
other, a hand is extended in good faith to want to be included in the new Yugoslav 
society and enjoy and contribute to the benefits that would correspond to this inclusion. 
Both tendencies – anger and resentment on one side, with a desire for inclusion, 
contribution, and cooperation on the other – were well-represented among the German 
minority in Slovenia, and both strands struggled to overwhelm the other and become 
dominant. 
On September 10, 1919, the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was signed, which 
finalized the post-war borders of the Republic of German-Austria.97 The German reaction 
in Slovenia was decidedly mixed. Sadly acknowledging that “a time-honored, glorious 
past” had ended, the Cillier Zeitung remarked that a new “chapter in the checkered 
history of the city” had thus begun. In contrast to he Marburger Zeitung, which had 
refused to express an allegiance of loyalty to the Yugoslav state in reaction to the treaty, 
the Cillier Zeitung bluntly stated the options facing Slovenia’s Germans: They could 
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either refuse to recognize the Entente’s decision and fight it; return to a position of 
neutrality; or accept the decision and come to terms with reality.98 “Which way is the best 
[for the Germans]?” rhetorically asked the paper, bfore answering its own question: “We 
think the first option is wrong, as well as the second one. We think, in the interest of 
Germandom, that the last [option] is the only correct and possible one.”99 
For the Cillier Zeitung, the decision to fully accept the Entente’s decision and 
pledge loyalty to Yugoslavia was the only feasible way for the German minority in 
Slovenia to achieve its desire of full legal equality: 
Only when we consider ourselves full-fledged citizens, when we wholeheartedly 
accept the Entente’s decision, not with joy but honestly and loyally, then we will 
also be able to ask that we will be legally accorded and factually allocated all 
rights [owed] as German citizens.100 
Though the decision to fully accept the political reality of being a national minority in 
Yugoslavia was not the ideal situation for Slovenia’s Germans, it was, given their 
situation, the only feasible one.  If, the Cillier Zeitung reasoned, Yugoslavia’s German 
element refused to accept this political reality, they would be giving the kingdom’s 
majority a “terrible weapon” to use against the Germans, who were for many Yugoslavs 
“already a thorn in the eye.”101 
                                                          









 The Cillier Zeitung’s pledge of allegiance to the Yugoslav state sought not only to 
placate skeptical Slovene authorities,102 but also uncertain and agitated ethnic Germans. 
After clearly spelling out the negative consequences further resistance to the Yugoslav 
state would accrue, the paper goes on to reassure that part of its German readership that 
might have been exceptionally unwilling to heed its advice. “We Germans are an orderly 
element, whose calling was always to build up, not to destroy,” it stated, appealing to the 
more nationalist pride of the region’s German-speaking population. Trying to walk the 
line between drawing the ire of the Yugoslav authori ies and soothing its German 
readership, the Cillier Zeitung concluded: 
Granted, this is not a sky-high, jubilatory commitment to the state…No one can 
today demand or expect that from us…but it is honorable and without reserve. It 
is not dictated out of love, but developed out of plitical insight and 
rationality…Our state can earn easily and at one blow the trust, even the love of 
all its German citizens, if it does not thereupon lay out to de-nationalize us…We 
want to remain Germans and demand that the state resp cts this about our will.103 
Claiming to speak for the “overwhelming majority of the German population”, the Cillier 
Zeitung reflects the circumstances facing the Germans of Slovenia in the Fall of 1919. 
German-Austria and the German Republic had both been d feated in the Great War and 
signed peace treaties as the losing sides, unable to dictate their will. Despite their 
preference for becoming Austrian or German citizens, the German-speaking population 
of Slovenia had become Yugoslav ones.  The reassurance that the Germans would not 
                                                          
102 The editorial claimed that this statement of loyalty was the “will of the overwhelming majority of the 
German population.” Ibid. Despite this pledge by Slovenia’s Germans, the Slovene majority would not 
necessarily be willing to fully accept it at face value.  As explained to H. Percival Dodge, United States 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia: “While in America a Teuton or Magyar considers himself an American as soon 
as he becomes naturalized as such, in Jugoslavia [sic] and many of the newly constructed states, race is 
considered first and an often involuntarily acquired citizenship comes second, the Teuton considering 
himself a German or Austrian having little interest in his new citizenship, and often having little interest in 
the local official language.” Alfred R. Thomson to H. Percival Dodge, August 15, 1922. NARA, RG-59. 
  
103 CZ, “Das Bekenntnis zum Staate”, September 13, 1919. 
45 
 
have to be happy or excited about this fact demonstrates the strong desire to maintain, as 
well as an equally as strong fear of losing, their Ge man identity. The claim that the 
Germans calling had “always” been to “build up, notto destroy” was a way of showing to 
the Yugoslav authorities that Slovenia’s German minority was willing and able to 
contribute to the well-being of the new kingdom.  But it was also a subtle paean to the 
nationalist German attitude that saw its history in Slovenia as one of societal and cultural 
progress come about only through the work, attitude, and culture of Germans. 
The Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye held, for Slovenia’s German-speaking 
minority, several clauses and articles that would be legally-binding and thus help improve 
their socio-political situation. The part of Article 7 of the treaty that stated that all citizens 
were equal before the law, meant, the Cillier Zeitung stressed, that Germans were 
allowed to be politically active. German-speakers also took especial note of the treaty’s 
mention of the free use of language in public and private, as well as the right to “take care 
of” their German culture by assembling cultural associations.104 
Article 8 of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye declared that the minorities of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had the samerights as others; that is, the right to 
create their own humanitarian organizations, clubs, and facilities for the support of their 
fellow “ethnic comrades.” Finally, the Cillier Zeitung breathlessly reported, Article 8 
allowed the establishment and maintenance of minority p vate schools, with the purpose 
of “maintaining” their Volkstum “unhindered.”  A sticking point for some Germans was 
in the fine print of the treaty’s clauses on education – Article 8 said that the federal, 
regional, and municipal government must pay for German humanitarian clubs, facilities, 
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private schools, and other public organizations.105 The gap between what the treaty 
promised Slovenia’s German minority community and what was likely to be enforced 
was not lost on the Cillier Zeitung, which wryly noted that “it seemed before that the 
entire Slovene public lacked any notion of (its) inter ational commitments.”106 
 
German Identity in Transition from Multinational Em pire to South Slavic Kingdom 
German identity during the first several years after th  end of the First World War 
was heavily impacted by external events and social policies that were out of their control. 
The position of the Germans of Slovenia was “not easy”, being “huddled together” in a 
narrow area and, with German-Austria and the Weimar Republic concerned with their 
own internal affairs,107 utterly dependent upon their own power and resources.108  This 
notion of being left to fend for themselves, with neither Germany, nor Austria, nor the 
League of Nations willing to substantively help improve their political situation, served 
to further heighten a certain strand of nationalism a ong some ethnic Germans in 
Slovenia.  
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Despite being surrounded by a “loathsome and nasty” Slovene majority, whose 
“national exuberance” was merely a “maneuver” to punish the local German population, 
these Germans could yet feel pride; pride that “theGermans in the old Austria achieved 
cultural and economic value that reached all the people of the monarchy”, that “German 
culture” had turned the schools in the Slovene lands i to prestigious, sought-after 
institutions and made all of the region’s cities and villages “clean and modern.”109  
In this way, the social policies that impacted the German minorities were a way of 
singling them out for their unique contributions and cultural worth to the region; the 
Slovene nationalists who ran the government were mer ly jealous and vindictive. This 
reaction to these social policies – policies that res ricted the right to vote, to assemble, to 
use the German language in public – also helped to pick up German-speakers’ spirits as 
they contemplated their situation through nationalist-tinged lens. 
The transition from ethnic majority to ethnic minority had been difficult to endure 
and adjust to. The impact of social policies that steadily eroded German-speakers’ 
political rights, public presence, and language and culture, began to add up.  Initial 
reactions of some Germans to the new Yugoslavia of outrage and hostility in 1918 and 
1919 gave way to bitterness, resentment, and finally weariness for others by 1920.  “You 
must be blind, deaf, and without judgment”, raged the Marburger Zeitung, “if you do not 
want to admit that our public life and all that is a sociated with it, is suffering from a 
deep and dangerous sickness.”110 The effect of all these social policies on the German 
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minority meant that, by 1921, German-speakers in Slovenia had barely any political 
rights.111 
The Marburger Zeitung is, with this editorial, lashing out at its German-speaking 
readership and attempting to maintain the level of motion that had first arisen in the 
aftermath of the end of the Great War. The paper’s excoriation of its German-speaking 
readership suggests that a substantial amount of Germans had either become too weary of 
or were genuinely indifferent to the impact of the Slovene regional government’s social 
policies on their cultural presence. For the Marburger Zeitung, as well as those who 
agreed with its editorial stance, the “sickness” that was affecting German culture in 
Slovenia was the result of a concerted, purposeful ef ort.  But in lashing out at those 
German-speakers who did not view their situation in th s way, the paper also highlights 
the identity and cultural divisions among Slovenia’s German minority community – 
divisions between conservative nationalists, moderate n tionalists, and a type of “every-
day” German who merely wanted to live their life and was either not aware of or did not 
care enough about the politics of the time. 
In October of 1920, the League of Nations-mandated pl biscite was held in 
Carinthia to determine the official borders between Yugoslavia and Austria. The 
designated “Zone A” south of the Drava river resulted in a decision to remain part of 
Austria, with tens of thousands of self-identified Slovenes voting for the same choice as 
Germans.112 The reaction of the Cillier Zeitung is a window into the conflicted nature of 
German identity. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the paper’s initial response was one of 
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empathy: “The Slovenes”, somberly stated the Cillier Zeitung, “have lost a not-
insignificant amount of ethnic brothers” due to thepl biscite. “Through this,” the paper 
continued, “the fate of the Slovene nation has become more similar to that of the German 
Volk.” Slovenes were, according to this perspective, similar to those ethnic Germans who 
lived “under foreign dominance” and among “enemies of the Germans” – that is, in 
Alsace, Bohemia, Poland, and elsewhere – and had to “as citizens struggle for their most 
primitive rights.”113 The paper concluded its article by happily noting hat “some public 
opinions in Slovenia” had begun to voice the idea that he “local Germans should not be 
treated overly poorly.”114 
Multiple strands of German identity can be seen in the Cillier Zeitung’s reaction 
to the Carinthian plebiscite. Its empathetic respone to the plight of those ethnic Slovenes 
cut off from their homeland implies that some Germans, knowing what it was like to be 
geographically separated from those who were considered national comrades, understood 
the sorrow that other Slovenes felt at the result. It also indicates the extent to which some 
Germans’ identities were not completely tied up in their German-ness; those German-
speakers who perhaps were bilingual, had an ethnic-Slovene relative, or simply lacked 
the nationalist “awareness” that other German-speakers felt so strongly about. 
At the same time, the Cillier Zeitung’s mentioning of those other places in Europe 
outside of the Reich where ethnic Germans were located in large numbers served as a 
reminder to those in Slovenia that the German Volk had also been unfairly separated.  The 
difference between the Germans and Slovenes was, despite the paper’s initial claim of 
                                                          





similarity, that the Slovenes who had chosen to stay in Austria had been able to exercise 
their right for self-determination, while the Germans living outside of the Weimar 
Republic had not been given that opportunity. As such, those Germans still lived under 
“foreign dominance” by “enemies” of the German peopl  – and that included the ethnic 
Germans of Slovenia. Mentioning Bohemia, Alsace, and Poland was as much a reminder 
as it was a reprimand to those German-speakers in Slovenia that felt something other than 
nationalist joy at having “won” the plebiscite in favor of Germandom.  
The issue of neighboring Austria’s treatment of the ethnic Slovene minority 
residing there had an impact upon Slovenia’s treatmn  of its German minority.115 For 
Slovenia’s Germans, being unable to influence the policies that impacted their lives, 
Carinthia’s Slovene minority presented a situation where mutual, beneficial treatment for 
the minority groups on both sides of the border could be pursued.116 Lamenting that 
previous articles on the condition of Austria’s Slovene minority had been “at best 
unread” by the Slovene press, the Cillier Zeitung expressed a sense of injustice on the 
part of its German readership by noting how good their Slovene minority counterparts 
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had it: “In the bilingual part of [Austrian] Carinthia, there exist 85 bilingual schools in 
which the first grade is exclusively Slovene. The population is overwhelmingly in 
agreement with this system of bilingual schools because the knowledge of both regional 
languages is a necessity.”117 The paper went on to detail how the Austrian government 
had established “purely Slovene schools” in areas where solely Slovenes lived and that 
there were a further 42 Slovene advanced training school associations.118 
For some Germans, the difference in treatment between the two countries of their 
respective minorities was so obvious that it was almost a cruel joke that the Slovene press 
could claim otherwise. The “Carinthian Slovenes have full rights” as proscribed them by 
the minorities treaties, incredulously pointed out the Cillier Zeitung, before claiming that 
the “Germans in Yugoslavia would be completely happy to have the same!”119 From this 
perspective, that the German-speaking majority in Austria treated its Slovene-speaking 
minority according to the international treaties it had signed – opening Slovene-language 
schools and allowing Slovene cultural associations – was not simply a reflection of the 
lack of similar pro-minority policies coming out ofSlovenia, but was also a testament to 
the national character of Germans; where Germans had political power, rights were 
upheld, democracy flourished, and order reigned. For Slovenia’s German-speakers who 
ascribed to this view, Austria’s treatment of its Slovene minority had only to be 
compared with what they had experienced under Slovene-majority rule to be confirmed. 
                                                          







Slovenia’s Germans continued to seek the fulfillment of the promise of equality 
before the law, though they did not have the political power to achieve this without 
reliance upon either the federal Yugoslav authorities or outside entities such as the 
League of Nations. King Alexander had declared that all citizens, regardless of ethnicity 
or religion, to have “guaranteed, equal rights for ever” – a statement that the Germans of 
Slovenia accepted with “trust and confidence.”120 German-speakers tried to bring the 
king’s attention to their situation by appealing to his sense of non-sectarian Yugoslav 
unity.  “The unfair treatment that German citizens in the S-H-S Kingdom receive…must 
be astonishing to anyone who looks with clear eyes”, opined the Cillier Zeitung. “We 
German citizens in this area have the same duties and hould enjoy the same rights” as 
everyone else. Slovenia’s Germans “pay our taxes and fulfill our military duties at least 
as well as our Slavic neighbors”, but nonetheless flt aggrieved when it came to school 
education policy, cultural associations, press freedom, and state hiring. 
 The Cillier Zeitung’s previous “cordial reception of the heir to the trone” should 
not, however, have been taken as a “sign that we hav accepted our current situation”, as 
the “leading Slovene press seems to have taken” it. “We participated so fully with the 
heir’s visit,” explained the paper, “because our ruler and his German subjects…set 
complete trust in the capability and reliability of the German citizens in this kingdom.”121 
Germans wanted to be treated the same as their South lavic co-citizens, and they wanted 
to utilize their unique skills to help contribute to their new society. By speaking directly 
to the king, and making frequent deferential references to themselves as citizens and 
                                                          





subjects, the German-speaking community was attempting to show their desire for 
inclusion in Yugoslavia, while at the same time making it clear that they still considered 
themselves to be separate, with some even feeling superior. That the Cillier Zeitung 
would address the king directly and not the local regional government displays the 
desperation and frank concern that the German minority in Slovenia felt at the perceived 
erosion of their culture. 
 
The Legacy of the Habsburg Empire in the New Slovenia 
German identity was, however, as well largely shaped by the nature of the history 
of society and culture in the Slovene lands. A Cillier Zeitung article from February 1, 
1920, bristled at the accusation that ethnic Slovenes who intermarried with Germans, or 
who had a Slavic name and spoke predominantly German, were “apostates.”122 “We 
consider it to be the most original right for mixed-language parents to decide for 
themselves the nationality of their children…(and) in the Slovenian language area, 
mixed-marriages have taken place for ages!.”123 
The paper explained, “It will not cross any German’s mind to designate a Slovene 
who carries a German name an ‘apostate’, as long as he represents the Slovenian culture.” 
Under the Habsburg monarchy, “assimilation was not rare”, but the “worst elements were 
not it who attached themselves to the German cultural sphere in order to partake in the 
goods of the German culture.” From a certain German nationalist perspective, when a 
                                                          





Slovene joined the German cultural sphere, this did not make them an “apostate” from 
the Slovene cultural sphere, but rather was merely th  completion of ascension to a 
“higher culture.”124 “We are convinced,” concluded the Cillier Zeitung, “that there are 
many understanding and quiet-thinking men under the Slovenes who advocate that the 
German culture here, as an earlier example and model, should not be chased away but on 
the contrary, maintained and promoted.”125 
Slovene claims of apostasy on those who “joined” the Germans and the 
subsequent response of the Germans show much about German identity, society, and 
culture in Slovenia. Historically, marriages between Germans and Slovenes occurred with 
enough frequency for nationalists among both ethnicities to try to exploit these events 
and “win” the war of cultures.  For many Germans in Slovenia, intermarriage was simply 
a matter of spending the rest of their life with the person they loved.  But for some 
nationalists, this was an occasion to “increase” th number of Germans in Slovenia while 
“decreasing” the number of Slovenes, who in any case should be happy about this loss 
since Slovenes who “joined” the German culture were advancing their own. While this 
historical trend continued in post-Versailles Slovenia, the Slovene majority who ran the 
government were no longer inclined to accept the int rpretation that their culture was 
inferior to the Germans’.  
Despite the nationalist overtones of the Cillier Zeitung’s editorial, there existed 
multiple German identities in Slovenia in the first several years after the end of the Great 
War. Most Germans and Slovenes in mixed-language marriages did not view themselves 






as part of the culture war being waged between the two ethnic groups, but the fact that 
others did interpret their society in this way meant that they were stuck between a rock 
and a hard place. What did it mean for mixed-marriages when Slovenes called you an 
apostate and Germans declared the victory of a higher culture? With whom did they 
identify? What was their identity? Some considered themselves Carinthians (or Styrians, 
or Carniolans) who happened to speak German or Slovene. Others could not be moved to 
care about the nationalist narratives that other Slovenes or Germans were pushing on 
them. 
The historical interaction between Germans and Slovenes in the old Austria-
Hungary made it difficult for some Slovenes and Germans to come together in the new 
Yugoslavia. The Slovene-language newspaper Jugoslavija wrote about how “the war is 
over…and Austria is fallen (but) the Austrian aristocracy remains; there are so many 
nobles that they are taking Slovene women.”126 For German nationalists in Slovenia, this 
kind of article in a Slavic paper only served to heig ten their sense that the Slovene 
government’s minority policies were designed with vengeance in mind.  
Part of this history had been a strong affiliation with the Austrian Empire’s 
Germanic character, and the contemporary Republic of Austria held much sway for some 
Germans in Slovenia. The Marburger Zeitung, for example, in one early 1920 edition 
dedicated three articles on the same page to storie concerning Austria, more than any 
other single subject.127Some Germans lamented the times when the “white-blured [of 
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Carniola] and black-red-gold [of the Austrian Empire] were symbols of greater national 
festivities and were harmless differences in opinion.”128  
Germans resented what they viewed as the hypocritical stance taken by the 
Slovene government toward their minority’s opinions of Austria and Yugoslavia. “We 
can demand of the Germans,” sarcastically intoned th  Cillier Zeitung after some German 
houses were criticized for not displaying the Yugoslav flag on a national holiday, “that 
they become peaceful citizens in our state[;] we may not force them, however, to be 
enthusiastic about it and to manifest for it.” 129 On May 27, 1921, a new German-South 
Slavic association met in Prague.  The Cillier Zeitung noted that the “Slovenes have 
naturally come into closer contact with the German culture through their earlier 
belonging to the Habsburg Empire…The Slovenes, who have lived an entire millennium 
in the German cultural sphere, have grown most tighly with it together.”130 
Not all Germans saw their historical role from the perspective of a Pan-German or 
nationalist viewpoint, however. Rejecting the Pan-German idea of a culture war between 
Slavs and Germans, many German-speakers in Slovenia sympathized with those Slavic 
groups who were also minorities in countries outside of their ancestral homeland.131 The 
“hate” that some Slovenes had for Germans was, for some, nothing more than a “pure 
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fantasy”, egged on by the “German-hating French” and  “European worldview of 
nationalism” that produced “fear of other nations.”132   
 
German Political and Cultural Developments 
An electoral law enacted just a few months before the first Yugoslav federal 
election in 1920 took away voting rights for any citizen that had declared for a foreign 
country at the Paris peace treaties, a stipulation that disproportionately affected Slovenia's 
German population.133 The stripping of Germans’ voting rights led the Cillier Zeitung to 
wonder if it “had occurred to anyone in the old Austria” to take the right to vote away 
from “citizens of a different nationality or even aentire nation?” With bitter irony, the 
paper commented that it had “recently been denied us to constitute ourselves as a nation”, 
but that “it appears that we are considered a natio, s  long as our exclusion from the 
right to vote comes into question.”134 
Partly in order to redress the political weakness of the German minority in 
Yugoslavia, a new German cultural association called th  Schwäbisch-Deutscher 
Kulturbund (Swabian-German Cultural Alliance, SDKB) formed with the goal of uniting 
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1918 und 1938”, 184. 
 
134 CZ, “Unser Wahlrecht”, March 25, 1920. The German mi ority in Yugoslavia was not accorded group 
rights, only individual rights. As such, minority rights were formulated in the framework of obligations of 




all German-speaking citizens of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.135 The 
German reaction to this in Slovenia was extremely positive. The formation of the SDKB, 
which “should guarantee protection and shelter for all Germans in Yugoslavia,” gave the 
Germans of Slovenia a “gleam of light in the dark of our grief” that “warmed and 
animated” their hopes.136 The Kulturbund was, for Slovenia’s German minority 
community, the “first visible sign that we Germans i  Slovenia also have citizenship”, as 
well as giving them the power to “develop our national characteristics and culture 
without being hindered from above or below.”137 
The formation of the Kulturbund was a symbol of a unified German identity in 
Yugoslavia, which had heretofore not existed. It represented a newfound socio-political 
power for Slovenia’s German minority, who were hopeful that it could help stem the tide 
of perceived erosion of German culture through actions from the Slovene national 
government that, for example, eliminated all municipal advisory boards in Cilli/Celje 
except for culture and education, thereby taking sole c ntrol over education from the 
city’s magistrate.138  
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But the Kulturbund’s power to influence social policy was decidedly limited.139 
Slovenia’s Germans, who constituted a “considerable percentage” of the region’s cities, 
felt that those same cities projected a decidedly monolingual image, and were forced to 
watch as German-language signs were removed by officials from the street and private 
businesses and replaced with monolingual Slovene ones. I  practice, this meant that 
German cultural associations and other social clubs could not post information about their 
organizations in public in the primary language of the club itself. The public removal of 
the German language gave rise to a fear that German literature would join the German 
culture in being “eradicated” from Slovenia.140 
 
German Views of Slovenia and Yugoslavia 
German identity was also shaped by views of Slovenia a d Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia’s failure to “completely approve” of the Treaty of St. Germain was compared 
with the example of Czechoslovakia, who, in the eyes of some Slovene German-speakers, 
treated their German minority better: “There are no restrictions allowed against the free 
use of a preferred language on the side of any Czechoslovak minority, be it in private 
aspects, be it in the religious sphere, the press, publications of any kind, or in public 
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gatherings.”141 That Czechoslovakia’s German-speaking minority had t eir own 
complaints about the state of minority policy in that country142 does not diminish the 
substance of Slovenia’s Germans’ comparison; the perce tion of their own state of affairs 
in Slovenia as being worse than that of the Bohemian Germans highlights rather just how 
poorly Slovenia’s Germans thought they were being treated. 
Due to the overwhelming reliance that the German miority had upon the 
enforcement of the obligations of the international minority treaties that should have 
protected their rights, Slovenia’s failure to live up to these expectations influenced as 
well how Germans viewed their new country. In April of 1921, the regional parliament in 
Austrian Styria called upon Yugoslavia to “protect the Germans” of that country. Lest the 
Slovene government object in response to the Austrians’ treatment of their own Slovene 
minority, the Cillier Zeitung issued a pre-emptive declaration: “We Germans in Slovenia 
have a vested interest in getting the protection of ational minorities finally officially 
recognized by the state…We will certainly never hesitate to call for Slovenes in Austria 
to have the right to vote in Austria as long as thiright is also not the case in our state.”143 
Going further on that point, however, the paper went on to say that 
It is self-evident that the inadequacies in the enforcement of the internationally-
guaranteed minority protection cannot be of long duration. Since the principles of 
equality of all citizens without difference of lineage and of the self-determination 
of every individual pertaining to his own nationality and that of his children must 
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and will, over the course of time, in all democratic countries, and Yugoslavia as 
well as German-Austria will want to be recognized as such, achieve this 
breakthrough.144  
In attempting to be equally condemning of both German-Austria and Yugoslavia for not 
fulfilling their legal obligations inscribed in the international minorities treaties, the 
Cillier Zeitung nonetheless goes a step further in both emphasizing the Slovene failure to 
fulfill their obligations more so than the Austrian, as well as subtly opining that 
Yugoslavia is not and would never be a truly democrati  state until it completely fulfilled 
its legal obligations of guaranteeing full equality for its German-speaking minority. 
 
1921 – A New Census and a New Constitution 
The census of 1921 was of exceptional importance to the Germans of Slovenia, 
and in fact further enhanced the view of Yugoslavia as undemocratic. Since a precedent 
had been set under the Habsburgs in conducting census s that some had perceived to give 
disproportionate favor to the Austrian Empire’s German-speakers,145 Slovenia’s 
Germans, now themselves a national minority, expected the census in the new 
Yugoslavia to be implemented in such a way as to diminish their own numbers.146 This 
expectation was partially reinforced when, in February 1921, the “radical Jugoslavija” 
reported that “the German census agents had (used) th  well-known Austrian methods to 
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the Slavs’ detriment and the Germans’ advantage” in the Gottschee/Kočevje district. In 
response, local officials intervened and reappointed Slovene commissars. The Jugoslavija 
concluded that it was “sad, that even some Slovenes are o little self-conscious” that they 
“rashly accommodate any pressure and register themselves as German.”147 
German complaints about the methods the census used wer  based on the major 
difference from the way in which censuses were conducted in Austria-Hungary; namely, 
that the Yugoslav census’ designation of “mother tongue” rather than “language of daily 
use” unfairly diminished the number of Germans while disproportionately inflating that 
of the Slovenes. Stating that “10 years ago, Germans were majorities in cities” and that 
this German urban majority seemed “unshakeable”, th Cillier Zeitung incredulously 
wondered how it was that, in that same time period, Marburg/Maribor could have gone 
from 22,000 Germans and 4,000 Slovenes in 1910 to 21,000 Slovenes and 6,500 
Germans in 1921. The paper went on to accuse the Slov ne and Yugoslav governments 
of replacing the “German census commissions” when “the numbers (didn’t) go their 
way.”  The paper reasoned that the logical explanatio  for the vastly lower number of 
Germans in Slovenia was due to “government interfernce and revision.”148 
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While the use of “mother tongue” instead of “languae of daily use” in the 
Yugoslav census undoubtedly had an impact upon the statistical population of Germans 
in Slovenia,149 in all likelihood the largest single reason for the significant drop in the 
amount of Germans in Slovenia in 1921 from 1910 was due to the previous years’ mass 
removal of German-speakers from public and administrat ve positions.150 Regardless of 
the reasons, however, for why Slovenia’s German population so drastically fell from its 
prewar numbers, the perception among some members of the German community was 
that this was overwhelmingly the result of a purposeful attempt by an undemocratic state 
to erase its German presence.151 Such a perception at a time when the new South Slav 
kingdom was just beginning its newly-established life meant that the important project of 
minority inclusion into society continued to struggle. 
Despite the presence of international minority treaties meant to protect the 
cultural and linguistic existence of ethnic minorities, the 1921 Yugoslav constitution had 
a noticeable lack of explicit guarantees for minority protection.152 The 1921 constitution 
was partly well-received by Slovenia’s German community, who viewed it as an 
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“historic” occasion to be celebrated with their “Slavic cohabitants.” But the lack of 
explicit minority protection guarantees worried them, as well as the fact that the 
constitution had not received the assent of a majority f representatives in parliament and 
that it had been “almost exclusively written by Serb-language representatives.”  The 
“German element in Yugoslavia…through the taking away of voting rights, was not in a 
position to work together on the constitution.”153  
Some Germans in Slovenia felt that, despite the constitution’s flaws, there were 
opportunities to contribute in a unique way. Once their “existence of Germandom” in 
Yugoslavia was secured, Slovenia’s Germans would then be able to act as “agents in the 
service of our new Fatherland” to forge “relationship  with the ethnic Germans outside 
the state” that would benefit both sides.154 In this way, a new type of German identity 
began to take shape in Yugoslavia. This German identity had one foot firmly placed in 
the ancestral homeland of Germany and Austria, withthe other in the new home in 
Yugoslavia and Slovenia. By embracing both German and Slavic Europe, Slovenia’s 
Germans were creating a new type of citizen and natio list, one who was both law-
abiding and respectful of Yugoslavia while also being proud of the accomplishments of 
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Formation of the Partei der Deutschen and the Election of 1923 
In early 1922, so that they would not have to simply accept the adverse changes 
affecting them that had been implemented over the course of 1921, the Partei der 
Deutschen im Königreich der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen was founded. The Partei 
der Deutschen (PDD) was intended to give political voice to Yugoslavia’s Germans in 
ways that the SDKB could not, without differentiating between religion, class, or 
province.155 The aspect of religion was an important one, as many Germans in Slovenia, 
who were predominantly Catholic, viewed the leadership of the SDKB with suspicion, as 
they were perceived to be largely Protestant.156 The PDD would also help to give a more 
realistic weight to the kingdom’s German-speaking population, whose “economic and 
cultural significance” went “well beyond” their headcount.157 
The Slovene press reacted with “unfriendliness” and “suspicion” to the founding 
of the PDD.158 To push back against this negative reaction, the Cillier Zeitung explained 
what the founding of the party could mean for Germans nd Yugoslavia: 
[The existence of the PDD] could appear sobering for the strife among the 
founding nations, what predestined our cultural and economic strength…The 
party could open the eyes of the founders [of Yugoslavia] and make them aware 
of the real, that is, the (country’s) social needs…But that is just one side of our 
duty…We are also clearly bound to play a facilitator role in the spiritual, cultural, 
and economic (spheres) between our country and the hig ly-cultivated German 
states.159 
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The Partei der Deutschen, then, was to act as an intermediary agent to bring about 
resolution between both the kingdom’s own conflicted factions and its German-speaking 
neighbors. As such, the PDD reflects the strand of German nationalism and identity that 
developed in response to the adaption to the Yugoslav state. 
Despite the PDD’s purpose of uniting Yugoslavia’s German-speaking community 
behind a common political party, its founding also laid bare the differences in identity 
between Germans in Slovenia and those in the rest of the kingdom. The Cillier Zeitung, 
in a reply to alleged Slovene critics who said thate region’s Germans should not join 
the new party because its interests and culture werdifferent from those in the Banát and 
Bačka, stated that “coming together to solve economic problems helps everyone.”160  The 
PDD’s emphasis on not differentiating based on class shows that, for many Germans in 
Slovenia, their identification with the upper class nd wealthier lifestyles contrasted 
sharply with the more rural and agricultural identity of the rest of the kingdom’s German-
speakers. 
The motto of the PDD was “Staatstreu und Volkstreu” (loyal to state and Volk), 
representing two different forms of German identity and nationalism in interwar 
Slovenia.161 The Volkstreu served to placate those German nationalists who considered 
themselves spiritually part of the living body of the German Volk, while the Staatstreu 
reassured those Germans who did not feel such ill-will towards Slovenia and wanted to 
contribute to their new state and get on with their life. At the same time, the motto 
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reflects the newer, unique, more ambitious German ide t ty being fashioned of 
intermediary agent in the country.  
The political program of the PDD called for the “enforcement of the 
constitutionally-guaranteed basic rights”, including the “freedom of conscience, freedom 
of the press, freedom to assemble and form associations, academic freedom”, as well as a 
“correct and uninfluenced census.”162 As well, the PDD sought the “guaranteed right to 
politically organize” itself for the fulfillment of the Germans’ “special cultural, national, 
and economic duties as an institutional Vo kstum.” Such a right would guarantee that 
“every citizen” would have the freedom to “determine for himself his own ethnic 
affiliation.”163 The desire to declare for oneself one’s ethnic affiliation was a response to 
the so-called “name analysis”, which was an education policy in Slovenia that put 
students into Slovene-speaking schools if they had a Slovene name, regardless of whether 
they actually spoke Slovene or considered themselve ethnically Slovene.164 
The federal election of 1923 was the first time in Yugoslavia that Slovenia’s 
Germans were allowed to vote. As such, their exhilarated reaction shows how much it 
meant to them to have this fundamental right. The past four years had seen the Germans, 
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“apparently with success”, viewed as “irredentists” in Belgrade. “Our declarations of 
loyalty were described with derision as empty words, as lies.” Despite their relief over 
being allowed to exercise their democratic voting rights, Slovenia’s Germans nonetheless 
recognized that their impact on the country’s politics would be small.165 
The Germans of Slovenia, in response to the election, elected to form their own 
regional party called the Deutsch-Wirtschaftliche Partei (German-Economic Party). The 
new party, unique to Slovenia, would have more specifically local political aims. “We 
believe that every man is completely aware of the importance of this decision for his 
personal future, for the present and future of his c ld and his family, [and] for the present 
and future of all Germandom in this country.” Similar to the larger Partei der Deutschen, 
the Deutsch-Wirtschaftliche Partei sought to contribute to the “great works of 
development of our common South Slavic fatherland.” To avoid any ambiguity, the new 
party declared itself in no uncertain terms to be “loyal citizens.”166 The Cillier Zeitung 
ran large-font ads, urging their readers to vote for the party,167 thereby reinforcing the 
notion that the Deutsch-Wirtschaftliche Partei represented the political interests of the 
entirety of Slovenia’s German-speaking community just as the Cillier Zeitung 
represented  the social and cultural expression of the entire minority group. 
The election on March 18, 1923 resulted in gains for the (Serbian) Radicals and 
Croatian Republican Peasant Party, at the expense of th Yugoslav Democrats.168 The 
                                                          
165 CZ, “Zum Wahlkampf”, February 1, 1923. 
 
166 CZ, “Eigene Wahlwerber”, February 22, 1923. 
 
167 CZ, “Werfet Eure Kügeln in die 6. Kiste!”, March 8, 1923. 
 
168 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 135. 
69 
 
Partei der Deutschen elected 8 members, with over 40,000 votes. The German 
community in Slovenia “achieved what we wanted to achieve: 6,000 men with voting 
power have proven to the world that the much-maligned…Germandom in beautiful Styria 
does, in fact, exist.” 169 While the Cillier Zeitung was jubilant about the 6,000 “men who 
did their duty” in the city, it had harsh words forthose who “were too comfortable, who 
could not think through the importance of the matter” and did not vote or voted for 
another party: “We are confident that, at the next election, every man will fulfill his 
duty.”170  
In this way, the Cillier Zeitung represents one way in which German identity was 
tied to politics – good, patriotic Germans had the duty to vote for a German party that 
would serve to protect Slovenia’s German culture. But the obverse of this coin is that 
there were Germans who did not tie their German idet ty to the Deutsch-Wirtschaftliche 
Partei or the Partei der Deutschen; despite protestations to the contrary, some German-
speakers who did not identify with the conservative nationalist worldview were 
unconvinced that voting for a Slavic party would harm Slovenia’s Germans.   
The German community established the Politisch-Wirtschaftlichen Verein der 
Deutschen Sloweniens (Political-Economic Association of Germans in Slovenia) in the 
fall of 1923.171 The purpose of the new political association was the “elucidation of the 
Germans of Slovenia in political, national, and economic affairs and ensuring their ethnic 
and economic rights according to the principle ‘Staatstreu and Volkstreu.” It was 
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expected that, with the formation of this new organiz tion, that every German in Slovenia 
would fulfill their “duty” and become a member of the Politisch-Wirtschaftliche Verein 
der Deutschen Sloweniens. To reassure those who might have anticipated political 
reprisals for joining, the leadership claimed that “no one has anything to fear, since our 
slogan is ‘Volkstreu but also Staatstreu’.” 172 By taking the motto “Volkstreu and 
Staatstreu”, the Politisch-Wirtschaftliche Verein was attempting to unite the disparate 
strands of German identity and nationalism in Slovenia in order to form a stronger 
political front for advocating on behalf of the German community’s minority rights.173 
 
Developments in Schools and the Deutsches Haus 
On April 17, 1924, the SDKB was dissolved on recommendation by the 
Education Minister due to allegedly “overstepping the statutorily-defined” solely 
“cultural activity” prerequisite and for espousing political views. The dissolution caused 
“deep outrage” among the German community in Slovenia. “One is generally of the 
opinion that the government wanted to, in this brutal way, get back at the German 
delegates but at the same time keep the opportunity open to secure the support of the 
German delegates” by reinstating the club.174 Such political machinations and, from their 
perspective, blatantly illegal maneuvers enhanced th  view prevalent in some quarters of 
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Slovenia’s German minority of the undemocratic and erratic nature of the Yugoslav 
government. 
A proposed change in education policy brought up in the spring of 1924 caused a 
certain reaction among the German community in Slovenia,175 whose educational 
situation remained different from those of other Geman-speakers in the kingdom.176 The 
new law would end the teaching of the German language in elementary schools in 
Slovenia, and only be reinstated in “exceptional” cses where parents specifically 
requested it. For German parents, relying upon the “good mood” of the Education 
Minister for something that was guaranteed by the constitution was ominous, indeed.177 
German concerns about schools in Slovenia had, by the end of 1924, not relented. 
While German students and families had to endure their schools closing and loss of 
language, “Slovene families (did) not see fit to have their children stop learning German. 
Slovene fathers send their children to foreign German schools, while considering 
German-language songs ‘provocation’.”178 For some German parents who had gone out 
of their way to show the Slovene government that “all our children will speak both 
languages”, the decree by the Education Minister was unfair but “unsurprising” given the 
past several years’ events. “The Slovene leaders have told the Serbs so many bad things 
about the evil Germans that the minister perhaps believes to have [done] a special favor 
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with the abrogation of the frowned-upon German language.”179  The Germans of 
Slovenia were simply not politically powerful enough to influence their region’s 
education policy, and none of their actions were enough to change the minds of the, from 
their perspective, Slovene nationalists in the governm nt. 
The ongoing issue of the Deutsches Haus in Cilli/Celje caused some Germans’ 
views of the Slovene government as radical and anti-democratic to become entrenched. 
The “blind hatred of the opposing press and other public statements” concerning the 
Deutsches Haus infuriated some Germans, who resented claims that the Deutsches Haus 
was a “political business of German" nationalist activity. For these Germans, the 
expropriation of the Deutsches Haus was equivalent to a “legal title of theft and rape.”180  
For the Germans of Cilli/Celje, the Deutsches Haus represented more than just a 
gathering place for cultural activities, but was alo “German cultural property” which 
could not be “(made) Slovenian” by a simple change of ownership.181 This view of the 
Deutsches Haus was incompatible, however, with the legal argument for German 
ownership of the property, as the Cillier Zeitung argued that “since the existence of the 
house, only the [city’s] men’s choir” used it as its office headquarters, and could in no 
way be considered a paramilitary organization (Kampfverein).182 While the Deutsches 
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Haus may have, to the outsider, been merely a communal point for social gatherings, the 
corporation behind its funding was the German natiol st organization, the Südmark.183 
The issue of the Deutsches Haus and the dissolution of the SDKB were just one 
aspect of a perceived assault on German culture in 1924, which also suffered political 
setbacks in the Cilli/Celje municipal elections in the fall. Before the election, the Slovene 
newspaper Nova Doba expressed disbelief that the Germans would consider joining their 
local party with a Slovene one to form a coalition n the upcoming municipal election. 
The Germans, explained the Cillier Zeitung, “associate themselves as Germans because 
they are everywhere antagonized and discriminated against as Germans.”184  
The Cillier Zeitung’s adamant refutation of the idea that Germans could not vote 
for a Slavic party stands in clear contrast to their stance during the 1923 federal election, 
when they stated that Slavic parties could never truly represent German interests.185 Such 
an about-face shows how flexible German identity could be – able to change depending 
on the circumstances, on when and how it could be useful. For Cilli/Celje’s German-
speaking population, the municipal elections represented an opportunity to join with the 
                                                          
183 Suppan, “Zur Lage der Deutschen in Slowenien zwischen 1918 und 1938”, 185-187. The Südmark’s 
original purpose, when it formed in the late nineteenth century, was to “buy up local property and to settle 
colonists who spoke one language in regions inhabited by speakers of another language”; the end result was 
supposed to have “claimed” or “taken over” an ethnically- and linguistically-mixed region for the German 
nation. Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 17. Such “protection” of an “imagined borderland” for the nation 
was the purpose of these so-called Schutzvereine. For more, see Pieter Judson, “Die Schutzvereine und das 
Grenzland: Strategien zur Verwirklung von imagined borderlands”, in Haslinger, ed., Schutzvereine in 
Ostmitteleuropa, 7-19. For more on the role of the Südmark, see Laurent Dedryvère, “Regionale und 
nationale Identität in deutschen Schutzvereinen Österreichs im Spiegel ihrer kulturellen Betätigungen vo  
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Südmark”, in Ibid., 42-52. 
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“Slovene parties, whose representatives are loyal (like) us”, a “new beginning of real 
cooperation.”186 
The municipal election ended in a victory for the opp sition parties,187 but 
Germans were still proud of being able exercise their right to vote, and to prove to the 
rest of Slovenia that they were more than the accusations that had been hurled at them.188 
But the election was also a microcosm of the political and social struggles that Slovenia’s 
Germans had endured since the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes. “To speak of a ‘free’ election in a free state of law would be absurd”, declared 
the Cillier Zeitung. Individual Germans and German-owned businesses had been 
“threatened with boycotts and immediate firings”, as well as “oral threats to destroy 
German property” if they voted the wrong way. For those Germans threatened in this 
way, the official election result could be “attributed only to the terror” that had reigned in 
the days and weeks leading up to the voters going t the polls.189 Even after the years-
long struggle to regain the right to vote, some German-speakers in Slovenia felt 
themselves, their culture, and their language under attack from a radical, anti-democratic, 
and perhaps even militant regime. 
Germans felt pride in the accomplishments they had m naged over the decades in 
Slovenia, and some of them believed these accomplishments were due to their inherent 
Germanic nature. Such a view would make it difficult to fully accept the new political 
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187 There were 600 votes for the National Block, and 485 for the coalition of German and Slavic parties. 







reality of being an ethnic minority in a state governed by those who until very recently 
had always been on the lower rungs of society and culture. Others, however, while still 
being proud of their German identity and dearly wishing to maintain that identity, 
reluctantly but purposefully accepted this new state of affairs and sought to utilize their 
unique skills for the common good and betterment of the kingdom. The key condition in 
both of these contested German identities and nationalisms was that the German minority 
be able to remain, in some significant way, German in culture. Slovenia may be their 

















Chapter Two – Of Democracy and Dictatorship, 1925-1932 
As the 1920s carried on into the 1930s, Slovenia’s Germans remained conflicted. 
Some who had initially been resentful of their inclusion in Yugoslavia from the 
kingdom’s beginnings in 1918 remained so, with the negative impact of social policies on 
the German language, educational system, and cultural associations only serving to 
maintain that resentment. Yet there still remained those Germans who, while 
acknowledging that the situation was still not ideal, felt that the best way to rectify the 
situation was through continued democratic appeals, and therefore maintained hope that 
this way forward would be successful. The end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s 
saw the National Socialist German Workers’ Party gain in popularity in Germany. This 
chapter will address how Slovenia’s German-speaking community reacted to domestic 
and foreign political events, fascism and dictatorship in Europe, and the rise of the Nazis. 
The Cillier Zeitung greeted the year 1925 with optimism, despite feeling that the 
“various powers that in the old year controlled…our fate are not changing, are not getting 
younger, are learning nothing! They know nothing of a new spirit and new ways.” 
Despite this message of doom and gloom over the apparent intransigence of the Slovene 
majority towards its German minority, the paper continued that “…we drink to the new 
year because…we can’t stop hoping for better, despit  our knowledge.” 190  
With the previous years’ experience behind them, and some still looking forward 
with hopes that their situation would improve, Slovenia’s German community had to deal 
with the continuing legal struggle over the D utsches Haus in Cilli/Celje. On January 5, 
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1925, the “Slovenes, with help from the courts and government bureaucrats, took over the 
Deutsches Haus in Celje. The greatest joy is prevalent in leading Slovene circles over this 
change in property.”191 That a certain segment of the Slovene population wuld have “the 
greatest joy” over this transfer in property reflects a view held by some Germans of the 
vindictive nationalists in the Slovene government.  This view, however, was not 
projected onto the entire Slovene population, as can be seen in the “leading circles” 
conditional.  
 The expropriation of the Deutsches Haus was the last straw for those Germans 
who were weary of years of perceived attacks on their culture.  “Every cheek must flush 
with the terrible thought that even our last public set of assets, which was built with so 
much effort and sacrifice…was simply taken from us.”192 The phrasing of “every cheek 
must flush” demonstrates a type of class divide among the German minority in Slovenia, 
as the Deutsches Haus had been historically used by wealthy elites, and not the more 
working class German-speaking urban residents of Cilli/Celje.193 By saying “every cheek 
must flush”, the Cillier Zeitung exposes that not every cheek was being flushed at the 
Slovene takeover of the Deutsches Haus. Indeed, while non-affluent German-speakers 
might not have been able to bring themselves to quite the same level of indignation that 
their rich German businessmen and industrialists did over the Deutsches Haus incident, 
the paper’s description of the injustice of the situation was as much a declaration of 
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193 For example, in Lower Styria at this time almost 26% of Germans were involved in trade, 21.7% in 
commerce, 17.9% in “free occupations” like medicine, law, and psychology, and only 14.1% in agriculture. 
Though a majority of German-speakers had well-paying, white collar jobs, many did not. Nećak, Die 
“Deutschen” in Slowenien, 11. 
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majority sentiment among the city’s German residents as it was a plea to convince those 
more indifferent German-speakers of this travesty to the German culture in Slovenia.194 
 
The Election of 1925 
The upcoming national election in February, 1925 gave the German minority 
community another chance to exercise their constrained political rights. Though the 
Germans “could decide nothing” in the election, it was nonetheless considered by the 
Cillier Zeitung to be the “greatest political campaign that was ever waged” in Yugoslavia. 
Despite knowing that they would be too insignificant to affect the election’s outcome, the 
paper nonetheless reported that Slovenia’s Germans “hope that the political campaign 
may bring a result that…can build the foundation of a secure, peaceful, and honorable 
[state] in the interest of all residents.”195 Notably, the editor of the Cillier Zeitung, Franz 
Schauer,196 ran for election to the national parliament in Belgrade.197 
 Though Slovenia’s Germans wished to express their pr ference for democracy by 
exercising their right to vote in the elections, they also feared the Slovene government’s 
potential response to this demonstration of German political power. “For the upcoming 
                                                          
194 The struggle over ownership of the D utsches Haus/Celjski Dom lasted a decade and, after being 
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election,” the Cillier Zeitung warned its readers in late January, 1925, “expect arrests, 
house searches, knock arounds, and the prevention of personal freedom of movement of 
citizens.” The threat of oppressive measures was for ome Germans an expected response 
in the context of their understanding of the Slovene government as being composed of 
nationalists who held an irrepressible hatred for the German minority. As such, 
Slovenia’s political atmosphere gave the “feeling of lawlessness and outlawness”, with 
the government’s attitude being considered “cowardice” to “threaten a small, friendless 
group due to the exploitation of their civil rights.”198 From this perspective, the German 
minority in Slovenia was the victim of a hostile, undemocratic authority that would stop 
at nothing to constrict the exercise of German political rights, merely because of their 
German-ness.199 
 The potential for oppression gave Slovenia’s German inority an extra incentive 
to participate in Yugoslavia’s democratic process. “We are fighting for the primitive 
human rights that must be fought for all, regardless of class…We all are leading the proof 
of our existence,” explained the Cillier Zeitung to its audience.200 The paper also ran 
advertisements that stressed the importance of peacefully participating in the electoral 
process, with sentences such as “We cannot impress our opponents through anxiety, but 
only through manly advocacy for our good right!”201  For the German minorities who 
feared for the very existence of their presence and culture in Slovenia, being able to 
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199 In a special report on the German minority in Yugoslavia, the author noted that anti-German minority 
policies had been “contrary to the Yugoslav constitution and to the treaty agreements regarding these 
minorities.” John Dyneley Prince to Frank B. Kellogg, January 25, 1927. NARA, RG-59. 
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influence the election in a significant way was besid  the point – what mattered was that 
they merely vote in large enough numbers to concretely prove to their detractors that 
they, as Germans, did exist and were not going away.202 
The Cillier Zeitung acted as the German minority’s public advocate, helping 
monolingual German-speakers to navigate Slovenia’s electoral laws and stand fast in the 
face of tricks designed to confuse or block them from voting. Warning its readers to 
ignore opposition tactics, the paper advised that “the candidate list cannot be recalled” 
and that “Franz Schauer or his candidate list have not been removed and no one would 
even dream of doing so.” The paper further made its readership aware that the German 
party’s candidate list could “only be declared invalid by the authorities due to some kind 
of form mistakes.”203 Publicly advising its readership reflects not only the types of 
electoral shenanigans that were being pressed upon the German minority, but also made 
known to those German-speakers who were either indifferent to or unaware of these 
tactics that they were, in fact, happening. 
A reader writing in to the Cillier Zeitung to give his opinion on the election stated 
that the “Slavic parties have tried very hard with all kinds of threats, tricks, [and] abuse to 
beat the feeling of loyalty to the fatherland out of us.” For this German reader, the “tribal 
membership” to the German nation, along with the “tought of the manes of our 
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ancestors” and “devotion to our dear mother tongue” demanded that the Germans of 
Slovenia “do our duty” by casting a vote.  The opinion piece went on to say 
What do we actually want? To pursue a politics of “German nationalism”? That is 
complete nonsense, and anyone who says that or claims that of us…is trying to 
portray us in the eyes of the Slovene people, under whom we have lived for 
centuries in peace, as untrustworthy…We Germans in Yugoslavia want only to 
honorably contribute to the well-being, for the flourishing of our current 
fatherland, but for that we must be represented in the parliament…And in…this 
parliament, we want nothing more than to only achieve the lowliest rights of a 
minority; we do not want to deprive our youths of their mother tongue…we want 
only to have the ambition to live in peace with ourrespected Slavs as respected 
Germans.204 
On the day of the election, the Cillier Zeitung urgently called on German-speakers of 
Slovenia, “as legally and constitutionally equal citizens”, to “most honorably represent 
your needs, your wishes, your complaints.” The paper desperately tried to impress its 
opinion of the circumstances onto its German readership, declaring that the election “is 
about the proof of our existence!” From the Cillier Zeitung’s perspective, the national 
election presented the “most sacred obligation” for Sl venia’s Germans to “do (their) 
duty”; the paper decried those whose “betrayal” was, “despite all awareness”, the sin of 
staying at home or voting for the wrong party.205 
Several strands of German identity and nationalism can be seen in these articles in 
the Cillier Zeitung. Referring to the “Slavic parties” serves to encourage German-
speakers to vote for the Partei der Deutschen while also attempting to exhibit the 
perceived vindictive nature of the Slovene governmet to those members of the German-
language readership who had, for whatever reason, not felt compelled to support the 
“German” party over any of the “Slavic” ones.  
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 That the “Slavic parties” would have to “beat the fe ling of loyalty” to 
Yugoslavia out of the Germans signifies the extent o which some Germans truly did 
strongly affiliate with the kingdom.206 But this phrase also was a means of vindicating the 
opinion of those German nationalists who felt persecut d due to their ethnic identity, 
since the use of the word “fatherland” could be intrpreted to mean either Yugoslavia of 
the German Reich. To “fulfill one’s duty” was to vote for the Partei der Deutschen, 
indicating that, for this contributor, those German-speakers who did not vote the 
“correct” way were not only voting out of their interests, but were going against their 
ethnic and cultural German comrades. 
 The opinion piece’s stressing of Germans’ desire fo  peace and stability, such as 
had reigned in Slovenia before the Great War, reflect a strong current of weariness 
among some Germans who wanted to contribute to Yugoslavia’s economy and society. 
By rejecting the notion of “German nationalist” politics and once again expressing a 
willingness to socially, economically, and politically integrate into Yugoslav society, 
Slovenia’s Germans were attempting to move on from the tiring nationalist back-and-
forth that had marked the region’s previous several ye rs. The frequent mentions of 
maintaining the German mother tongue shows as well th  extent to which Slovenia’s 
German-speakers wished to maintain their version of German identity, but not necessarily 
at the expense of excluding themselves entirely from the wider ethnic-Slavic majority 
society. Such a view was incompatible with the “culture war” perspective of some 
German nationalists. 
                                                          
206 Use of the word “beat” was not just a literary flourish – the leader of the Partei der Deutschen, Dr. 
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 The election resulted in a “considerable loss” for the German minority in 
Slovenia, though Schauer himself was able to win a direct mandate.207 The Slovene 
newspaper Nova Doba called the German electoral campaign a “campaign against the 
state…and the Slovenian people”, which was regarded as an “infamous and obvious lie” 
by the Cillier Zeitung. For the Cillier Zeitung, the electoral campaign had been merely a 
“defensive campaign” which had unfortunately come up short.208 The idea of a 
“defensive campaign” gained credence when news emerged of a plan by 22-year old 
Slovene nationalist Ivan Lipnik to “get rid of” Franz Schauer on the day of the election. 
The Cillier Zeitung declared that Schauer had been targeted “not becaus  he endangered 
the state in some way…but because this man…stepped to the front of a small, defenseless 
minority and led a defensive campaign for this minority within the framework of the 
existing laws and within the framework of the Belgrade parliament against an 
overwhelming majority.” In highlighting this story, the Cillier Zeitung hoped to ensure 
“that the world knows what is intended in our cultiva ed and civilized Slovenia for the 
leader of a small, defenseless national minority.”209 
 A planned assassination of an ethnic German political leader had the double effect 
of validating the notion that Slovenia’s government was undemocratic – even though the 
plot was hatched by a private citizen and foiled by Slovene/Yugoslav government forces 
– while also highlighting the specifically German character of the man being targeted. 
The death of Franz Schauer was the potential assassin’s goal precisely because he 
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symbolized, from a German nationalist view, as the editor of the Cillier Zeitung and a 
leader in a German political party, the political and cultural strength of the ethnic German 
minority in Slovenia. 
 This perception of Slovenia as undemocratic and lawless was reflected in an 
official declaration by the Partei der Deutschen, who condemned the “electoral terror”, 
“serious abuse”, and “countless acts of violence” in Slovenia.210 The Cillier Zeitung ran 
an advertisement on the same day of the Partei der Deutschen’s condemnation of the 
events in Slovenia which called upon German voters to “take care of your voting 
rights!”211 While there were certainly instances of voter suppression and other obstacles 
put in the way of allowing Germans from voting, theCillier Zeitung’s fervent reporting 
of it suggests both outrage on the part of some and indifference or apathy on the part of 
others. Attempting to convince those Germans whose identities and worldview did not 
match up with the more nationalist one, the paper highlights in sensational terms the 
“terror” being employed against ethnic Germans by ethnic Slovenes as a way of showing 
the nature of this perceived tyranny. To ensure that Germans are not only aware of but 
actively concerned with the status of their voting rights indicates the extent to which a 
substantial portion of the German community was politica ly engaged. But it is as well a 
call to arms for those other Germans who had not placed such importance in the electoral 
process or in the Germanic character of their own ide tity. 
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 A reader-submitted opinion to the Marburger Zeitung in May of 1925 elucidates 
this feeling. “National sentiment, which has deep roots in every noble person, can 
however impossibly aim at the extermination of the national sentiment of a neighbor! 
That would be completely wrong and would belittle and offend one’s own national 
sentiment.” Comparing Slovenia’s treatment of its German minority to a rebellious child 
rejecting both the “gift of (a mother’s) language” and her “Heimat”, the author wonders 
what the mother – that is, the Germans of Slovenia – h d done to deserve such 
disrespectful and unfair treatment.212 
 In comparing the relationship between Germans and Slovenes to a mother 
imparting unacknowledged benefits upon a child, the author expresses a form of German 
identity which viewed itself as a Kulturträger, bringing the superior German culture to 
the inferior Slovenes and bestowing upon them its advantages.  Imparting the German 
culture onto Slovenes and Slovenia meant that the region’s cultural and social progress 
had originally been entirely due to the efforts andinherent characteristics of Germans.213 
To then be treated in a way that was felt to disrespect these basic facts about society and 
history in the Slovene lands would have incensed th German nationalists who held that 
worldview.  
                                                          
212 MZ, “Völkerliebe und Völkerhass”, May 1, 1925. 
 
213 This notion of unique characteristics inherent in the German character can be traced back to the late-
nineteenth century’s Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl’s idea of Deutsche Arbeit, which was also linked to the 
concept of Kulturarbeit. These ideas combined with a vision of “unique German essence” called völkisch 
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Ostmarkenverein in describing Posen: “…this land has been conquered for the German people by sword 
and plow, it has been fertilized by German blood answeat, and owes its culture to Germans. For these 
reasons, we are the masters here.” Ibid., 118. 
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 Yet, the Cillier Zeitung was still willing to claim to speak for the majority of 
Germans when, exasperated, it addressed the claim th t Slovenia’s German minorities 
were disloyal. “We have concerned ourselves so often with the question of loyalty, as 
well as disloyalty, and have in no uncertain terms pronounced our belief.” Pushing back 
once more against the idea that the German minority was actively working against the 
state, the paper declared that “we are loyal becaus we have, as reasonable people, 
accepted local relations [with Slovenia]…Everyone who has stayed within the borders of 
this state have, for a long time already, come to trms with it.” “What do you actually 
want from us?”, the paper rhetorically asked. .”..That we spit on our history and our own 
people?” In what it hoped was a final, conclusive explanation of German affiliation to 
Slovenia and Yugoslavia, the paper declared, “We are loyal to the state and loyal to our 
Volk…If we were not loyal to ourselves and our Volk, then our loyalty to the state would 
also not be worth a damn.”214 
The sentiment expressed in this article in the Cillier Zeitung reveals the fatigue 
that some Germans were experiencing after years of social policies and lack of political 
progress in the areas they wanted to see improve. That certain Slovenes were still 
skeptical of the Germans’ loyalty to the state even after multiple public statements and 
peaceful, democratic participation left many of them f eling as though nothing they could 
do would ever be enough to definitively prove their fidelity to the South Slavic kingdom. 
Reaffirmation of the split German affiliation to both state and Volk illustrates the 
continuing tension between the different strands of German identity and nationalism. 
Those German-speakers who implicitly rejected the enic Slovene character of the 
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region would have appreciated the Cillier Zeitung’s confirmation of being Volkstreu, 
while others whose identities did not mainly revolve around their German language or 
culture would have better understood the paper’s declaration of loyalty to the state.  That 
the motto of the Partei der Deutschen sought to please its Slavic critics and German 
supporters at the same time does not reduce the significance that it also sought to please 
its German-speaking detractors and partisans alike. 
 
German Identity and Nationalism between Culture Wars and Cultural Peace 
  Addressing the issue of minority rights in both Austrian Carinthia and Slovenia, 
an opinion piece in the Cillier Zeitung wrote that “…we see here, in the soul of a people, 
a cultural war happening that in its tragedy demands our participation.” Recognizing that 
“we Germans also barged into the…cultural nationalism” of the previous “30 to 50 
years”, the writer opined that “we Germans must have the courage to have objective and 
compassionate self-criticism.”215 That the author of this opinion piece calls both Austria’s 
treatment of its Slovene minority and Slovenia’s trea ment of its German minority as 
examples of a “cultural war” exhibits the enduring ethnic antagonism that had intensified 
during the Great War.216 Yet, the author is willing to move on from the stale nationalist 
conflict and try to come to some meaningful compromise between the two major ethnic 
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groups of Slovenia and Austria. By admitting that the German side had “also” been guilty 
of the previous “30 to 50 years” of “cultural nationalism” conflicts, he endorses the view 
of Germans as having tried to force their culture on Slovenes. Through his attempts to 
move the discussion beyond the “culture war” happening between Slovenes and 
Germans, the author is appealing to those Germans who had rejected the notion of a 
“culture war” or had never been as stridently emphatic of their German language or 
culture as other nationalist activists would have lik d. 
 The Germans of Slovenia called upon the Carinthian regional government in 
Austria to “give the Slovene minority…full cultural utonomy.”217In addition to being a 
plea to the Slovene regional government to reciprocate any progressive policy of cultural 
autonomy in Austria, this demand from Slovenia’s Germans to the Austrian Carinthian 
government is a recognition of the cultural equality between the Slovene and German 
cultures. Those German nationalists who viewed the Slovene and Slavic cultures as 
inherently inferior to the Germans’ would have disagreed with the sentiment of cultural 
equality, but for many Germans in Slovenia this recognition was nothing more than the 
simple acknowledgement of reality – there was, for these Germans, in fact no culture war 
going on in Slovenia.  
 Other Germans, however, felt that, after years of minority policies that removed 
the German language from the public sphere, significantly reduced the teaching of 
German in schools, and expropriated property held by ethnic Germans, the “minority 
policy in Slovenia up to now” had been a “systematic politics of de-nationalization 
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[Entnationalisierungspolitik].” 218 Entnationalisierung signified more than just the 
physical removal of the German cultural presence in Slovenia – that is, it meant more 
than the street signs and language of education changing from German to Slovene. For 
those Germans who felt strongly that they were, due to their German language, heritage, 
and culture, an integral part of the spiritual body f the German Volk, a “politics of de-
nationalization” represented the spiritual as well as physical and legal removal and 
transformation of the German element in Slovenia. By removing the physical presence of 
Germandom in Slovenia – books, street signs, schools, businesses – as well as the 
cultural presence – language, education, and power ver ethnic affiliation – the Slovene 
government was severing the spiritual link that connected Slovenia’s Germans with the 
rest of Europe’s Germandom. Not only was this “de-nationalization” a purposeful policy 
whose goal was to remove the German presence from Sl venia, it also was viewed as 
ultimately turning Germans into Slovenes, weakening the German Volk in its culture war 
against Slavic Europe. 
 Seven years after the tumultuous events of “Marburg’s Bloody Sunday”, the 
Cillier Zeitung reported on an article in the “Slovene nationalist” paper Jutro219 that 
claimed that the Yugoslav soldiers in 1919 had acted out of self-defense. “This 
publication”, the German-language paper angrily riposted, “displays a completely absent 
willingness to understand on the part of certain Slovene circles who, through the 
reference and newly-fraudulent portrayal of any distressful event, seeks to open up old 
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wounds in the hearts of all Germandom in Slovenia.”220 The paper then went on to give 
its version of the event, in which the unarmed German protesters had been innocently 
shot upon by Yugoslav troops. While German nationalist ctivists would certainly have 
much to agree with this portrayal of the incident in Marburg/Maribor in 1919, the Cillier 
Zeitung’s reminder and portrayal of the event as being twisted by a “nationalist” Slovene 
newspaper and “wound in the heart of all Germandom in Slovenia” was as much a 
statement of a German-nationalist worldview as it was an attempt to convince other 
Germans in Slovenia of the veracity of its interpretation. That “certain Slovene circles” 
actively wanted to “open up old wounds” indicates that the Cillier Zeitung is conveying 
the notion that the Ljubljana government – which had claimed power and thus 
responsibility in 1919 – had been openly trying to exploit a terrible event for German-
speakers in the country in order to dispirit or break them up. 
 Despite marking the anniversary of an activist political protest in which ethnic 
Germans had been killed, the German minority community i  Slovenia had changed the 
way it approached political action in the intervening years since 1919. The new Partei 
der Deutschen enabled them to represent themselves in a democratically-elected 
parliament. “The Partei der Deutschen stood and stands today outside of the narrow 
oppositional block and always gives independent and impartial opinions…on the 
political, cultural, and economic treatment of the minorities.”221 The change in emphasis 
from the violent confrontations and calls for Anschluss with Austria of 1918-1919 to a 
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desire for peaceful, democratic political action cabe seen in the Partei der Deutschen’s 
statement on the national election of 1927:  
The Partei der Deutschen greets the announcement of elections [of 1927]…as the 
beginning of a renunciation from the arbitrary and commisarist methods of our 
political administration that had great harm and humiliation for the population as 
a result, as the beginning of a modern era of democratic administration in which 
the population will be called upon to an ever-widening extent for the direct 
participation in administration and contributions to decision-making…(The 
Germans) will provide proof, through loyal and serious cooperation with the 
important duties of (the parliament), that they are rip  for the…right of self-
government.”222 
The Partei der Deutschen’s references to the “beginnings” of a “renunciation from the 
arbitrary…methods” and a “modern era of democratic dministration” indicate a 
pervasive view among the Germans of Slovenia that, hitherto, the Ljubljana government 
had been acting in an unconstitutional, undemocratic, nd discriminatory way.  The 
phrasing and tone of the statement suggests that the German minorities and the Partei der 
Deutschen had been the cultured, modern, and democratic component of Slovene society 
for the past several years while enduring the effects of a backwards, vindictive, and 
tyrannical Slovene government lashing out at its disa vantaged yet superior German 
community. Through this frame of thinking, a form of German national identity in 
Slovenia can be seen – one that views ethnic Germans as having an inherently “orderly” 
and “civilized” culture with the opposite view ascribed to the Slovenes. 
 Though a paternalistic-nationalist identity was present among some Germans in 
society, many members of the community in Slovenia had, by the late 1920s, come to the 
decision that the way forward in advancing their goals of increased minority rights and 
protections was not through foreign help – from Germany, Austria, or the League of 
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Nations – or from their own domestic resistance, but through proving their worth to the 
Slovene and Yugoslav majorities. “Loyal and serious cooperation” would provide 
“proof” to the regional and national governments of Yugoslavia that the ethnic Germans 
of the kingdom were not irredentist or disloyal butrather were capable and willing to 
contribute and participate in wider society. Such a transformation in political thought – 
from the violent and turbulent upheaval of the immediate post-war period to the late 
1920s – represented a growth among the German minority c mmunity of a desire for 
peace and stability over other, more radical forms of action.223 
An advertisement in the Cillier Zeitung from July of 1927 expresses this new 
political development among the German-speaking community in Slovenia: “Ethnic 
brothers! Join, without fail, the Politisch- und Wirtschaftliche Verein der Deutschen in 
Slowenien and support it with your best power for its fulfillment of its greatest duties! 
Because it is the only shield and sponsor of your ethnic cultural, social, economic, and 
political interests!”224 The Partei der Deutschen’s claim to be “the only shield and 
sponsor” of Slovenia’s ethnic German interests represents a strong turn away from 
expectations of receiving aid from the foreign German-speaking nation-states or the 
League of Nations. But its pleading for higher membrship indicates that there was a not-
insignificant section of the German community that w s politically unengaged, favored a 
different political party, or harbored hopes that Germany or Austria would still come to 
their rescue. That the Partei der Deutschen formed itself explicitly to advocate for the 
interests of Yugoslavia’s German minority and yet was disappointed in lower voter 
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turnout and community support demonstrates that, for many German-speakers, their 
identity and cultural affiliation did not begin or end with their mother tongue. 
 Germans had become tired of Slovene attacks that questioned their loyalty to the 
state or accused them of pursuing nationalist goals. Calling out the Slovene Democratic 
Party for having “German hatred”, the Cillier Zeitung declared that, in contrast to alleged 
claims of being staunch nationalists, Slovenia’s Germans were “businessmen, 
manufacturers, (and) private retirees.” Fatigue and exasperation can be heard in the 
paper’s voice, as the title of its article asked of its Slovene critics “Do you all really have 
nothing else?”225  Descriptions of ethnic Germans as “businessmen” and “manufacturers” 
was a way of showing to the Slovene majority the skills and characteristics of the 
minority community, and intimating that these Germans were ready and willing to 
contribute to the wider ethnic Slovene majority society if given the chance to do so. That 
the Cillier Zeitung had been publishing articles making this point for almost 10 years 
without a satisfactory acknowledgement by some Slovenes explains the paper’s weary 
tone. Yet this weariness with unsuccessful attempts to integrate into Yugoslavia’s society 
and economy would come with a price; weariness would give way to a feeling of 
bitterness that would leave open the door to a potential outside force with the power to 
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The Regional and National Elections of 1927  
The election for the regional parliament in Slovenia took place on January 23, 
1927. The election, according to the Cillier Zeitung, should have been “clear for 
everyone” that they “cannot be indifferent, especially for the members of a national 
minority.”226 Previous years’ electoral results had so underwhelmed the paper’s 
expectations of Slovenia’s ethnic Germans banding together in a unified community to 
showcase their political strength that it sought to shame its readership into realizing the 
seriousness of the election’s consequences.  
 Germans wanted equality and justice from the election. “If we want to find 
understanding for the cultural, social, and economic needs of our population, (then) the 
representatives must allocate justice,” declared th Cillier Zeitung. The paper went on to 
condemn the “hatred” it felt had been shown to the German minority, and extolled the 
virtues of full legal equality. Underneath this article, the paper also printed in enormous 
letters “Everyone in Celje vote for the first box! No one stay home! This is to go against 
our common enemy!”227 While Slovenes would certainly not have appreciated b ing 
designated the Germans’ “common enemy”, this description of the region’s ethnic 
majority was intended by the Cillier Zeitung to stimulate ethnic Germans’ sense of 
nationalist patriotism. Repeatedly demanding that Cilli/ elje’s German-speaking 
population turn out in greater numbers as well as vote for the “correct” party reflects the 
high hopes and depths of disappointment in rousing the region’s minority community that 
the paper had experienced in prior elections. 
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 The election ended in a loss for the Independent Dmocratic Party and a win for 
the United Economic List, which had stressed economics over social policies, and the 
socialists. The Ciller Zeitung was relieved: “The occasional exaggeration of electoral 
agitation,” it declared, “has receded.”228 Though the paper clearly meant the Slovene 
“nationalist” press’s “exaggeration of electoral agit tion”, its omission of its own part in 
inflaming tensions does not take away from the fact tha  both Slovene- and German-
language nationalists had portrayed the regional elections in a sensationalized, epochal 
light. 
 An election for the national parliament in Belgrade was to take place in 
September of 1927. Despite remaining a politically-insignificant force, Slovenia’s 
Germans hoped that they would be able to “see to it that we also find a comfortable home 
in the new house (of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes).” The Cillier Zeitung declared that 
Slovenia’s Germans “enter the electoral campaign as a Volk, not as a party”, and once 
again stressed that only the Partei der Deutschen could protect Yugoslavia’s German 
element.229 The Partei der Deutschen, for its part, included in its party platform the 
“compensation of all the serious injuries to the rights and equality of the German 
minority”; the “protection and realization of complete civil equality in political, cultural, 
and economic life”; and the ability to participate in governing.230  
Once again, on the day of the election the Cillier Zeitung did all it could to stress 
to its readership the seriousness that the election would have for the German minority in 
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Slovenia. “The day of duty is here, the day of fate”, proclaimed the paper. The election 
would “decide the future of our Volk in our beloved old Heimat.” The 1927 national 
election was “incomparably more” meaningful than for the Slavic parties, since such an 
election was for the German minority a “confirmation” f their “Volkstum, our existence, 
the validity of requests, without whose fulfillment a people cannot live.”231 Essentially a 
full-page advertisement for the Partei der Deutschen, in large block letters on the front of 
that day’s Cillier Zeitung was listed the party’s electoral demands:  
We demand, in order to be able to live, German schools f r our children! We 
demand that we are able to continue to live in the greater cultural sphere of our 
Volk! We demand equality in all areas of life that are owed us as loyal, 
resident…citizens! In order to achieve these fundamental necessities, however, 
we must all fulfill our duties on September 11 like a man! We must vote on this 
Sunday for the representatives of our good causes, whose choice alone confirms 
our existence!”232 
The fear of some German nationalists of having their spiritual connection to the German 
Volk severed can be seen in the Partei der Deutschen’s call to “continue to live in the 
greater cultural sphere of our Volk”, as well as the repeated references to the threats 
facing the German minority’s “ability to live” and even its very “existence.” Equating the 
“fulfillment of duty” to acting “like a man” was another tactic of the nationally-aware 
Partei der Deutschen and Cillier Zeitung to shame or goad its readership into 
participating in the election and voting for the “right” party. The Partei der Deutschen’s 
exclamation that voting for it would “confirm” the “ xistence” of Slovenia’s German-
speaking minority indicates that not every German w s aware that they were part of a 
wider cultural community, or, if they were aware, did not identify strongly enough with 
that wider community to politically engage with it. 
                                                          





 The Partei der Deutschen saw their share of seats in the national parliament 
decrease from 8 to 6.233 Despite the Cillier Zeitung’s urgent calls for Slovenia’s German 
minority to fulfill its duty, the paper blamed the lack of German representatives on those 
German voters who did not heed its previous advice to participate in the electoral 
process. “It is so bitterly sad,” complained the paper, “that the fulfillment of almost 6,000 
valiant men’s duty was forced to collapse due to disinterest.”234 Out of a total population 
of over 41,000 native German-speakers in Slovenia, receiving only 6,000 votes must 
have seemed quite low.235 While electoral participation rates of eligible voters is not 
available, it can however be assumed that there wermore than 6,000 eligible voters 
among Slovenia’s German-speaking minority.  That only 6,000 voted for the Partei der 
Deutschen suggests that those who did not stay at home due to apathy or indifference 
indeed voted for a different party. The continuing disappointment that the Cillier Zeitung 
expressed after another election in which the German turnout was lower than expected is 
a testament to the enduring national indifference, ambiguous nationalism, and soft- or 
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Developments in Education Policy and German Schools 
Schools continued to be an issue for German-speakers in Slovenia. The Cillier 
Zeitung reported in March, 1927, on a speech by Stephan Krft, leader of the Partei der 
Deutschen in the national parliament. “For a national minority,” began Kraft, “there is no 
greater branch of determining factor of public lifethan the education system, given that a 
national minority entrusts the education system to its young offspring and with that, its 
national language and cultural future, its continued existence.”236 Kraft emphasized that it 
was “just as important and justified to learn the state language” as for the minorities to be 
able to raise their children in their own culture. “How should teachers for German 
schools”, Kraft asked, teach their students important topics, such as science, if they could 
not speak German well enough?237 “Without a complete understanding of the soul of the 
child,” continued Kraft, “and without love, then pedagogic successes are impossible.”238 
Kraft expressed a visceral fear for Yugoslavia’s ethnic Germans being realized when he 
exclaimed, “Our German education system, for both elem ntary and middle schools, is 
thus effectively destroyed.”239  
Even after the Yugoslav Education Minister Kumanudi abrogated the previous 
school policy which had given the local government a d not the parents the decision for 
where to send their children, Slovenia’s Germans remained extremely skeptical that this 
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would actually be implemented and enforced in their own schools.240 “A provision that is 
qualified as unjust in the Bačka, the Banát, and the Baranja is supposed to be justified in 
Syrmia and, above all, in Slovenia?!”241 Years of the Ljubljana government ignoring or 
bypassing federal law and international treaty when tr ating its German minority had left 
many Germans bitter and resentful that any policy change that did not come from the 
regional government itself would actually be carried out. Such disaffection with the 
effects of political action marked a change from previous years’ hopefulness and 
optimism that the Germans’ situation would improve. If the League of Nations, Germany, 
Austria, and the national Yugoslav government all could not significantly alter the plight 
of German-speakers in Slovenia, then what would? 
 Education policy had become, for Slovenia’s German i ority, generally 
intolerable by the end of 1928 – 10 years after Yugoslavia had declared its 
independence.242 Ethnic German politicians in the national assembly in Belgrade 
attempted to pass their version of minority education policy changes. The proposed new 
policy sought a middle way between respecting the current government’s policies 
towards their South Slav constituents on the one sid  and needs of the minorities on the 
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other side. The German deputies’ proposal envisioned th  minority schools being 
“completely independent from the other administrators” as well as granting the minority 
“full participation in the running of the schools.”243 German-language parallel classes 
would be reinstated, with exams being taken in the “mother tongue of the child.” These 
changes would also see the Serbo-Croat language tauht from grade 3 on as a 
requirement in German parallel classes and schools. Minority schools would be 
constructed when the minorities affected communicated in writing to the local 
administration their intent to do.244 The draft of the bill called for the right of national 
minorities “to construct, manage, and inspect school and other educational facilities with 
the mother tongue as language of instruction through cultural organizations and private 
means.”245  
 This proposed minority education policy was designed to appease both the South 
Slav majority and its German-speaking minority. Allowing minority participation in the 
running of the schools would be enough to satisfy both minority calls to have a say in 
how their children were being taught while also leaving the Yugoslav majority in overall 
charge. While the German language would be reintroduce , thereby easing German fears 
of having their culture erased and “turning into” Slovenes, the teaching of the “state 
language” remained mandatory, thereby demonstrating e hnic Germans’ loyalty to the 
Yugoslav national framework. 
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 Within the first few months of 1928, a new national minority education policy 
allowed for parents in the Marburg/Maribor administrative district, following the 
precedent set in the Bačka, Banát, and Baranja, to choose the nationality of heir child 
and therefore to which school they would go. The Education Minister, in announcing the 
change in policy, stated that it was “so that the fre dom of cultural development is also 
made for the national minorities and with it the stipulation that the learning of the state 
language is maintained.”246 German-speaking parents were relieved and overjoyed. That 
the “right to decide for themselves the nationality of their children” had been taken from 
parents had been “the heaviest burden that had been imposed on the German minority” in 
Yugoslavia. “How many tears…the question of schooling had condemned our children to 
does not need to be fleshed out…It is enough (to know) that the majority of children 
that…went through middle school in these years cannot speak and read German. They 
have been excluded from the enormous cultural assets of our Volk.”247 
 That the new national minority education policy broadly agreed with the 
framework laid out in the one proposed by the German delegates symbolizes a small but 
significant victory for German politics in interwar Yugoslavia. The very real and deeply-
held fear by some German parents of losing their children or even their community’s 
culture is seen in their exultant and relieved reaction, as well as their sadness over the 
“majority of children” who were cut off from the German Volk after being unable to learn 
how to read or speak the German language properly. This new policy was a partial 
fulfillment of the minority protection treaty that Yugoslavia had signed after the end of 
                                                          





the Great War.248 Nonetheless, German-language education in Slovenia r m ined more 
restricted than for the rest of Yugoslavia’s German-speaking minority.249 
 
Response to the Rise of Fascism and National Socialism in the 1920s 
As events in fascist Italy in the late 1920s develop d, the Cillier Zeitung 
responded with disgust at the loss of “freedom in Italy”, in addition to decrying the “end 
of parliamentarism” in that country. The paper, in November of 1926, described 
Mussolini and his fascist allies as “agents of conspiracies”, “liars of right and freedom”, 
“Rome’s barbaric conquerors”, and “adventurers without belief and law.”250 Slovenia’s 
ethnic Germans’ response of shock and revulsion at the undemocratic and authoritarian 
events in neighboring Italy could perhaps be understood as an attempt to prove their pro-
democracy bona fides to the Yugoslav majority skeptical of their intentions. But their 
reaction more convincingly points to a real sentiment of disapproval of fascism, 
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dictatorship, and undemocratic principles that had also been evident in certain responses 
to the, from their perspective, undemocratic and illegal social policies implemented 
against Slovenia’s ethnic minorities. 
 The Cillier Zeitung’s report on the 1928 Reichstag election, in which the left-
wing Social Democratic and Communist Parties gained more than 40% of the total vote, 
barely mentioned the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, who lost 100,000 votes 
from 1924 in receiving just 2.6% of the vote.251 The new government led by the Social 
Democratic Party, who were so hated by Hitler’s NSDAP, was accepted by the Cillier 
Zeitung without a fuss.252 The paper’s detailed analysis of the center-right national liberal 
Deutsche Volkspartei and its subsequent fall in the share of votes from the previous 
election demonstrates that an important segment of its readership was generally of the 
same type of ideology and identification. The D utsche Volkspartei had split from the 
left-wing of the former National Liberals, the Deutsche Demokratische Partei, after 
World War I and initially favored a constitutional monarchy over a republic. The party’s 
platform called for a larger commitment to free enterprise and stronger emphasis on 
improving big business as a way of strengthening the middle class.253 Affiliation to a pro-
business, pro-capitalism ideology among Slovenia’s German population makes sense, 
considering their share of ownership in industry, trade, and banking. 
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 The possibility of an Anschluss with Austria, so favored and prevalent among 
Slovenia’s German population in 1918, had by 1928 come to be rejected as unfeasible, as 
its hypothetical completion might very well lead to war. “It is clear,” wrote the Cillier 
Zeitung in August of 1928, “that…the…threat of war cannot bring about any special 
effect.”254 With the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye signed, Austria was not in a position to 
do more than conduct diplomatic action to address their concerns over the republic’s 
territorial boundaries and the German-speaking minority in Slovenia. Having experienced 
four years of brutal, bloody warfare as part of the Habsburg Empire, followed by several 
months of paramilitary fighting in the borderlands, the idea of unintentionally inciting 
another European war was not appealing. But there was another sentiment found among 
Slovenia’s Germans other than peace: a desire for stability. Through the first several 
years after the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, ethnic Germans 
endured in rapid succession various policies that completely changed the region’s social 
landscape to which they had in their daily life been accustomed. While unhappy about the 
current state of social and political affairs in Slovenia, Germans no longer sought any 
kind of rapid, radical change, instead preferring the peace and stability that they had 
missed out on for so many years. 
 A strong strand of German identity and nationalism n Slovenia was connected 
with a cultural awareness of the accomplishments of Europe’s German-speakers. When 
the Graf Zeppelin made its first intercontinental flight across the Atlantic Ocean, 
Slovenia’s German-speakers were exultant over this feat of German scientific progress. 
“For all Germans in the world and also for us,” wrote the Cillier Zeitung on the occasion 
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of the successful flight, “the flight of the ‘Graf Zeppelin’ is a joyous symbol. As the 
German airship, the German soul on board, flew against the storms and proved its 
capability in this hard approach and fly-through, so too does the German Volk grind out 
its history in the most terrible storm nights, the G rman soul on board, the way leading 
forwards and upwards.” 255 
 The case of the Graf Zeppelin was, for some German nationalists in Slovenia, a 
testament to the progress that the German culture could bring about. But the airship was 
more than simply a feat of German scientific achievement – it was also a symbol of the 
living body of the German Volk. The “German soul” was on board the dirigible – the
same soul that inhabited the German Volk of “all Germans around the world” and led the 
world “forwards and upwards” in cultural progress. The Cillier Zeitung’s reaction to and 
description of the Graf Zeppelin’s flight simultaneously represents a German nationalist 
worldview while also serving to project an idea of an indissoluble spiritual body of 
Germandom upon those ethnic Germans in Slovenia who had not yet been convinced of 
or made aware of their affiliation with this body. 
  
Under a Royal Dictatorship 
On January 6, 1929, King Aleksandar dissolved the natio al parliament, abolished 
the constitution of 1921, and banned political parties with any ethnic affiliation.256 
Renaming the country from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to the Kingdom 
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of Yugoslavia, the king intended to run the country through his sole power as a nation-
state, in the wake of political gridlock and ethnic strife that had resulted in the shooting 
death of the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radić. The kingdom’s name 
change went along with a corresponding re-ordering of territorial districts called 
banovinas which, in theory, formed geographic and not ethnic boundaries.257  
The royal dictatorship, as it was called, was an attempt by the monarchy to fix the 
kingdom’s nationality problems between Serbs and Croats, and in the process bring about 
national unity and social stability. Thus, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes ostensibly became 
Yugoslavs.258 The news that the king was taking over the running of the country and 
turning it from a democratic state into a dictatorship was received by the Cillier Zeitung 
with a neutral or even positive tone, who simply reported the event as if it were talking 
about the weather.259 This non-confrontational tone reflects the paper’s caution about 
what the political consequences of coming down on one side or another in the immediate 
aftermath of the king’s seizure of power might be.  
 In the days after the king’s announcement, however, G man reaction was split. 
In an article discussing the new situation in Yugoslavia, the Cillier Zeitung bemoaned the 
country’s experience thus far with politics and political parties. While on the one hand 
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passively supporting the seizure of power in the hands of one man, the paper at the same 
time noted that the dictatorship was “not forever”, and would “look forward…full of 
hope” that in so doing, the king would soon be able to bring order and stability back to 
the country.260 Slovenia’s German minority community had over the years witnessed not 
only minority policies that negatively impacted their social lives, but also the political 
strife and ethnic tension at the heart of the social framework of the Yugoslav state.261 The 
Cillier Zeitung’s article demonstrates a tension among Slovenia’s German community 
between supporting a dictatorship versus supporting a democracy. But this tension was 
also present in, on the one side, conservative natio lists with a disparaging view of 
Slavic culture and, on the other, less ideological German-speakers who wanted 
Yugoslavia to live up to its potential as a modern, pluralistic, and democratic state. 
 There is yet a third dimension in the German reaction to the royal dictatorship, 
however. While there were both those who supported and disagreed with the king’s 
seizure of power on principle, there were also some Germans who supported it simply 
because they had become weary of the, from their perspective, disadvantages to 
democracy: too many divergent political parties, corruption, political impasses, and 
insufficiently tangible policy implementation meant that the end of a working democracy 
would lead to a better, more efficient state. Such disaffection with the downside of 
democratic governance was a major driving force behind the radical and revolutionary 
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right-wing in Germany and Austria, whose influence would be felt upon Slovenia’s 
Germans when the National Socialist movement gained i  popularity.262  
 Due to their weariness with politics and political p rties, as well as the increasing 
ethno-political conflicts between Serbs and Croatians, it was “unsurprising” when, in 
January 1929, the Partei der Deutschen and the Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund were 
both banned.263 Disbanding both the Partei der Deutschen and the Schwäbisch-Deutscher 
Kulturbund drastically reduced the political and organizational power of Yugoslavia’s 
German minority.  But, in practical terms, it also severely limited the ability for the 
different local branches to coordinate their efforts with each other, thereby compounding 
the problems facing the two ethnic German organizations in unifying the kingdom’s 
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The Cillier Zeitung becomes the Deutsche Zeitung 
In February of 1929, the Cillier Zeitung was ordered to change its name due to the 
continuing use of the German name for Celje in the paper, which went against the law 
forbidding use of a non-state language in public. Despite the “bad times behind itself”, 
the Cillier Zeitung nonetheless felt that it had “maintained itself as an upstanding, 
courageous, honorable fighter in defense” of the German minority. “We do not favor 
parting from our old name, and not voluntarily…It is not a goodbye, however…What it 
was as the Cillier Zeitung, it remains in the next period and in all those in the future. It 
remains the loyal German paper of our minority even under the new name.” The paper’s 
new name had not been “an easy” decision, but was to be called “simply what it is for us 
all, as well in the eyes of our opponents: the Deutsche Zeitung.”265  
 The new Deutsche Zeitung claimed to be the “mouthpiece for the German 
minority in Slovenia.”266 This transformation of the Cillier Zeitung, though forced upon 
them, signified another stage in its attempts to unite the contested identities and multiple 
nationalisms of the German minority in Slovenia. The previous name of Cillier Zeitung 
was a reference to the city and therefore region of Lower Styria that had for centuries 
contained a German-speaking presence. Cillier Zeitung signified a type of regional 
identity in which ethnic Germans and Slovenes could both appreciate the German-
language press without the distorting effects of natio lism. Though “not an easy 
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decision”, changing the name of the newspaper to Deutsche Zeitung (which was not 
mandated but chosen by the owners) represented a shift from the regional to the 
nationalist identity for German-speakers in Slovenia.   
By bluntly displaying the German name of the paper, the new Deutsche Zeitung 
was claiming a nationally-aware identity for all of Slovenia’s German-speaking 
population that was affiliated with the greater German Volk. To appease the various types 
of German identities and nationalisms in Slovenia – conservative nationalism, soft 
nationalism, indifference, apathy – the D utsche Zeitung claimed to be maintaining its 
core from the Cillier Zeitung.  But by explicitly proclaiming to be the “mouthpiece” for 
all German-speakers in Slovenia, as well as noting that in doing so it was merely 
responding to the characterizations its “enemies” had bestowed upon it, the Deutsche 
Zeitung was also making a political claim over the self-identity and nationalisms of the 
German minority community. 
 The new Deutsche Zeitung started displaying “German commemoration days”, 
highlighting events such as the founding of the North German Confederation in 1870, the 
victory of Prussia over the French in 1871, and the birth of Habsburg Emperor Franz 
Josef I in 1830.267 In addition to these commemoration days, the Deutsche Zeitung also 
put the spotlight on the fact that the “600-year anniversary” of the Gottschee Germans 
was also being celebrated in Germany.268 Such emphasis by the paper on important 
events in German history highlighted and attempted to show the connection between 
Slovenia’s German minority and the wider cultural sphere of European Germandom. 
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Using geographically disparate events – the North German Confederation, Prussia, the 
Habsburgs – was a means for the Deutsche Zeitung of shoring up German nationalist 
sentiment while illustrating for more ambiguously self-identified German-speakers in 
Slovenia the alleged strong ties that they held with the wider German world. 
 The lack of discernible progress in gaining more rights, autonomy, and 
maintaining their identity led some of Slovenia’s Germans to look outside Yugoslavia for 
help.269 After Reich Foreign Minister Dr. Gustav Stresemann died, the Deutsche Zeitung 
praised his support for the ethnic Germans living outside Germany: “…foreign 
Germandom throughout the world will keep the memories of this flawless person, this 
tireless fighter for a better present, this powerful, forward-pushing leader…in loyalty and 
gratitude.”270 Stresemann had been notable for originally being a pan-Germanist and 
fervently believing in a strong German foreign policy that supported Europe’s German 
minorities.  This support translated into increased government funds for the Verein für 
das Deutschtum im Ausland and the Deutsche Auslandinstitut.271  
That the Deutsche Zeitung considered Stresemann “flawless” due to his “tireless” 
efforts in support of Germans outside of Germany demonstrates a strong current among 
Slovenia’s Germans of seeking help from outside Yugoslavia that would aid their cause. 
But the paper’s highlighting of Stresemann’s efforts in support of “foreign Germandom” 
also was a demonstration to nationally-indifferent Germans in Slovenia who had been 
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unaware or apathetic to the efforts that their ancestral mother country had been partaking 
on their behalf.  
 
Reaction to Nazi Electoral Success, 1930-1932 
In Marburg/Maribor, the local German-language paper reported on the September 
1930 Reichstag election, in which the National Socialist German Workers’ Party 
massively increased their votes from the previous election and became the second 
strongest party behind the Social Democrats.272  The Mariborer Zeitung informed its 
readers that the “victory of the extremist parties” had been “surprising” and thus served to 
make Germany’s domestic political scene even more difficult than it had been. In listing 
the Nazis’ post-election conditions for entering the government, the paper adopted a 
severely disapproving tone in acknowledging that “if hese conditions are not accepted, 
(the Nazis) would…turn to obstruction” in the oppositi n. For the Mariborer Zeitung , 
that the “new parliament (would) have to overcome great difficulties in order to put 
together a stable governing majority from the [political] center” was not only a 
disheartening and disappointing failure of Weimar’s pro-democracy parties, but also an 
alarming threat to the cherished notion of democracy itself.273   
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In the days after the election, the Mariborer Zeitung expressed further alarm at the 
street fighting and violence occurring in the Reich. Detailing the dead and wounded that 
had resulted from the “bloody…confrontations” between National Socialists and 
Communists, the paper emphasized the extent to which it had taken the police to “restore 
order” and bring about “relative peace” – it had only come about as a result of “strong 
police detachments” who had been “patrolling the str ets all over.”274 The Mariborer 
Zeitung’s shock and alarm at the surprising electoral gains for the Nazi Party and the 
subsequent violence that accompanied those gains speak  to the strong current among 
Slovenia’s Germans for peace and stability. Political strife and social instability had been 
front and center for Yugoslavia for years. The D utsche Zeitung’s passive acceptance of 
the royal dictatorship suggests that many were willing to approve, however hesitantly, the 
temporary end of democratic governance if it meant peace and stability, but not if it was 
accompanied by violence as was the case in Germany. Though desperately wanting to see 
an end to political and social instability, Slovenia’s Germans nonetheless were open to 
the idea of a dictatorship to bring about a more qui t state of affairs – a sentiment that 
would gain exponentially in importance after 1933. 
 Germans’ desire for peace in Slovenia and Europe centered on an end to violence 
and war, in stark contrast with the ideas of the Nazis. While Hitler’s plans for the 
National Socialist revolution called for German rearm ment and aggressive expansion,275 
in Slovenia the German minority community felt that the “path to Europe’s pacification 
and recovery” lay in the world conference on disarmament to be held in Geneva in 
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February of 1932.276 The Great War and the violent upheaval that occurred in its 
aftermath clearly had an impact upon Slovenia’s German minority, as their support for 
and understanding of disarmament being the “only path” for European stability 
demonstrates. 
 A new census was to be taken in 1931.  Similar to the 1921 version, the Deutsche 
Zeitung advised its readership to resist influence from any non-Germans about how to 
correctly inscribe their ethnicity in the form.277 For German nationalists who were 
concerned about the disappearance of their culture and presence in Slovenia, the census 
represented both an important yet terrifying opportunity to display their existence. If the 
numbers of German-speakers were too low, then this would prove that the German 
presence was on an inevitable path to decline and erasure. If, on the other hand, German-
speakers showed themselves to be residing in Slovenia in great numbers, they would 
therefore be able to secure the preservation of their culture through this demonstrably and 
verifiably clear method. The results of the census showed the number of Germans in 
Slovenia declining from 41,514 in 1921 to 28,998 in 1931, a slip from 3.9% to 2.53% of 
Slovenia’s population.278 In Cilli/Celje, the number of Germans fell by half, making their 
share of the city’s population there only 5.9%. The German share of population in 
Marburg/Maribor fell from 21.5% to 8.3%.279 
                                                          
276 DZ, “Um die Weltabrüstung”, August 2, 1931. 
 
277 DZ, “Volkszählung”, March 29, 1931. 
 





 By the spring of 1931, the Great Depression had rech d Slovenia. 
Unemployment increased steadily until 1933, and only reached its pre-Depression level 
in 1938.280 Austria’s Creditanstalt failed in May of 1931, resulting in Yugoslavia losing 
millions of dollars.281 “Our whole continent,” wrote the Deutsche Zeitung in May of 
1931, “especially its center, but also its east, are under the crushing pressure of economic 
desolation and therefore an uncertainty reaches into almost every family.”282 Economic 
problems added to the already-strained German minority in Slovenia, who were still 
dissatisfied with the current state of minority education and political rights. 
 Despite recoiling from the end of democracy in Italy and violence in the streets in 
Germany, Germans in Slovenia welcomed the stability that their own royal dictatorship 
had brought. “We Germans,” wrote the D utsche Zeitung in October of 1931, “having 
always proven to be an element of order, of construction, of economic progress, are 
above all interested in” the “well-being of all citizens” at a time when the worsening 
continental economy was causing hardship for millions. The paper expressed support for 
the royal dictatorship, since it was no longer “weakened by party struggles.” “We would 
like to keep this state of peace and order”, wrote the paper, “and so…we will vote for the 
state!”283 Despite massive abstention from non-Serbs, the 1931 election brought 306 new 
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deputies to the national parliament, little more than a front for democracy under the 
king’s personal rule.284 
 In November of 1931, the Deutsche Zeitung wrote an article addressing the rapid 
political rise of the National Socialist movement i the German Reich. Noting the 
incredible gains of the NSDAP in only a few short years, the paper expressed a mix of 
shock and awe at the increase in mandates for the National Socialists “from 12 to 107” 
and “six and a half million votes for Adolf Hitler.” While recognizing that 
“parliamentarism is rejected by the Hitler party”, the paper nonetheless could not help its 
amazement at how “every type of class…from the simple volunteer over [to] the 
bureaucrats and farmers, to the academics and educat ” had been convinced to vote for 
the Nazis. The Deutsche Zeitung was aware of the implications for European diplomacy 
and stability that the election of the National Socialists would bring: “It is obvious that 
this would be of enormous meaning for world politics.”  
“What, then, do the “Nazis” want…?” asked the paper. It went on to describe the 
party’s program, emphasizing the “liberation” and “renewal of the German people” in 
“racial, political, economic, and cultural” terms. Hitler’s claim to include all Germans in 
one state, along with his plans for reducing unemployment, was also stressed. Finally, the 
Deutsche Zeitung concluded its assessment of the Nazi Party by noting that “it was they 
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who first confronted the Social Democratic terror, broke it, and today are wresting away 
thousands of members from the Marxists.”285 
 Yet during the campaign for the new Reich President, the Deutsche Zeitung 
observed that “no one seriously believed” that Adolf Hitler would defeat “the old Field 
Marshal” Hindenburg.  “For that”, the paper stated, “there would have had to have been a 
revolution of the soul of extraordinary kind that, however, is still unimaginable in the 
peaceful, order-loving German people, despite its terrible experiences.” The paper went 
on to express relief that Hindenburg would “remain t the head of the Reich”, meaning 
there would be “no rash, adventurous development.” Nonetheless, the Deutsche Zeitung 
also remarked that “Hitler has doubled his votes…and that against Hindenburg!”286After 
the second round of voting concluded, the paper expessed its relief that the “venerable, 
legendary form of Hindenburg” would remain at the head of the Reich, and that what was 
“even more important” was that Hitler’s failure to win was seen as a setback for the 
National Socialists.287  
“Hitler’s National Socialism has become”, declared theDeutsche Zeitung on July 
24, 1932, “one of the most violent movements that is shaking the German world…It is 
the ideology of Hitler and his supporters that…must be grappled with.”288 Revulsion at 
the violence that accompanied the National Socialist movement in Germany but tacit 
approval of the end of democracy, as displayed by the Deutsche Zeitung and Mariborer 
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Zeitung, demonstrates the tensions and conflicting opinions among Slovenia’s German 
minority community. Some German nationalists were amazed at the astounding political 
rise of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists, who they saw as embodying their 
worldview of a living German Volk and German cultural superiority. Others of a more 
conservative nationalist persuasion agreed with parts of what the National Socialists were 
advocating, but disavowed its violent tendencies. Still others who may have had 
favorable or unfavorable views of the NSDAP itself had reservations over the party’s 
violence but had stronger concerns over the politica  instability its electoral success and 
party program resulted in. Such a wide spectrum of views on the National Socialist 
movement mirrors the type of reactions Reich Germans themselves held,289 and displays 
the various types of German nationalisms present in Slovenia.  
 After the July 1932 Reichstag elections in Germany which saw the NSDAP gain 
the largest share of the vote but not a majority,290 the Deutsche Zeitung expressed its 
“wonder” at the way “all of Germany” had been gripped by “election fever.” The paper 
gushed about how “there are now 13,722,748 National Socialist voters!” Most notable 
was the Deutsche Zeitung’s concluding thoughts about the election: “(What is) important 
for Germany is the overwhelming proof that this election has brought, that the German 
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Volk is disposed towards national, fatherland-ish, and masculine in its dynamic and 
youthful parts. When a people in the situation of the German people give 37.3 percent of 
its voters to so sharp a fatherland party, then that is  sign of healthy, lively freshness. 
Every German abroad must be happy about that.”291  
The Deutsche Zeitung’s disdain of the disorder the democracy could bring was 
seen in its reaction to the NSDAP’s electoral rise. “No one other than the leader of the 
largest…German party, Adolf Hitler, has denounced parliamentarians as well as 
parliamentarism as sharply as he did in his book, Mein Kampf.” The German people 
themselves, after the November elections resulted in a slight loss for the Nazis,292 had 
“decisively…shown” that the “Reichstag cannot rule”, and was “incapable of working, as 
it was earlier.”293  
While the Deutsche Zeitung was largely approving of Adolf Hitler and the rise of 
National Socialism in Germany, the Mariborer Zeitung expressed different views.  A few 
days after the July election, the paper commented upon the possible participation of the 
Catholic Zentrum party in a right-wing coalition government. Phrasing the article as 
“Zentrum against Dictatorship”, the paper saw the party’s entrance into a coalition with 
the NSDAP as helping to bring stability and legitimacy to what would otherwise prove to 
be a disaster for the German Republic.294 Unlike its counterpart in Cilli/Celje, the 
Mariborer Zeitung emphasized the NSDAP’s electoral decline in the November 1932 
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Reichstag elections. Especially important for the Mariborer Zeitung was that the election 
had taken place in “complete peace” and throughout “the entire Reich”, demonstrating 
that the German people had not been unduly influenced by other factors in expressing 
their will against a Nazi majority.295 
The Nazis’ electoral gains through the end of 1932 had produced mixed reactions 
among Slovenia’s German minority. While the Cillier Zeitung/Deutsche Zeitung spoke 
for some in its exultation and awe at the Nazis’ party platform and incredible gains made 
over such a short time, there were still pockets of keptics to be found in ethnic German 
perceptions of the NSDAP. Some Germans had seen the stability that had been brought 
about by the royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia and applied that logic to the politically-
deadlocked Weimar Republic. Others were revolted by the Nazis’ use of violent tactics to 
sway public opinion, or were not convinced by arguments in favor of a living 
Volksgemeinschaft of Germans in Europe. Though some German nationalists in Slovenia 
were taken up in passion by the rise of the NSDAP, this had only come about after their 
initial explosion onto the political scene in the 1930 Reichstag election.  The effects of 
the Great Depression and continuing lack of progress in regards to minority education, 
rights, and protection in Slovenia added to the disaffection that some Germans in 
Slovenia felt for the Yugoslav state. 
Throughout the 1920s, however, there remained a tension among Slovenia’s 
German minority – a tension in identity, nationalism, and views of Slovenia and 
Yugoslavia.  While some Germans remained optimistic that they could achieve social and 
cultural progress through political means, others maintained their conviction that they 
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were being persecuted by a nationalist Slovene majority government due to their ethnic 
German character. While German nationalist activists – aided by, at times, the Cillier 
Zeitung and Deutsche Zeitung – attempted to convince their fellow German-speakers that 
they were a part of a wider German Volk whose very existence was under threat, the 
reality of German identity and nationalism was more nuanced. Many German-speakers 
were unconvinced that voting for the Partei der Deutschen was in their best interest, or 
indeed, that voting in the election was important at all. The repeated attempts of German 
nationalists to control the interpretation of German identity in Slovenia were 
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Chapter Three – In the Shadow of the Third Reich, 1933-1941 
Previous scholarship has shown that, after the Nazis’ rise to power in 1933, 
particularly the Germans of Slovenia became Nazified, beginning a period of staunch 
support for National Socialism that would last through to the war years of the 1940s. 
Were all Germans supporters of the Nazis though? If not, then who were the Germans 
that were not supportive? What was, or was not, the appeal of National Socialism? How 
did the Germans in Slovenia view political developments in neighboring Austria? What 
can this reaction show about German identity and natio lism? This chapter will examine 
the reaction of the German minorities in Slovenia to the rise and the rule of the Nazis in 
the 1930s, then analyze what this reaction shows about German identity and nationalism 
in Slovenia, and explain why National Socialism was so appealing to some. 
Adolf Hitler, who had been publicly declaring his intentions to “intern 
Communist and Social Democratic opponents in concentration camps” should he receive 
the power to do so, became Chancellor of Germany in January of 1933 due to his own 
political maneuverings, as well as a “complex process of bargaining and intrigue” from 
other factors. Kurt von Schleicher and Franz von Papen’s fatefully-misguided 
assumptions of being able to control Hitler, or, once he “cracked under the strains of 
government”, take control of the German government, helped to manufacture the 
opportunity for the leader of the National Socialists to come to power.297 
                                                          
297 “Those who had engineered Hitler into the chancellorship imagined that they had finally achieved a 
viable conservative coalition, with the National Socialists alongside the German National People’s Party 
and the Stahlhelm, together with a scattering of expert ministers. Papen exuded confidence that Hitler could 
be contained, marginalised, and dropped before governm nt reverted to those who thought they had an 




Shortly after Adolf Hitler was appointed Reichskanzler on January 30, 1933, the 
Mariborer Zeitung expressed skepticism about the wisdom of giving “exclusive power” 
to “one single man” whose placement had been “strikingly” faster and earlier than “one 
may generally have thought.” The paper went on to explain, in a reassuring way, that the 
Reichswehr emained separate from his control, and that the Social Democrats would “set 
themselves in the harshest struggle against the new Hitler regime…with all available 
means.”298 Predictions of left-wing resistance to the Nazis’ ri e to power were 
immediately proven accurate, as members of the KPD and SPD, who had long been the 
objects of fanatical hatred of National Socialists during the years of the Weimar 
Republic, engaged in street fights, produced anti-Nazi publications, and otherwise 
“engaged in mass resistance” in the first year of dictatorship. Reprisal and repression was 
quick and ferocious; thousands of left-wing opponents of the Nazi regime were 
imprisoned, detained, tortured, and brutally mistreated in the months after Hitler and the 
National Socialists gained control of the Reich government.299 
 Similar to the Deutsche Zeitung’s previous alarm and exultation at the 
surprisingly rapid rise in the electoral fortunes of the National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party, the Mariborer Zeitung’s critical appraisal of Adolf Hitler’s appointment to 
Chancellor of the German Reich reflects varied thoug ts among its German-speaking 
readership in Slovenia. Reflecting on the “exclusive power” being given to “one man” 
                                                          
298 MZ, “Hitler als Kanzler”, February 1, 1933. 
 
299 Nikolaus Wachsmann, “The policy of exclusion: repression in the Nazi state, 1933-1939”, in Jane 
Caplan, ed., The Short Oxford History of Germany: Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 123. For more on left-wing resistance to the Nazis, see Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German 
Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism, trans. Jean Steinberg (New York: 
Praeger, 1971), 370-379. See also Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2004).  
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who had gained that power in a rather quick fashion is at once a lament for the fall of 
German democracy and an expression of support for the end of a perceived-unworkable 
parliamentary system.  
For those German-speakers in Slovenia who felt strongly in the tenets of 
democracy, the rise of the extremely anti-parliamentary NSDAP could only be a step 
backwards for stability both in Germany and in Europe. Others, who had seen the years 
of fragile coalitions of Weimar politics and obstacles to strong governance, felt that 
Hitler’s appointment and the strength of the Nazi Party would bring about a more stable, 
stronger German nation. Mentioning the opposition SPD gives a signal to both supporters 
and detractors of the NSDAP alike; for detractors, this was a sign that the Nazis would 
not have it all their own way, while supporters could steel themselves for the coming 
attempt to crush left-wing forces in Germany. Both f these currents, pro- and anti-Nazi, 
were among the members of the German minority community in Slovenia on the eve of 
the beginning of the German dictatorship.  
 
The Reichstag Election of March 1933 
The German Reichstag election of March 5, 1933, result d in a slim 52% majority 
for the Nazis and the DNVP, giving them 340 out of 647 seats. Despite expectations for a 
better result, the lack of a more widespread support for the National Socialists’ revolution 
meant that the two-thirds majority necessary to alter the constitution failed. Even with 
various methods of disenfranchisement and political oppression of other parties, the 
125 
 
National Socialists faced a country that had not, in he end, given it full trust to control 
the country.300  
The Deutsche Zeitung was firmly on the side of the new National Socialist 
government.301 In an article titled “Maker of Poison: The Fight against the Massive Lies 
of the Press”, the paper explained how a new “emergency decree” that contained 
“significant tightening of existing penalties for treason” was necessary to counteract the 
communications broadcast to foreign countries whose g al was to “slander and damage 
Germany.” From the Deutsche Zeitung’s perspective, the Reich government had “special 
reason to defend itself” against “how many occurrences happen abroad”, and was thus 
justified in its “fight against the untrue news” whic  had resulted in a “poisoning of 
public opinion.” The problem was, as the paper put it, that “the public will always believe 
these false, sensationalist news reports over the sob r truth.”302  
The Deutsche Zeitung’s vindication for the Nazis’ press censorship appealed to 
German nationalists who were already supportive of the National Socialist movement and 
government. But the paper’s lengthy explanation of the purpose of the censorship was 
also an attempt to persuade skeptical German-speakers in Slovenia of the legitimacy of 
the Third Reich’s new governmental policies. Being outside of Germany, German-
speakers in Slovenia would have been open to other countries’ interpretations of the 
                                                          
300 These methods included discounting the “votes of eighty-one Communist deputies” and changing 
procedural rules of the Reichstag to count absent dputies as present. Burleigh, Nazi Germany, 153. The 
Nazis and their allies were also able to command totally all media and had the police and SA to suppress 
political opposition. Stibbe, Germany, 1914-1933, 194. 
 
301 The editor in chief, Erich Petschauer, was known to be an “organized National Socialist” and “notorious 
opponent of Austria.” Dušan Nećak, “’Die Deutschen’ in Slowenien, 1938-1948”, in Slowenisch-
österreichische Beziehungen, 375.  
 
302 DZ, “Giftmischer”, March 5, 1933. 
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Nazis’ policies and, in the words of the Deutsche Zeitung, might be led to “believe these 
false, sensationalist news reports over the sober truth.” 
After the March 5 election, the Deutsche Zeitung reported on the “German 
wonder” that “Adolf Hitler’s liberation movement” had achieved. Noting how much 
larger the National Socialist share of the vote wasover its nearest competitors, the paper 
exulted in the spectrum of different types of peopl who had supported the NSDAP: 
The child from the Volk, the unknown German soldier, the German musketeer 
have accomplished the great, the unthinkable, after14 years of superhuman 
struggle: The German nation has placed a majority behind its national 
government, forged together in a fire. The Hitler government has been promised 
the overwhelming trust and all power from the German people. There is today no 
government in Europe that could have won such a measur  of power in a legal, 
constitutional way through the persuasive power of its idea[s]…303 
Welcoming the “turnaround of the German people and its fate” that the NSDAP’s 
political breakthrough had caused, the Deutsche Zeitung castigated “all those 
who…prophesied the deterioration” of the Nazi Party nd its ability to “take power 
through legal means.” The paper declared that “Adolf Hit er has confirmed his power 
through legal means: through legal means, he achieved the German revolution, the 
uplifting of the nation (Aufbruch der Nation), the Third Reich.”304   
 Addressing critics who would “of course say, the wonder of this election has been 
achieved through the terrorization of the other parties”, the Deutsche Zeitung asked, 
“Where was this terrorization?” Putting the blame on the “communists” who had 
“identified themselves” as “lackeys of Moscow” in burning the Reichstag, the paper 
rejected the notion that the Nazis had achieved their el ctoral victory through illegal or 
                                                          





violent methods.305 The Deutsche Zeitung’s accusation of communist terrorism in 
Germany was one reason for its support of the NSDAP’s political victory: “The elections 
of March 5 are, finally, of great significance for Europe, since it signals the liquidation of 
Communism.” The paper also explicitly included the G rman minority community in its 
celebration of the result of the March 5 election. “Not only the Germans in the Reich or 
in Austria, but rather all Germans in the world joyously and, deeply moved, thank God 
that He has sent the German Volk , of which we are a part, over all borders as a far-
reaching community, the right man for the most horrible hours of fate.”306 
 The Deutsche Zeitung’s crowing over the NSDAP’s electoral success was 
tempered by its awareness that a significant portion of its readership held critical views of 
the violent tendencies of the Nazis. Stressing the legal methods by which the Nazis 
gained power was intended to reassure or placate th segment of German-speakers in 
Slovenia who were skeptical of aspects of National Socialism, while the paper’s clear joy 
of the significance of the National Socialists’ ideology for the renewal of the Volk shows 
that there was also a not-inconsiderable amount of Germans in Slovenia who were 
supportive or, indeed, fanatical in their beliefs in common with National Socialism. The 
Deutsche Zeitung’s stringent anti-communism as well reflects a deeply-held worldview 
among certain members of the German minority in Slovenia, like those involved in 
industry and business, who were strongly liberal, ntionalist, pro-free market, and pro-
                                                          
305 Ibid. 
 
306 Ibid. Including “Germans all over the world” as part of the Volk, not just the citizens of the Reich, 
supported National Socialism’s ideology of the Volk as a living, breathing, indivisible component nation 
comprised of all Germans throughout the world. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 19. 
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capitalism.307 That the paper would include a strongly-worded refer nce to God’s 
involvement in the rise of German National Socialism points to a robust Catholicism and 
Christian identity among German-speakers in Slovenia.  By linking Christianity with the 
Nazis, the Deutsche Zeitung was attempting to persuade those German-speakers who felt 
strongly about their religion and the anti-Christian tendencies of the National Socialists308 
that the revolutionary movement was not in fact a threat to their way of life and identity. 
 
 
                                                          
307 Despite the social policies of the 1920s that saw German culture and societal institutions restricted if not 
removed, Germans still retained well into the 1930s a large part of their pre-Versailles hold on Slovenia’s 
industrial wealth: Slovenian sources stated in 1938 that, in Lower Styria, 144 industrial establishments 
were German, while only 131 were in Slovenian hands.  This at a time when the German population had 
been shrinking and the Slovene one increasing. The German community in banking was still strong in the 
1930s as well; the Marburger Kreditanstalt had links to Vienna and though it had Slovenian representatives 
on its board of directors, it was always Germans who had the final say in decisions. Suppan, “Zur Lage der 
Deutschen in Slowenien zwischen 1918 und 1938”, 190. When the NSDAP was campaigning in elections 
in the Weimar years, emphasized anti-capitalist views in order to appeal to the working class. Mark 
Mazower writes that “fascism stressed manual labor rather than machinery and technology as in the USSR 
or the USA…’I am a socialist,’ Hitler stated, ‘because it appears to me incomprehensible to nurse and 
handle a machine with care but to allow the most noble representatives of (labor), the people, to decay.’” 
Though the Nazis and other fascist parties in interwar Europe portrayed themselves as pro-worker and anti-
capitalism, once in power they acted quite differently – as the Nazis’ treatment of socialists and 
communists in the 1930s decisively shows. Mazower, Da k Continent, 131. Though German industrialists, 
liberals, and others who held pro-capitalist views in Slovenia would have regarded the anti-capitalist, an i-
business rhetoric of the Nazis with alarm, this wasevidently outweighed by these same peoples’ intense 
dislike of socialism and communism, as well as perhaps other appealing aspects of National Socialism. 
 
308 The Nazis were, in their early years, supporters of Christianity, even including an article in the party’s 
program that emphasized Christianity’s role in fight ng “Marxist atheism.” Bracher, The German 
Dictatorship, 380. Though Hitler was personally opposed to the C urch for political reasons, millions of 
German Catholics and Protestants – who together constituted the overwhelming majority of Germans – 
were drawn to the National Socialist movement. Despit  this, many Christians found the Nazis 
incompatible with their religious beliefs; in some parts of the country, Catholics “were explicitly forbidden 
to become members of the Nazi Party.” J.S. Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933-1945 
(New York: Basic Books, 1968), 3-6. The Roman Catholic Church and many Catholics in Germany in 
particular were opposed to the Nazis’ racist treatment of Jews, forced abortions, sterilizations, and 
euthenizations, if they at the same time did not actively or violently resist the National Socialist regime. See 
Richard Steigmann-Gall, “Religion and the churches”, in Caplan, ed., The Short Oxford History of Nazi 
Germany, 146-167. As for Austria, the German Nazi Party saw Catholics as “the chief sources of anti-
German hate” in that country. Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian 
National Socialism (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 99. 
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In the Wake of the Machtergreifung and the National Socialist Dictatorship  
Moving quickly after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in January and the 
Party’s electoral success in March of 1933, the Nazis manipulated the political opposition 
enough to pass the Enabling Act by a wide margin, thereby giving the NSDAP the ability 
to govern for four years without needing to consult the Reichstag.309 With complete 
political power in the hands of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, the various 
cultural organizations that supported Germans abroad quickly fell victim to the process of 
Gleichschaltung and began, along with newly-created organizations such as the 
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle,310 to pursue the spreading of Nazism to the Volksdeutsche 
outside the Third Reich.311 For Hitler and his National Socialist ideological ompatriots, 
Eastern Europe’s vast terrain, inhabited by “lesser” humans, posed a grave threat to the 
                                                          
309 The Enabling Act,  which was renewed in 1937, was only opposed by the Social Democrats, who voted 
against it en masse. While the SS and SA intimidated opposition deputies, Hitler and Papen managed to 
convince the Catholic Zentrum and other parties, to vote in favor of the law. The Weimar constitution was 
kept “for reasons of convenience, and to foster an impression of continuity and legality.” Burleigh, Nazi 
Germany, 154-155.  
 
310 The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi – Ethnic German Liaison Office) was founded in 1935 by the 
Nazis to “centralize and coordinate all organizations and activities in the Reich dealing with the 
Volksdeutsche.” Hitler had given leadership of the new party appratus to Heinrich Himmler, who, in his 
new capacity as Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV – Reich Commissar for 
the Strengthening of Germandom), “considered it a chan e to begin the construction of the new racial 
order.” Himmler eventually maneuvered VoMi’s organizat on to essentially become an arm of the SS, and 
would use the group to communicate with and spread Nazi ideology to Europe’s ethnic German minorities 
living outside the Third Reich. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 12-14. 
 
311 Ibid., 73. The ultimate goal was to, if not complete y convince the millions of Germans abroad to 
become hard-core believers in National Socialism, then to at least accept Adolf Hitler as Führer of the 
German Volk. Once this was accomplished, the various ethnic German minority groups would then be able 
to serve (or be exploited for) the foreign policy objectives and interests of Nazi Germany. Ibid. The major 
Reich organizations concerned with Germans abroad, the VDA and DAI, were quickly put under Nazi 
leadership. New Reich departments, such as the Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP and Auslandabteilung 
der Reichsleitung der NSDAP were set up so as to promote Nazi ideology abroad, especially among ethnic 
Germans. Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 6-9. An example of the type 
of message Nazi organizations sent to ethnic Germans abroad can be seen in the following quotation from 
Theodor Oberländer, writing against Poland: “The struggle for ethnicity…is nothing other than the 
continuation of war by other means under the cover f peace. Not a fight with gas, grenades, and machine-
guns, but a fight about homes, farms, schools, and the souls of children, a struggle…which goes on for 
generations with one aim: extermination!” Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 44.  
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very existence of Germany. The only recourse was a massive territorial expansion into 
the East, accompanied by Germanization of the land and its people.312 Though Hitler 
privately was uncertain as to what role, precisely, thnic Germans abroad should have in 
his plans for Lebensraum in the East, in public at least he claimed that Nazi Germany was 
to be their defender. While this purpose would, for the Nazis, partially justify aggressive 
territorial expansion, the views and loyalties of the ethnic Germans themselves towards 
the Third Reich and its motives were more nuanced.313  
The first signs of National Socialist propaganda,314 or indeed, genuine support for 
the Nazis, among the German community of Slovenia began to arise in early 1933. Some 
German-speakers in Cilli/Celje had begun to greet each other with “Heil Hitler”, while 
swastika flags started appearing on houses in the Gottschee/Kočevje and Hitler’s 
                                                          
312 Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, volume I, 4-9. 
 
313 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 11-15. Though there were, depending 
on which country, many Germans who desired to return to the Third Reich and accepted Nazi Germany’s 
expansionist goals, the fact that many more of the so-called Volksdeutsche had to be persuaded and 
sometimes “educated” to accept this ideology and their Germanic identity itself shows that regional 
affiliation was often stronger than an ancestrally-German one. For Europe’s ethnic minorities in the 
interwar period, the question of loyalty was often interpreted by the majority ethnicity to justify anti-
minority policies. Traditional pillars of “loyalty” that divided majorities from their minorities – nationality, 
ethnicity, religion, language – were not in every case treated the same by either side of the issue. Pet r
Haslinger and Joachim von Puttkamer, “Staatsmacht, Minderheit, Loyalität – konzeptionelle Grundlagen 
am Beispiel Ostmittel- und Südosteuropas in der Zwischenkriegzeit”, in Peter Haslinger and Joachim von 
Puttkamer, eds., Staat, Loyalität und Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, 1918-1941 (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 1-3.  
 
314 The Nazi Machtergreifung signaled the start of a “national revolution” that would “transform German 
society in accordance with their ideology.” Part of his “re-education” and mobilization of the German 
people, as well as Germans abroad, was through propaganda aimed at the integration of “disparate elements 
under the banner of national rebirth for Germany.” This attempt to spread the message of a 
Volksgemeinschaft, of which every ethnic German in the world was a part, was based upon four core 
principles: “1) appeal to national unity based upon the principle ‘the community before the individual’ 
(Volksgemeinschaft); 2) the need for racial purity; 3) a hatred of enemies which increasingly centered on 
Jews and Bolsheviks, and 4) charismatic leadership (Führerprinzip).” David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and 
the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community”, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 
32, No. 2 (2004), 213-217.  For more on Nazi propaganda during World War II, see Jeffrey Herf, The 
Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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speeches were broadcast on the radio.315 Austria’s consul in Ljubljana, Dr. Orsini-
Rosenberg, “apprehensively” (besorgt) reported to Christian-Social Chancellor Dollfuß 
on the National Socialist attitudes of German youths in Slovenia, many of whom had 
studied at universities in the Reich.316  
The Deutsche Zeitung, in its exhilaration over the rise of the Nazi Party, listed the 
reasons for its support of the NSDAP – and thereby attempted to persuade its readership 
of the benefits the new National Socialist regime would bring. The paper jubilated over 
the German people’s “readiness” to “raise itself out of destitution and, through effort and 
labor, win a place in the world again, a place in the sun.” The rejuvenation of Germany’s 
economic and political might, which had been brought down by “enmity against 
Germany”, would “signify good for the whole world.”317 The National Socialist 
“revolution” had brought about “reconciliation between the manual laborer and 
intellectual” which had helped to bring about the “elimination of unemployment.”318  
Germany’s economic revival would certainly have been w lcome news for the 
business owners, bankers, and other industrialists in Slovenia who stood to benefit from 
increased trade between the Third Reich and Yugoslavia.319 Expressing exhilaration over 
                                                          
315 Attempts by the Austrian National Socialist Party to spread their own version of German nationalist 
propaganda to the Germans of Slovenia were largely suppressed by the Slovene government, though not in 
every case; for example, the Marburg/Maribor branch of the Kulturbund was successful in March of 1934 
in organizing a German youth group with the Führerprinzip being implemented. Suppan, “Lage der 
Deutschen in Slowenien”, 210-212. 
 
316 Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 14. 
 
317 DZ, “Die Deutsche Maifeier”, May 4, 1933. 
 
318 DZ, “Das Riesenfest der Deutschen Arbeit”, May 4, 1933. 
 
319 A major problem for establishing Yugoslavia’s independence was its reliance upon foreign trade with 
the neighboring countries that “most wanted to control or destroy” it. Frank C. Littlefield, Germany and 
Yugoslavia, 1933-1941: The German Conquest of Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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Germany’s apparent revival of its former glory attests to the strong current of post-war 
emotion for German-speakers throughout Eastern and Ce tral Europe, as they had had to 
endure losing their privileged status as an ethnic majority in either the German Reich or 
Austrian Empire after the Central Powers’ defeat in the Great War. Emphasizing National 
Socialism’s appeal across class boundaries as well refl cts upon a certain class divide 
among Slovenia’s German community; in highlighting the “reconciliation between the 
manual laborer and intellectual”, the Deutsche Zeitung is demonstrating the newfound 
strength in unity in Germany that it wanted to replicate in Slovenia’s German minority. 
While the Deutsche Zeitung was expressing support for a foreign political party 
that was explicit in its aggressive intentions towards other countries,320 the paper still 
emphasized non-violence and loyalty to the Yugoslav t te. On the occasion of an 
attempted assassination of Chancellor Dollfuß, the paper reported that “an Austrian shot 
at the Minister-President of our neighboring state! Luckily the shots were not fatal, and 
we are happy that they were not deadly.” To underscore its continuing loyal devotion to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1988), 27. Yugoslavia’s main trade partner had been Italy, until the Great Depression led Mussolini to 
favor Hungary. Relations worsened when Yugoslavia approved of the sanctions put against Italy for its 
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Nazi Germany was ready nd willing to fill the gap that had thus opened up 
in Yugoslavia’s trade. Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 275.While economic 
concerns were definitely a reason for increased trade with Germany, there were also political reasons f r 
Yugoslavia’s shift in foreign interests. “By 1935, Yugoslav exports to France had shrunk to less than 15 
percent of their 1930 level. The shift to Germany began as an effort to observe the League of Nations 
embargo against Italy after its 1935 conquest of Ethiopia. If Yugoslavia observed the sanctions, it would 
hurt Mussolini’s hostile government and win Western approval at the same time.  When the French 
government failed to reward [Prime Minister] Stojadinović by relaxing its protectionist tariffs, he readily 
responded to the offer of favorable export prices tendered by Hitler’s finance minister, Hjalmar Schacht, in 
June 1936.” Germany had also an increased demand for Yugoslavia’s copper and bauxite resources. 
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 179-180. As well, France’s diplomatic cooperation with Italy and the Soviet 
Union especially irritated Yugoslavia. The Great Depression had heavily damaged the export-oriented 
economies of Slovenia and Croatia, who began in the early 1930s to advocate for a stronger economic 
relationship with both Germany and Great Britain. Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich, 285. 
 
320 Though Hitler had, once he gained power, begun to moderate his international image, his earlier 




the Yugoslav state, the paper explained that “as members of the German 
Volksgemeinschaft with the motto “loyal to State and Volk, we are interested in the 
incidents in Germany and Austria.” Noting that “because we belong to a different state”, 
the Germans of Slovenia would be expected even moreso to condemn the incidents, they 
took pains to repudiate what had happened.321  
With the growing strength of the Austrian National Socialist Party (Deutsche 
Nationalsozialistische Partei, DNSAP) creating a threat to Dollfuß’s ruling by decree in 
early 1933, the Austrian Nazis began a period of several years in Austria marked by 
terrorism, civil war, bombings, and political suppression.322 As a reflection of its 
German-speaking, Austrian-affiliated readership, the Deutsche Zeitung’s repudiation of 
the violence occurring in Austria done by National Socialists was meant to reassure both 
Germans in Slovenia as well as the Ljubljana and Belgrade governments that this same 
type of ideological warfare would not be spilling over the border. But the paper’s 
inclusion of Slovenia’s German-speaking population in the racial Volksgemeinschaft 
points as well to a large segment of the minority community that sympathized, at least in 
some ways, with aspects of the German nationalism of National Socialism.  
                                                          
321 DZ, “Schüsse in die Weltgeschichte”, October 8, 1933. 
 
322 By the Spring of 1933, Austria’s Nazi Party could “legitimately claim to be a mass movement”, with 
roughly one-third of Austrians finding at least parts of its platform appealing. The DNSAP appealed to a
wide swath of the Austrian electorate – the young, students, peasants, miners, businessmen, and Catholics 
and Protestants alike. With the German Nazis’ electoral victory in March of 1933, the Austrian Nazis 
“appeared to be well prepared to challenge the governm nt in a test of strength and will power.” Chancellor 
Dollfuß “refused to be intimidated” by this growing threat, and exploited a parliamentary procedure in 
March to rule Austria by decree. He proceeded to oulaw the Austrian Nazi Party and wage a campaign of 
violence against both Nazi and Socialist agitation against his rule over the next several years. Pauley, Hitler 
and the Forgotten Nazis, 102-104. Austria’s Christian Social movement saw “political Catholicism” as a 
greater force than ethnic German nationalism as espoused by the Nazis, who in any case were perceived to 
be anti-Catholic. Similar to the German-language press in neighboring Slovenia, this did not stop pro-Nazi 
sentiment in newspapers to claim a majority in favor of Anschluss and National Socialism after the 
Machtergreifung in 1933. Thorpe, Pan-Germanism and the Austrofascist state, 108-109.  
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One major factor shared by both of these camps, whether anti- or pro-Nazism, is a 
type of German nationalism. German proponents of Nation l Socialism in Slovenia who 
jubilated over Hitler’s ascension to power in the Rich and sought Austria’s inclusion 
with Nazi Germany maintained this sentiment, but had to remain muted due to the hostile 
attitude of the Yugoslav and Slovene governments. But other German nationalists, many 
of whose Christian identity precluded them from fully embracing National Socialism, 
were apprehensive about the Third Reich’s intentions t wards Austria and Slovenia’s 
Catholic German populations.323  
The Deutsche Zeitung found itself defending Nazi Germany’s new laws,324 such 
as one aimed at “preserving the (German) race”, which ad “incited a not inconsiderable 
storm” of controversy. To justify what was “really meant to achieve with this measure”, 
the paper declared that the “most dangerous opponent f German National Socialism was 
and is perhaps still – Communism.” Noting that the Soviet Union had the “most 
inconsiderable” attention to “preservation of the race”, the paper then explained how 
“German racial preservation is not so much the product of an overwrought, specific 
Germanic racial pride as it is more a defensive measure against an intermixing [of races] 
                                                          
323 This same type of dynamic was present in Austria a the time, whose geographical proximity to the 
Third Reich heightened the conflicted identities and nationalisms among German-speakers there. Thorpe, 
Pan-Germanism and the Austrofascist State, 109-120. 
 
324 Shortly after taking over control of the country, the Nazis began to implement racial laws that legalized 
discrimination against “non-Germans” in Germany, such as Jews, gypsies, Poles, and other minorities. 
Some examples of the titles of these laws, whose objectives were plain to see: “The Law for the Prevention 
of Progeny with Hereditary Diseases (Eugenics Law)”, “The Law for the Protection of German Blood and 
German Honor” (September 15, 1935), “The Law on the Revocation of Naturalization and the Deprivation 
of German Citizenship (July 14, 1933)”, “The Reich Citizenship Law” (September 15, 1935). See Diemut 
Majer’s exhaustive study of the Nazi legal system and its racial discrimination against “non-Germans” in 
the Third Reich and the countries it occupied during World War II.  Diemut Majer, “Non-Germans” under 
the Third Reich: The Nazi Judicial and Administrative System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Europe, 
with Special Regard to Occupied Poland, 1939-1945, trans. Peter Thomas Hill, Edward Vance Humphrey, 
and Brian Levin (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
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that can bear no good fruit.”325 The paper’s defense of Nazi Germany’s race laws was 
also a defense of an extremely nationalist aspect of National Socialist ideology that saw 
the German Volk as composed of not merely German language and culture, but by race. 
For the Deutsche Zeitung, a dangerous “mixing” of other races into the German Volk was 
not simply a problem for the Third Reich, but all Germans in Europe who, as organically 
attached to the Volk, could not be divided by geographical barriers.326 
Justifying Nazi Germany’s racial laws by referring to the specter of international 
communism indicates that the more extreme-racial str nd of National Socialist ideology 
did not have a strong grip upon German-speakers in Slovenia. Rather, the threat of 
revolutionary communism was a real, tangible fear for many Germans in Yugoslavia. 
While certain German nationalists in Slovenia felt themselves to be culturally superior 
due to their Germanic characteristics, this did not necessarily translate into support for the 
Nazis’ belief in Aryan dominance.327 
Anti-communism was a robust principle held among a significant segment of 
Germans in Slovenia, whose politically center-right, national liberal worldview became 
more prominent as the National Socialist government targeted the German left-wing for 
persecution. One of the last articles of the Deutsche Zeitung before it was shut down due 
                                                          
325 DZ, “Rassenerhaltung”, November 19, 1933. 
 
326 Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 20.  
 
327 Hitler, who as Führer was the embodiment of the will of the entire German Volk, mixed the biological 
racism of radical anti-Semitism with the “politically and economically motivated anti-Semitism that had 
been widespread in the nations of Europe since the nd of the nineteenth century. According to this 
doctrine, whatever race was stronger was therefore the better one, and the weaker therefore the worse; the 
stronger race’s rule over the weaker was a necessity ordained by nature.” The strongest race was the Aryan 
one, which was the only race capable of being able to rule the world. Majer, “Non-Germans” under the 
Third Reich, 35-37. 
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to governmental pressure328 painted in hysterical tones the “danger of war from 
Bolshevism”, an ideology that was aggressive in its ature and “duty-bound” to spread 
itself across Europe.329 Such fear-mongering indicates what was a common view held by 
many towards communism, but was also an attempt to convince others who were more 
pragmatic in their skepticism of communism how real the ideology and its adherents 
were for potentially impacting their lives.330 
 
The Erneuerbewegung, Conflicted Identities, and Contested Nationalisms 
In early January, 1934, the Deutsche Zeitung addressed claims about a split 
between older and younger Germans in Yugoslavia over l yalty to the state versus Nazi 
Germany.  Though the paper explicitly rejected the thesis of the composition of the so-
called Erneuerbewegung, arguing that young and old Germans in Slovenia alike were 
united in their support for National Socialism,331 this “renewal movement” had in reality 
taken firm root among many Germans outside the Reich.332 In Yugoslavia, there was an 
intense struggle for power for the leadership of the Schwäbisch-Deutsche Kulturbund 
between the “old” and the “new” generations, mostly over differences concerning the 
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329 DZ, “Kriegsgefähr durch den Bolschewismus”, January 31, 1937. 
 
330 Anti-communism was not limited to the wealthy classes who feared for their material and physical well-
being in the case of a hypothetical communist attack. Many anti-Communists were religious, afraid that a 
revolutionary takeover would lead to the abolition of their faith.  Others, who sometimes had been 
enchanted by the Russian Revolution, became disillusioned after seeing the disconnect between rhetoric 
and reality in communist countries. See François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of 
Communism in the Twentieth Century, trans. Deborah Furet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 
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minorities’ relationship with Germany and National Socialism.333 While the “old” 
generation held on to its leadership for a long time, it was forced to change direction by 
the increasingly-close relationship between Germany and Yugoslavia, as well as 
maneuverings from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and Verein für das Deutschtum im 
Ausland.334 The Deutsche Zeitung’s dismissal of the idea of a split in German attitudes 
towards National Socialism is in part an affirmation of the strength of the 
Erneuerbewegung in Slovenia335 but also highlights the fact that there was in fact some 
disunity, despite what the paper’s editors claimed.336 
One year after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, the Deutsche Zeitung reflected 
on the “historic” year 1933 and its implications for the “whole German people.” “When, 
                                                          
333 For a detailed look at the split in leadership of theKulturbund and the Erneuerbewegung, see Lyon, 
“After Empire”, 310-376. 
 
334 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 130-134. This split was marked not 
only by young versus old, but also by “Austrian” Germans in Slovenia, who had mostly controlled the 
leading positions in the Kulturbund despite being a minority of Germans in Yugoslavia, and German-
speaking Swabians from the more rural parts of the kingdom. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle had been 
trying since the early 1930s to decisively influenc and control the SDKB, but was only successful in 1939 
in getting their choice for leader, Sepp Janko, accepted by the membership.  Lumans, Himmler’s 
Auxiliaries, 119. Nonetheless, the mid-1930s saw increased contact between the Kulturbund and 
government agencies of the Third Reich. Four German embers of the Yugoslav parliament sent a report 
to the German Foreign Ministry in late 1935/early 1936 that gave a less-than-even-handed account of the 
political and economic developments of the German minority in Yugoslavia up to then. Report of the 
Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund to the Auswärtiges Amt, February 14, 1936. NARA, RG-242, T-120, 
Roll 3107, frame E540496-E540519. This undoubtedly helped to shape the Nazi regime’s understanding of 
the German situation in Yugoslavia as being dire and in need of official assistance from the Reich.  
 
335 “The popularity of the radical Erneuerung movement in Slovenia was understandable because of th  
Slovene attitude toward the ethnic Germans. By 1937 they had eliminated all German schools, and in the 
German classes of the state schools, the instructors we e mostly anti-German Slovenians. The Slovenes 
discriminated even against Germans who were reserve offic rs in the Yugoslavian army, especially in the
border districts where they did not permit the ethnic Germans to buy real estate within fifty kilometers of 
the border.” Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 134. 
 
336 Indeed, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle itself noted that the strongest way that it could spread its influence 
among the German minority in Yugoslavia was through the leader of the SDKB, Dr. Stephan Kraft, with 
dissenting opinions of anti-Nazi factions within the organization being “corrected.” Recognizing that t ere 
were powerful anti-Nazi voices within the German community shows how strong this non-Nazi identity 
was in Slovenia. Memorandum of the Auswärtiges Amt, March 19, 1936. NARA, RG-242, T-120, Roll 
3107, frame E540528-E540529.  
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in high misery, Adolf Hitler took over the regiment on January 30, 1933,” began the 
paper, “he faced a task whose solution appeared to xceed human power and human 
ability. Today, however, the new Germany is showing that it has become a strong state 
framework (Staatsgefüge) and a political factor that is no longer overlooked.” The paper 
also praised Hitler’s foreign policy, saying that he ad “pursued the struggle for 
Germany’s equality and security.”337 By showing how Hitler had overcome those 
problems facing Germany “whose solution appeared to exceed human power”, the 
Deutsche Zeitung is implicitly adhering to a religious-like belief in the Führer’s power to 
single-handedly renew the Volk, of which the Germans in Slovenia are a part. As such, 
Germany’s “struggle for equality and security” meant that the Germans outside of the 
Third Reich could expect to achieve those rights and protections from a successful Nazi 
foreign policy that they had not received through the previous decades diplomatic 
overtures. 
The Deutsche Zeitung ushed over how Hitler had “achieved a completely n w 
state and is in the process of forming a new Volk that will have nothing more in common 
with the German Volk before 1933.” Hitler, in contrast to what Bismarck had attempted 
to do with the founding of the Second Reich, was “creating one Reich and one Volk.” In 
foreign policy, the paper praised the “diplomatic su cess” of the Führer in signing the 
“pact of peace” between Poland and Germany. Hitler had “proven that he would pursue 
an identified goal with fanatical energy” as “part of a plan.” As well, the “Austrian 
people” would “not accept for long” the way the country had been being run by Dollfuß: 
“No country can be ruled (through) terror for very long. After these last, harsh measures 
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by the Dollfuß government, the rest of Austria will also probably grasp what is at 
stake.”338  
The paper’s emphatic expression of awe and jubilation over the Nazis’ “renewal” 
of the German Volk emphasizes one way in which National Socialism was appealing to 
Germans in Slovenia. It promised not only a legal restoration of prior societal dominance, 
in that Nazi Germany would return one day to give back to Germans their lost rights and 
privileges, but also a spiritual renewal, by including the souls of Germans in Slovenia 
with the organic, living body of a renewed, strong, and pure Volk. Restoration of both 
societal dominance and spiritual purity was needed for these Germans, as the Great War 
had resulted in not only a humiliating loss for Austria and Germany, but the real threat of 
cutting off the Germandom of the Slovene lands from its ancestral home. For these 
German nationalists, Hitler represented the final key to decisively ending the nationalities 
struggle, the culture war, that had existed between Slovenes and Germans for decades, 
and would ensure that the Germans, who were inherently superior, would emerge on top. 
Though the Deutsche Zeitung meant the suppression of Austria’s National 
Socialist opposition when it referred to the “harsh measures” of the Dollfuß government, 
its disinterest in clearly explicating that interpretation indicates that there was 
disagreement in Slovenia’s German community over th course of events in Austria. By 
highlighting the peacemaking abilities of Adolf Hitler, as well as the denigration of “rule 
through terror”, the Deutsche Zeitung exposes a segment of its readership that were eithr 
anti-Nazi, anti-violence, pro-democracy, or some combination of all three. One does not 
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necessarily have to be a supporter of National Socialism to dislike the imprisonment and 
oppression of its members within the context of an anti-democratic state.  
The Deutsche Zeitung emphasized the “real domestic stability” that the Nazis had 
brought to Germany, even (or perhaps especially) because of its “confrontation with the 
10 million Social Democrats and 5 million Communists.” The paper additionally pointed 
out how Hitler had succeeded in getting “millions of Catholics” to “heartily support” him, 
including his predecessor as Chancellor, Franz von Papen.339 The Deutsche Zeitung 
relayed a speech given by Franz von Papen on January 14, 1934, about the “Christian 
principles of the Third Reich.”340 Though in prior speeches von Papen had been critical 
of certain aspects of the Nazi regime, including its totalitarianism and dangerous joining 
of “Party” with “State”, the Deutsche Zeitung selectively edited its reports to include only 
excerpts that positively emphasized the different ways in which Christianity and National 
Socialism were compatible.341 In this way, the Deutsche Zeitung tried to persuade 
skeptical Catholic Germans in Slovenia of the merits of National Socialism, and show 
that the Nazis were not the danger to their religion that they were perceived to be. 
Germans in Slovenia were not completely convinced about the unity of the 
German people, especially when it came to a distinct Austrian identity.342 Reporting on 
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340 DZ, “Die Christlichen Grundsätze des Dritten Reichs”, March 1, 1934. 
 
341 Though von Papen himself was spared retribution for his less-than-subtle anti-Nazi comments, several 
thousand Catholics gathered for a rally a short time later to hear another speech by Erich Klausener’s 
Catholic Action, which would incense Hitler and lead to the death of the man who wrote von Papen’s 
speeches during the Night of the Long Knives. Burleigh, The Third Reich, 677-678.  
 
342 That is, the type of Austrian identity that competed with the Nazis “as defenders of the ‘true Germany’ 
and ‘true Germandom.’” Dollfuß displayed this uniquely Austrian-German nationalist identity when he 
proclaimed that “We want a German Austria and a free Austria…At a time when the world shrinks from a 
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this “cleavage” that had arisen at a time when “history is being made for the German 
Volk”, the Deutsche Zeitung expressed deep skepticism over the “tragedy” of the 
implications of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, which had said that “Austria must 
remain independent”:  
That the Germans in the Reich and in Austria were unable to fuse together, even 
though Austria was freed from all the non-German areas by the peace treaties, is 
sad. But what is to be anchored in the German Volk’s fate on May 1 of this year in 
Vienna is deeply tragic, (this) is history becoming German disunion!... The one 
half of Austrians thinks ethnically (völkisch), pushes ideologically and politically 
towards the Reich [while the other half] thinks Catholic and places itself with the 
government away from the natural arc of history of each geographically-separated 
body of the Volk. These two parts of the Austrian people are in a mighty struggle 
against each other.343 
The Deutsche Zeitung’s derision of an independent Austria and a uniquely Austrian 
identity exhibits the cleavage that had split German-speakers’ identities and nationalisms 
in Slovenia after the rise of National Socialism in the Reich. While the first several post-
war years had seen the forced exclusion of Austria from Germany, the Nazis’ taking of 
power in the Reich and explicit calls for Anschluss changed the dynamics of how German 
identity was shaped among the minority communities of East and Central Europe. Before 
the establishment of the Nazi state, Germans’ identti s and nationalisms in Slovenia 
could be defined in terms of a shared language, culture, and history. That Hitler 
established racial criteria in determining who was a German narrowed the spectrum for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
certain German spirit we want to show the world that we possess a Christian German civilization. In our 
Austrian way we feel ourselves to be a true component of the German way and of German life…” This 
German-Austrian identity allowed Austrians to continue to see themselves as members of the German 
nation and culture, but that the Christian and Austrian concept of Germanness was irreconcilable with the 
Nazi one in the Third Reich. William T. Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a 
Western State (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1973), 35-36. Dollfuß and his successors 
“defined the nature of their regime as Christian and German and Austrian – Austrian not as a contradiction 
to German but as the resumption of pre-republican tr ditions with a distinct Catholic flavor.” Pelinka, Out 
of the Shadow of the Past, 12. 
 
343 DZ, “Zwiespalt”, April 26, 1934. 
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who could be a part of the Volk. Catholic German-speaking residents of Lower Styria o  
Carinthia who were married to Catholic German-speaking and ethnically Slovene spouses 
would not be able to include their family in this new Volksgemeinschaft. For those 
German-speakers in Slovenia who identified themselves as strongly by their German 
language and culture as with their Roman Catholic re gion or affiliation to an 
independent, Catholic Austria, the new German natiol sm as defined by National 
Socialism was not especially appealing, and the new Third Reich was not the welcoming 
homeland for European Germandom that it was touted to be. Still other German-speakers 
who were perhaps bilingual, or did not consider thems lves fully “German” or part of the 
German community, had to be persuaded that they were, in fact, members of a racial 
Volksgemeinschaft. 
While the Deutsche Zeitung was denigrating an independent, German Austria, it 
also displayed advertisements that implored for more Germans in Slovenia to join the 
Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund: “Fellow Germans, join the Schwäbisch-Deutscher 
Kulturbund! It is the best promoter of your aspirations (and) that stands by your side in 
your ethnic distress (Volkstumnöten)…” 344 That the Deutsche Zeitung so prominently and 
consistently published these large-scale advertisements for the Schwäbisch-Deutscher 
Kulturbund reinforced both its own claim to be the voice of the German minority in 
Slovenia and that this German minority shared its editorial stance in defining the contours 
of German identity and nationalism. But its explanations of the point of the Kulturbund – 
to promote and support the German culture and community in Yugoslavia – should have 
been obvious and thus unstated if, indeed, all German-speakers shared a common self-
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identity.  That the paper continued to feel it necessary to clarify what use ordinary 
Germans would get out of joining the Kulturbund, as well as the fact that the Kulturbund 
itself felt that its enrolment was too low, shows that, for many Germans, identity and 
nationalisms were varied and not necessarily the same as those being espoused by the 
Deutsche Zeitung and Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund.  
After the assassination of King Aleksandar in Marseilles on October 9, 1934,345 
Slovenia’s German-language press expressed its shock and sympathy. The Deutsche 
Zeitung exclaimed “The greatest misfortune that could meet our state has happened: A 
heinous hand has murdered its king. The whole Yugoslav people stands as never before 
deeply shook before this unthinkable fact: the King is dead!”346 The Mariborer Zeitung 
featured an enormous front-page  display that stated “Honor the dead king!”347 and had 
an article titled “Yugoslavia’s Great King.”348 The enormous outpouring of sympathy for 
the dead king demonstrated not only the loyalty of Sl venia’s German-speaking minority, 
but also the pro-monarchy views held by many of them. This affinity for monarchy 
coincided with the history of the Austrian Empire, whereby continuing affiliation with 
the Habsburgs and Catholic, conservative tradition marked a distinctly Austrian identity 
among some German-speakers. 
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Reaction to the Plebiscite in the Saar 
After the Saar voted over 90% in favor of joining the German Reich in January of 
1935,349 the Deutsche Zeitung commented on the “world historic” speech that Adolf 
Hitler gave in response. Noting that Hitler’s “moving” speech spoke for the “whole 
German Volk” in thanking the “Saarland for its unparalleled loyalty”, the paper framed 
the area’s addition to Germany as a way to “world peace” and “solidarity of nations.” The 
paper went on to comment that the “people fell crying into each other’s arms, they sang 
and danced out of sheer unbearable joy.”350 The result in the Saar had, according to the 
Deutsche Zeitung, initiated “immense jubilation” not only in Germany but also “in the 
whole world”, and especially, “where German hearts beat.”351 
 Reaction to the Saar plebiscite showed that there w still contested identities 
and nationalisms among the Germans of Slovenia. Descriptions of the reactions of the 
Saar Germans on becoming part of the Third Reich were in part reflective of how some 
Germans in Slovenia would have accepted their own inclusion in the Reich. But these 
portrayals were also intended to demonstrate to German skeptics of National Socialism 
the benefits that Hitler could bring. These benefits are tendered by the Deutsche Zeitung’s 
framing of the plebiscite in terms of achieving world peace, thereby eschewing criticism 
of National Socialist foreign policy as being aggressive and destabilizing. Such framing 
of the intentions and rationale for Nazi foreign policy as being geared towards peace 
                                                          
349 DZ, “Das Wunder der Saartreue”, January 17, 1935. 
 
350 DZ, “Hitler spricht Welthistorische Worte zur Saarbstimmung”, January 17, 1935. 
 
351 DZ, “Saarantwort”, January 17, 1935. 
145 
 
indicates the extent to which many Germans in Slovenia valued stability over violent 
upheaval and revolution.352 
Hitler’s successful and peaceful inclusion of the Saar represented one way that the 
question of German minorities could be solved. Noting hat the League of Nations had 
been thus far unable to satisfactorily solve the minority question in Europe, the Deutsche 
Zeitung praised Adolf Hitler’s “hard will” in pushing Europe to come to find a way to 
come to a conclusion for this topic that was still ore for many Germans in Slovenia. 
“Adolf Hitler therefore represents for the German peo le, who are Europe’s largest 
minority group,” the paper declared, “extraordinary nd fruitful thoughts” for solving the 
problem of minority protections and rights.353 Continued praise and focus on Adolf Hitler 
as the sole force in Europe to bring about the much sought-after minority protection and 
rights for Germans outside the Reich was a method tat the Deutsche Zeitung used to 
both contest German nationalism and identity in Slovenia and convince its readership to 
embrace the National Socialist movement. By connecti g Slovenia’s German population 
with that of the Third Reich, Austria, and other German minorities, the Deutsche Zeitung 
was thereby making a case to its readership that this was the only acceptable identity for 
Germans – to be supportive of National Socialism as embers of a living, spiritual 
German Volk.  
                                                          
352 This sentiment of Germany’s peaceful intentions were probably partly influenced by the “massive 
propaganda campaign” that the Nazis had engaged in so as to “reassure the world about Germany’s 
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353 DZ, “Gegenseitiger Nationalitätenschutz”, January 31, 1935. Ethnic Germans did indeed comprise the 
largest group of national minorities in Europe during the interwar period, numbering at least 10 million. 
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In the eyes of the Deutsche Zeitung, Hitler’s actions had shown that it was 
Germany and not Austria that could be relied upon to support the case for political rights 
of Germans in Slovenia. “Since…the summer of 1933”, noted the Deutsche Zeitung, 
“there have been more or less heavy attacks in the Austrian press against the Verein für 
das Deutschtum im Ausland.”354 The Auslandsdeutsche should be able to form their own 
opinion of the VDA, and not be swayed by the efforts of the Austrian press.  For the 
Deutsche Zeitung, the “Austrian Germans should take (the Auslandsdeutsche opinion of 
the VDA) as a reason for satisfaction, not dissatisfaction.” Despite this attack on  
Austria’s claims of being the “true Germandom”, thepaper reassured its readership that 
“our Volkstum seems God-given to us Auslandsdeutsche.” Nonetheless, that “90% of the 
German people belong to the National Socialist state” fter the Saar plebiscite was, for 
the Deutsche Zeitung, an “impressive demonstration” for the Germans “outside the 
borders of the Reich to support the current Germany to at least as high a percentage.”355  
The Deutsche Zeitung’s attempts to convince its readership of the superiority of 
the Third Reich’s “Germanness” over that of Austria’s s seen by its defense of a Reich 
organization against what it perceives as a biased Austrian press. But the paper takes care 
to distinguish between the Austrian people and its media, giving notice that Germans’ 
ethnicity is “God-given.” Such phrasing, which was careful not to come across as being 
anti-Catholic, lent support to the strong Christian current present in some Germans’ 
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identities in Slovenia. The paper’s final request for the Germans of Slovenia to “support 
the current Germany” in numbers as high as 90% show that this level of overwhelming 
favor for the Nazis was far from being realized – if it were, there would be no reason to 
refer to the “impressive demonstration” as a positive example for its readership to follow. 
 
German Identity and Nationalism up to the Nuremberg Party Congress 
As German reactions to the Saar plebiscite and events in eighboring Austria 
show, many Germans in Slovenia had become fervent supporters of National Socialist 
Germany and Adolf Hitler, though there were still others who were not. For Nazi 
supporters, the ideological underpinnings of National Socialism combined with the re-
emergence of an economically and geo-politically-strengthened Germany to command 
their devotion. Still others who were critical of the Nazis’ and their ideology felt a strong 
connection to their Christian identity and affiliated with the Catholicism of an 
independent, but German, Austrian Republic. Most of these Germans shared at least two 
major things in common: They were – at least outwardly – loyal to the Yugoslav state, 
and they remained, as Auslandsdeutsche, outside the borders of the Third Reich 
The conception of Auslandsdeutsche r sted on the assumption that Germans 
abroad were in every way the same as German citizens of the Reich, but just happened to 
live outside its borders. But the veracity of this conception was not universally-held, for 
both Reichsdeutsche and Auslandsdeutsche alike. The Deutsche Zeitung reported on an 
anecdotal piece of evidence of a woman in Berlin lamenting the “poor Auslandsdeutsche” 
as she donated money to the VDA: 
148 
 
We Auslandsdeutsche are not “poor”, we are not to be felt sorry for, to be 
pitied…We Auslandsdeutsche are not “poor” since we too have our Heimat…we 
also have our feeling of Heimat, our love of Heimat, that are certainly no less than 
that of the (Reich) Germans; because the commitment to our Heimat is a 
commitment to the struggle, to daily exertion, to the daily ordeal. We Germans 
abroad have our signal for the entire Volk, our clear-cut field of activity with 
which we are partaking on the fate of the core Volk – just as the core Volk is 
partaking on ours’.356 
Portraying Reichsdeutsche views of the Auslandsdeutsche as being at a disadvantage due 
to living outside the Reich was a way for the D utsche Zeitung to show its readership that 
they shared a unique connection with German-speakers in Germany, despite the 
geographical barriers separating the two. But the woman in Berlin who donated to the 
VDA also demonstrates a conception among Reich Germans of the Auslandsdeutsche as 
being somehow different than themselves, as not “true” Germans.357 Repeated stressing 
of the Slovene Germans’ “love of Heimat” was both an affirmation of existing German 
nationalists’ spiritual affiliation with Germany aswell as a reassurance to those Germans 
whose regional identities were especially strong; Heimat can refer to both Germany and 
Styria. But by referring to the Auslandsdeutsche mission for the Volk, the Deutsche 
Zeitung reminded its German nationalist readers of their role to play in society, thereby 
emphasizing affiliation to Germany over Yugoslavia and opening itself up to charges of 
disloyalty. 
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speakers of East Central Europe should have, by nature of a shared language, culture, or history, 
automatically had an affinity or deep loyalty for the German Reich. See Judson, “When is a Diaspora not  
Diaspora? Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives about Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe”, in 
O’Donnell, Bridenthal, and Reagin, eds.,  The Heimat Abroad, 219-247. See also John C. Swanson, “The 
Second World War and its Aftermath: Ethnic German Communities in the East”, in Szabo and Ingrao, The 
Germans and the East, 347-361. This type of unique regional German identity being distinct from Reich 
German nationality can be seen, for example, in the cas  of the Baltic Germans of Latvia and Estonia, who
referred to the Reich as Ausland – for their part, Reich Germans up to the eve of Wrld War I considered 
the Baltic Germans to be Russians in any case. See Heide W. Whelan, Adapting to Modernity: Family, 




  The Deutsche Zeitung, in reporting on Hitler’s proclamation at the Nazi Party 
Congress at Nuremberg in September of 1935,358 emphasized that “National Socialism 
fosters an aggressive intention towards no European nation.” As well, the “Party 
has…neither previously or today the intention of leading any kind of war against 
Christianity.”359 Emphasis on the lack of aggression was belied by the paper’s stance on 
National Socialism’s feelings towards Bolshevism. For those critics who saw an 
“aggressive and defensive attitude” in Hitler’s speech, the paper noted that this had not 
only been called “the strongest shield of peace” by the Wehrmacht but was also vital in 
defending shared “European cultural goods” from “Bolshevist Soviet ideology.”360 
Denying the Nazis’ aggressive intentions towards other European countries and 
Christianity was an appeal to those members of the German minority community who 
were strongly Catholic and wary of any actions thatwould lead to continent-wide 
violence and upheaval. But the Deutsche Zeitung’s defense of Nazi Germany’s anti-
communism as a “shield of peace” that would protect civilized Europe reinforced the 
notion held by some German-speakers in Slovenia of a unique German duty and ability to 
maintain and protect Kultur.361  
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this aspect of the rally so much as downplay it by focusing much more intently and with many more 
voluminous articles on other aspects of the event.  
 
359 DZ, “Die Proklamation Hitlers auf dem Parteikongress”, September 15, 1935. 
 
360 DZ, “Die Grundthemen des Nürnberger Parteitages”, September 19, 1935. 
 
361 The notion held by some German-speakers in Central Europe of being a bulwark of Kultur against 
Bolshevist barbarism was not restricted to the lands bordering the Reich: when communist troops began 
spreading the Russian Revolution eastward in the aftermath of World War I, German soldiers flocked to the




Between Germany and Austria 
In contrast to “almost the entire non-German world p ess”, who had been writing 
about the “threat to world peace through the German Reich” and had “moved the people 
and nations to worry and disquiet”, the D utsche Zeitung reported that “nowhere else in 
the world” was more “happily peaceful”, or had greater “willingness for peace and work” 
than in the “National Socialist state.” From this perspective, the Third Reich’s “love of 
peace” was the “basis for National Socialist foreign policy.”362 The Deutsche Zeitung’s 
persistent defending of the Third Reich’s foreign policy and Hitler’s aggressive intentions 
indicates that there was a large split dividing the German minority community in 
Slovenia. For German nationalists, a stronger and more forceful Germany was a welcome 
development in helping to gain back Germany’s lost sta us as a Great Power and thereby 
restore ethnic German minorities to their previous po itions of privileged status. Other 
Germans, perhaps but not necessarily otherwise supportive of the Nazi Party, were 
alarmed at the potential for another European general war should Hitler’s belligerence 
work out differently than he thought it would.363 Order, stability, and minority protection 
were all very noble goals, but not at the expense of peace and certainly not if they were 
gained through illegal or violent means.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
something to do, others saw themselves in the same mold of the Teutonic knights of the Middle Ages, 
saving civilization from barbaric hordes. Modris Eksteins, Walking Since Daybreak: A Story of Eastern 
Europe, World War II, and the Heart of Our Century (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 63-64. 
 
362 DZ, “Das Hitler-Deutschland liebt den Frieden”, February 6, 1936. 
 
363 This is one reason why some Generals in the Wehrmacht opposed, to varying degrees, Adolf Hitler’s 
leadership. Chief of General Staff Ludwig Beck, for example, finally abandoned loyalty to the Führer after 
the crisis over the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia in 1938. Burleigh, The Third Reich, 683. For more on 
anti-Hitler opposition in the German military, see Ibid., 677-687. 
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 But the presence of a sovereign, German, and Catholic Austria split the unity of 
ethnic Germans of the former Habsburg Empire and competed with the German Reich for 
their loyalty. “A small house of neo-Austrians on the Danube is trying to make world 
history,” complained the Deutsche Zeitung. “First, six and a half million state nationals 
(Staatsvolk) were culturally and politically disenfranchised and in every way made 
defenseless. Then came the conflicts and showdowns that led to the defeat of Fascism 
and to a victory for the clericals.” The paper deplored that the “Austrian government lies 
in the hands of a group of people who completely pursue the policies of the Vatican.”364 
The Deutsche Zeitung tried to link Austrian monarchists, clericalists, and Jews in a kind 
of conspiracy to reinstall the Habsburgs: “There can be no doubt that the clerical regime 
is for the Habsburgs. The Volk, however, decisively rejects the regime and Habsburgs and 
a restoration would cause serious domestic disturbances.”365 
 The Deutsche Zeitung’s criticism of the Roman Catholic characteristics of the 
Austrian Ständestaat exposes the cleavages within the German minority community in 
Slovenia. Its attacks on the clericals and lament over the “defeat of Fascism” represent a 
culture war. This culture war, in contrast to the 1920s, was not occurring between Slavs 
and Germans but between Germans themselves – between German Austrians and Reich 
Germans. At risk was the spiritual unity of the Volksgemeinschaft, and with it, the 
national renewal of the German people that had beenushered in by the National Socialist 
revolution. If Hitler, as an embodiment of the living will of the entire German Volk, 
demanded the loyalty of every single German in the world, then it was intolerable for 
                                                          
364 DZ, “Zwischenspiele an der Donau”, June 4, 1936. 
 
365 DZ, “Habsburger Propaganda”, February 7, 1937. 
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there to be a source of loyalty for millions of Germans other than National Socialism. 
One of the major tasks of the Deutsche Zeitung, as a de facto arm of National Socialist 
ideology outside of the Third Reich, was to convince the Germans of Slovenia that were 
not already devoted to the Nazis of the necessity of becoming so – to end any and all 
conflicts in German identity and nationalism. 
  
Manufacturing Anti-Jewish Sentiment 
As Hitler and the Nazis’ extreme, radical anti-Semitism formed an undeniably 
central role in National Socialist ideology and thus permeated throughout German 
society,366 its impact would necessarily have to be felt among all Germans, no matter 
where they lived. The Deutsche Zeitung had, through the first several years of the Nazi 
dictatorship, either ignored or de-emphasized the anti-Semitic rhetoric that had so 
characterized the German National Socialists.367 But the paper could not maintain 
avoidance of this glaring feature of Nazi Germany forever, and by the latter half of the 
1930s found itself  explaining to its readership in Slovenia the rationale for 
discriminatory policies targeted at Jews in the Reich. “It is still too little known that, at 
the decisive negotiations that led to the dictate of Versailles, Jews played a leading and 
                                                          
366 Saul Friedländer describes Hitler’s “very specific brand of racial anti-Semitism” as “redemptive anti-
Semitism”, one that he “carried to its most extreme and radical limits. This “redemptive anti-Semitism”, 
which was “shared by the Nazi leader and the hard co e of the party”, was a “synthesis of a murderous rage 
and an ‘idealistic’ goal” that, Friedländer argues, “led to Hitler’s ultimate decision to exterminate the 
Jews.” Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume I: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 
(London: Phoenix Giant, 1997), 3. 
 
367 The radical anti-Semitic narrative of a massive Jewish conspiracy that was not held back by national 
borders and sought to destroy the German people was propagated in the Third Reich through mass media 
such as newspapers and radio, as well as the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. 
Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 6-7. For more on the spreading of anti-Semitic messages to German society in the 
1930s, see Ibid., 17-49. 
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disastrous role.” The paper continued, “The Jews do not constitute a nation…(Their) 
form of existence is not the Volk but…destruction.”368 The Deutsche Zeitung also sought 
to link Jews with the Soviet Union and communism. “The Paris-based journal ‘Centre de 
Documentation et de Propaganda’ reports that the Soviet authorities intend to guarantee a 
sum of 100 million rubles in the year 1937 for the construction of an autonomous Jewish 
district…in order to achieve a Red paradise for the c ildren of Israel in Russia.”369  
 The Deutsche Zeitung’s previous lack of attention for the Nazis’ extreme anti-
Semitism can be explained partly by the NSDAP’s downplaying of this element of their 
ideology so as to become more electable,370 but also because of the lack of any significant 
Jewish population in Slovenia.371 As such, the paper needed to reconcile the increasingly 
harsh anti-Semitic policies that had been enacted in Germany that sought to exclude 
German Jews from society.  By linking Jews with both communism and the hated 
Versailles treaty, the Deutsche Zeitung was attempting to illustrate for its readership, the 
overwhelming majority of whom did not share the Nazi Party’s fanatical hatred for 
                                                          
368 DZ, “Juden und Völkische Minderheiten”, March 18, 937. 
 
369 DZ, “Juden und Sowjets”, March 18, 1937. 
 
370 This occurred between the 1928 Reichstag election, where the Nazis won less than 3% of the vote, and 
their 1933 seizure of power. Richard J. Evans, “The emergence of Nazi ideology”, in Caplan, ed., Short 
Oxford History of Nazi Germany, 46. 
  
371 The 1931 census showed 165 Jews with a German mother t ngue in Slovenia, out of a total German-
language population of almost 29,000. For comparison, there were over 27,000 Roman Catholics, 1,447 
Protestants, and 5 Muslims who reported having German as their native language. Protestants and Jews 
were both found predominantly in urban centers such as Ljubljana, Marburg/Maribor, Cilli/Celje, and 
Pettau/Ptuj. Suppan, Jugoslawien und Österreich, 666. Though there was a relatively small Jewish minority 
in Yugoslavia, including some who were included in the kingdom’s German population due to their 





Europe’s Jewish population,372 that the NSDAP’s anti-Jewish policies were legitimate. In 
doing so, the paper was tapping into a strong strand of German identity in Slovenia that 
was nationalist in its perception of the Versailles tr aty and political in its fear of an 
international communist threat. 
 
Anschluss with Austria  
Four days before the German Wehrmacht entered Austria unopposed, the 
Mariborer Zeitung described the “massive crowd” of “50,000 people” that witnessed 
Minister of the Interior Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart give a speech in front of the Vienna 
Landhaus to the cheers of “Heil Hitler!” The paper quoted, in bolded letters, the part of 
the minister’s speech that declared Austria to be a“German country – and nothing else”, 
as well as “Austria can only go the way that Germany lso goes.”373  
The conflicted and contested nature of German identity and nationalism in 
Slovenia is evident in the Deutsche Zeitung’s report on Minister Seyss-Inquart’s speech. 
While there were clearly German-speakers in Slovenia who strongly identified with Nazi 
Germany’s version of German nationalism,374 this nationalist identity conflicted with 
                                                          
372 This is not to say that there were no anti-Semites among the Germans of Slovenia, just that the evidence 
of a similar kind of widely-held, publicly-displayed, virulently racial strand of anti-Semitism as appeared in 
Germany and Austria does not appear in the sources sed for this thesis. Anti-Semitism of varying degrees 
was widely-held all over Europe, even in places where there were few if any Jews. Burleigh, The Third 
Reich, 94-95. There is a difference between the radical, extreme anti-Semitism of many of the leaders of 
the Nazi Party and the more casual forms of everyday, tacit prejudice which would not necessarily be 
showcased in newspapers or government reports.  
 
373 MZ, “Österreichs Deutscher Programm”, March 8, 1938. 
 
374 The Third Reich’s embassy in Yugoslavia reported to the German Foreign Office that, after the 
“situation of the local Germans (had)…considerably worsened”, the “achievement of Greater Germany” 
had aroused “fantastical hopes for an improvement” in local conditions. The same report noted that this was 
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other German-speakers’ Roman Catholicism and connectio  with Austria. Though these 
Germans spoke the German language and were proud of their German cultural heritage, 
this did not necessarily mean that they were eager to see a perceived anti-Catholic – or in 
any case, a majority-Protestant – German nation state take over an independent, Catholic 
Austrian republic.   
 The day after the Nazi “seizure of power in Austria” was “bloodlessly 
completed”, the Mariborer Zeitung detailed the appointment of Dr. Seyss-Inquart as the 
new Federal Chancellor, as well as the replacement of domestic security forces by 
“exclusively National Socialists” and the SS. The paper also repeatedly stressed that there 
had been “nowhere in all Austria any confrontations.”375 Reporting on Chancellor Kurt 
Schuschnigg’s farewell speech before giving up power, it quoted in full his speech, with 
his accusations of the “news about Austria” being “made up”  and his final appeal, “So I 
depart in this hour from the Austrian Volk with a German word and with a heart’s desire: 
God protect Austria!”376  
The Mariborer Zeitung’s description of the Anschluss of the Austrian Republic by 
Nazi Germany demonstrates the mixed reaction among Slovenia’s German minority, 
which was divided by the minorities’ contested identities and nationalisms. Calling the 
Anschluss of Austria a “seizure of power” left open for its readership’s interpretations 
whether this was a good or bad thing; the term Machtergreifung, depending upon one’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
true for all Germans in Yugoslavia, not just those in Slovenia who “honestly perceived…the swastika…as 
the first step to their own liberation.” Report of the German Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Auswärtiges 
Amt, “Auswirkung des “Anschlusses” und der sudetendeutschen Autonomiebestrebungen auf die Lage der 
deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslavien”, June 15, 1938.  NARA, RG-242, T-120, Roll 3107, frame 
E540660-E540661. 
 
375 MZ, “Bundesregierung Dr. Seyss-Inquart”, March 13,938. 
 
376 MZ, “Schuschniggs Abschiedsrede im Rundfunk”, March 13, 1938. 
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politics, signified either the extension of the beginning of the “national revolution” that 
had begun in Germany in 1933 or a naked power grab by a violent minority with 
authoritarian aims.377  
 The Mariborer Zeitung illustratively portrayed Adolf Hitler’s entrance into the 
Austrian capital, with “all Vienna” on the street to “experience the historic hour of (his) 
arrival.” Calling him Chancellor instead of Führer, the paper noted the “great interest” 
and “excitement” of the people that “(grew) from hour to hour.” The former State 
Secretary Dr. Michael Skubl “voluntarily” resigned his post and was placed in 
“protective custody.”378 “The events since Saturday have rushed with film-lke speed. 
The National Socialist uprising (Erhebung) has become an upheaval, and overnight, so to 
speak, Austria – now called German-Austria – was united with the German Reich.”379 
The Wehrmacht‘s “invasion” had been met by “indescribable jubilation” and “scenes of 
fraternization (Verbrüderung) from the population.380 The Mariborer Zeitung explained 
to its readers that Italy, a predominantly-Catholic country, had not “obliged itself 
to…protect Austria from Germany” and that both Italy nd Germany had the “duty” to 
lead the “fight against the world-destroying Bolshevism.”381  
Describing the National Socialist takeover of Austria as widely welcomed by 
Austrian citizens, whose “indescribable jubilation” at finally being reunited with their 
                                                          
377 J.S. Conway, “’Machtergreifung’ or ‘Due Process of History’: The Historiography of Hitler’s Rise to 
Power”, in The Historical Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1965), 399.  
 
378 MZ, “Adolf Hitler in Wien”, March 15, 1938. 
 
379 MZ, “Die Vereinigung Deutschösterreichs mit dem Reich vollzogen”, March 15, 1938. 
 
380 MZ, “Der Einmarsch der Deutschen Truppen”, March 15, 938. 
 
381 MZ, “Die Empfangsfeierlichkeiten in Wien”, March 16, 1938. 
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ethnic brothers was clearly evident, represented an attempt by the Mariborer Zeitung to 
persuade its readers who were anti-Nazi that the Anschluss was not a negative event but 
that it was popular, legitimate, and indeed legal.382 Excusing Italy’s non-interference 
showed to these German-speaking readers that their Catholic religious identity was not 
under attack in Austria and would not be so should the Slovene lands ever join the Third 
Reich. By emphasizing the popularity of the Wehrmacht and Adolf Hitler’s entrance into 
Vienna, the paper was thereby marginalizing anti-Nazi sentiment among the German-
speakers in Slovenia, who were to see that events in neighboring Austria were considered 
by the vast majority as a good result, with no negative consequences. Combining the 
“duty” of both the Third Reich and Fascist Italy to “fight against world-destroying 
Bolshevism” helped as well to prey on the fears of communism held by many Germans in 
Slovenia. 
But the Mariborer Zeitung continued to refrain from wholly supporting the 
Anschluss, and this reticence to do so indicates that anti-Nazi sentiment in the German 
minority community of Slovenia remained at least somewhat significant. The paper’s 
consistent use of Reichskanzler instead of Führer lent credence to the view that this was a 
legally-permissible action and mollified skeptics of Adolf Hitler and the National 
Socialist movement. As well, Secretary Skubl’s “voluntary” imprisonment was meant to 
                                                          
382 Despite a post-war portrayal of Austria as having been the “first victim” of Hitler’s aggression, the 
Anschluss with Nazi Germany was in fact wildly popular. Anto Pelinka, Austria: Out of the Shadow of the 
Past (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 16-18. This is not to say, however, that it was universally 
welcome. But the portrayal of Austria as a “victim” of Nazi aggression served to, after 1945, allow Austria 
to escape the same fate as Eastern Germany and other S vi t satellites. As well, the idea of Austria as a 
victim had been promoted by the political right-wing i  that country for decades afterwards, until the Kurt 
Waldheim affair in the late 1980s forced the country to attempt to come to terms with its past – a past that, 
for example, had Adolf Hitler being Austrian, a higer percentage of Nazi Party members than in Germany, 
and a disproportionate amount of Nazi concentration camp guards actually coming from Austria. See Tony 
Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 2-3; 52-53.See also
David Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 101-144.  
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show that the former, illegitimate government was, f r from being undemocratically 
pushed out by an aggressive foreign power, acknowledging the legality and legitimacy of 
the Anschluss. Such nuanced reporting on these events demonstrate that, though perhaps 
not the more popular opinion, anti-Anschluss or anti-Nazi sentiment retained a 
considerable presence among the German minorities in neighboring Slovenia. 
 
German Understanding of the Munich Crisis 
In the days before the Munich Agreement was signed i  September of 1938,383 
British Prime Minister Sir Neville Chamberlain gave a speech that the Deutsche Zeitung 
described as appealing to “all those who would like peace and to avoid the downfall of 
                                                          
383 Czechoslovakia’s German-speaking population of more than 3 million represented an opportunity for 
Hitler to exploit the concept of self-determination a d deplore the “oppression” of a German minority 
outside the Reich’s borders. While many Germans in the area called the Sudetenland did resent what they 
saw as harsh measures taken against them in the interwar years and desired to join with Nazi Germany, 
Hitler had ulterior motives – Czechoslovakia represented a strong threat to Germany and needed to be 
eliminated as a danger as soon as possible. Hitler’s b lligerent stance towards Czechoslovakia heightened 
the political situation to the point that Italy, the United Kingdom, and France signed away the majority f 
the republic’s German population without the Czechoslovaks themselves being present. Rich, Hitler’s War 
Aims, Vol. 1, 101-109. For more, see Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed, 78-86. See also 
Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars, 126-132 and Komjathy and Stockwell, 
German Minorities and the Third Reich, 30-41. Though the cession of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany in 
1938 was seen by most as a victory for Hitler, the Führer himself viewed it as a “great, perhaps the greatest, 
setback and mistake of his career.” Hitler held a personal hatred for the Czechs, growing up as he did in the 
last decades of German-speaking Austria. As such, he desired the physical destruction of Czechoslovakia, 
not merely the inclusion of its German-majority regions. Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of 
Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 313-
317. For more on the planning and diplomatic developments in the run-up to the Munich Agreement in 
September of 1938, see Ibid., 318-377. Britain and France’s desire to come to a peaceful solution was 
heightened by their sense of isolation – unlike in World War I, there were no prospects of the United States 
or Japan, or another Great Power, coming to their aid. The costs of war would be enormous.  Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany understood this, and acted accordingly to gain the most possible of their goals without inciting a 
European-wide conflict. In all this time, the Sudeten Germans themselves were never considered by the 
Nazis as anything more than a means to an end – their use was purely in exploiting the situation. The 
British, on the other hand, precisely saw the situation as one of a minority exercising their right to self-
determination, and as such, had considered that issue as a real possibility in the context of keeping 
Czechoslovakia itself free from potential Nazi invasion. Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World 




European culture and civilization at any price.” The paper called it a “comfort to know 
that the considerations of a responsible statesman are being confirmed by elements of 
political events but also by regard for the people…who would be forced to fall victim to 
all the chicanery” that a “totalitarian war” and “its murderous annihilation” would bring. 
The “people’s memories of the four-year long struggle in the Great War (was) too lively” 
for any “clear-thinking” person to want again.384 Much as Prime Minister Chamberlain 
proclaimed “peace in our time” after concluding theMunich Agreement with Hitler, so 
too proclaimed the Deutsche Zeitung that “the world [had] exhaled” in relief.385  
 Though the Mariborer Zeitung supported Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement, 
and therefore his cession of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany, its support was not 
couched in terms of allowing oppressed German minorit es the right to return to their 
rightful homeland. Rather, the paper’s overwhelming relief is due to the aversion of a 
large-scale industrial war in Europe that had been threatening to break out. Such a 
“totalitarian war” would result in “murderous annihilation” that would inevitably fall the 
heaviest on innocent civilians. That the Mariborer Zeitung’s reporting on the Munich 
Agreement indicates widespread anti-war sentiment among Slovenia’s German minorities 
is evident by the dire situation it envisions should war come about, describing such a time 
as being the “downfall of European culture and civilization.” 
 What is notable about the Mariborer Zeitung’s interpretation of the Munich 
Agreement as one of relief at avoiding war is that it predicated this interpretation with the 
consideration that only “those who desire peace” would agree with its rejoicing over the 
                                                          
384 MZ, “Appell an die Vernunft”, September 29, 1938. 
 
385 MZ, “Die Welt atmet auf”, October 1, 1938. 
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result. Certainly many European countries earnestly desired to avoid a general war at all 
costs, but Adolf Hitler and diehard members of his National Socialist movement viewed 
military engagement and aggression as a way to expand the Reich’s borders, ensure 
German dominance in Central and Eastern Europe, and reshape the region’s society and 
culture so as to maintain this dominance.386 That the Mariborer Zeitung would frame its 
perspective that avoiding war was a good thing for Europe’s stability shows that, just as 
there was a strong desire for peace and stability among Slovenia’s German-speakers, so 
too were there those who believed in the Nazi vision of a violent upheaval in Eastern 
Europe that would propel Germandom to new heights through military means. Germans’ 
reaction to the Munich Agreement in Slovenia demonstrates the different strands of 
German identity and nationalisms in Slovenia. 
 
Reaction to the Kristallnacht 
On November 7, 1938, German diplomat Ernst vom Rath w s fatally shot in Paris 
by Herschel Grynszpan, a German-born Jewish refugee whose parents were from 
                                                          
386 “German policy in Eastern Europe was aimed…at full po itical, economic, and military control of the 
whole space between Germany and Russia, in order to be able to strike, either at the Soviet Union or at the 
Western Powers.” Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 382. But this simplifies the 
ideological underpinnings of Hitler’s intentions towards Eastern Europe. “Hitler was no longer spurred by 
the usual kind of great power politics and struggle against his country’s political and military rivals but 
rather by a desire to fully implement the ‘eastern program’ he had laid out many years earlier.  This 
involved the most extreme plans for the destruction and obliteration of the Soviet Union…Hitler was at 
pains to add one component underlying all the rest:to effect a racist war of annihilation.” Rolf-Dieter 
Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, Hitler’s War in the East, 1941-1945: A Critical Assessment (Providence, 
Rhode Island: Berghahn Books, 1997), 209. This racist ideology led to plans such as the G neralplan Ost, 
which foresaw the “restructuring” of the Eastern European economy through the forced removal of 
millions, and the Hungerplan, which cold-bloodedly stated that “many tens of millions of people in these 
territories will be surplus to need, and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia.” See Götz Aly and 
Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische 
Ordnung (Hamburg: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991), 372-373 and 394-397.  
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Poland.387 After being examined, the Mariborer Zeitung breathlessly reported, Grynszpan 
admitted to committing the act “in order to avenge his Jewish racial comrades.” The 
paper explained how the “cowardly revolver attack has aroused great furor (Aufsehen) in 
Paris.”388 Only a few days later, in the German Reich “new Jeish decrees” were 
announced whose aims were the “arrangement of measures against German Jewry.” The 
paper described how in “all Germany” the assassinatio  of the German ambassador by 
the “Polish Jew” had “incited popular outrage”; the“violent manifestation” against Jews 
in Germany was “a consequence.”389   
 In light of its previous efforts at manufacturing anti-Jewish sentiment among its 
German-speaking readership, who lived in a part of Europe with essentially no Jewish 
residents, the Mariborer Zeitung’s reporting on the assassination of vom Rath and 
subsequence riots in Germany can be seen as an explanation for the reasons behind why 
the NSDAP government and its supporters hated Jews and reacted with the Kristallnacht. 
The paper’s rationale for the murder – that vom Rath was killed to “avenge” Herschel’s 
“Jewish racial comrades” – clarifies that this action resulted in “great furor” and implies 
to its readership that anti-Semitic sentiment was widespread and accepted outside of the 
Third Reich.  
                                                          
387 Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 268. The assassination was partly in response to a “chain of 
events beginning in March 1938 when the Polish governm nt rendered stateless thousands of Poles living 
abroad, including fifty thousand Polish Jews living  Germany, in a drastic attempt to stem the tide of 
Jewish refugees fleeing Austria in the wake of the Anschluss.” Burleigh, The Third Reich, 323. 
 
388 MZ, “Attentat in Paris”, November 9, 1938. 
 
389 MZ, “Neue Judendekrete in Deutschland angekündigt”, November 12, 1938. Vom Rath’s death incited 
Nazi leaders to orchestrate a large-scale pogrom, later to be called Kristallnacht or the Night of Broken 
Glass, which saw coordinated violence directed at Jews in Austria and Germany. See Burleigh, T e Third 
Reich, 323-330 and Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 271-277. 
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Legitimizing the Nazis’ violent and discriminatory reprisals against Germany’s 
Jewish population as being a “consequence” of the “popular outrage” incited by the 
assassination was a way of canceling the negative asp cts of those reprisals’ violence. In 
the same way that the Mariborer Zeitung attempted to shore up support for the Nazis 
among its readership by invoking the specter of international communism, the paper also 
attempted to create anti-Jewish sentiment by portraying Europe’s Jews as an enemy 
element that deserved to be violently opposed. Such parroting of the National Socialists’ 
reasoning for their extreme anti-Semitism shows that t is type of perverse hatred was, if 
not completely unknown, then almost entirely excluded from the vast majority of ethnic 
German identities and nationalisms in Slovenia. Indeed, many Roman Catholics would 
have, similar to those in south Germany, found the violence and rampant anti-Semitism 
abhorrent and inconsistent with their Church’s teaching.390  
An article detailing the “synagogues in flames” in Germany and Graz was curtly-
written, with few details and being located further down in the day’s news listings than 
the death of Kemal Ataturk.391 Similarly, an extremely short article described the arrests 
of 1,400 Jews in Munich who were then deported to the Dachau concentration camp.392 
Such lack of emphasis, details, and attention paid to outbursts of anti-Jewish sentiment 
and actions in the only major German-language newspaper left in Slovenia further 
indicates the extent to which extreme anti-Semitism was a non-presence in ethnic 
German identity or nationality. Indeed, Nazi Germany’s anti-Jewish policies and 
                                                          
390 For some German Catholics, the Kristallnacht not only reinforced their perception of the Nazis as anti-
Christian but also made them fear that they might be next to be targeted for such violence. Burleigh, The
Third Reich, 332. 
 
391 MZ, “Synagogen in Flammen”, November 12, 1938.  
 
392 MZ, “1400 Juden in München verhaftet”, November 13, 938. 
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oppression of Jews may very well have entrenched anti-Nazi sentiment among certain 
Roman Catholic Germans in Slovenia, while heightening their Christian self-identity.  
 
Legitimizing the Annexation of Czechoslovakia 
After German troops occupied the Czechoslovak Republic in March 1939,393 the 
Mariborer Zeitung portrayed it with the headline, “Czechs enter the protection of Adolf 
Hitler”, and shared speeches made by Hitler and Goebbels that legitimated Germany’s 
actions. “In light of the chaotic situation in Czechoslovakia…” reported the paper, 
“Greater Germany saw it necessary to take over the duty of order.”394 In an article 
entitled “Berlin for an honorable German-Czech Cooperation”, the Mariborer Zeitung 
explained to its readership how the “German troops’” entrance into Bohemia and 
Moravia had “brought freedom” to the country and that the “Czechs (would) no longer be 
victims of Bolshevism.”395 
Though the Mariborer Zeitung once again re-used Nazi propaganda about the 
Third Reich’s aggressive foreign policies in portraying the annexation of Czechoslovakia 
as that country voluntarily being “put under” the “protection” of Nazi Germany and 
thereby saving it from international communism, this portrayal does more than highlight 
the fact that a significant portion of Germans in Slovenia were largely and fervently 
                                                          
393 The invasion and occupation of the country by Wehrmacht roops was, as in Austria, not resisted and 
without violence.  The former Republic of Czechoslovakia was split in two, with the new Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia being formed alongside an independent Slovak state. Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The 
State that Failed, 111. 
 
394 MZ, “Die Tschechen begeben sich unter den Schutz Adolf Hitlers”, March 16, 1939. 
 
395 MZ, “Berlin für Ehrenvolle Deutsch-Tschechische Zusammenarbeit”, March 17, 1939. 
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supportive of National Socialism. It also indicates a continuing reluctance of some 
German-speakers to pledge their own support either for the Nazi Party or for an 
aggressive war. Similar to prior explanations of Nazi foreign policies, the Mariborer 
Zeitung sought to head off criticism of the Third Reich’s actions by claiming Hitler’s 
government was acting out of a legitimate and noble purpose: to defend and save 
European civilization from the Soviet Union’s dangerous international communism. By 
framing Germany’s occupation of Czechoslovakia as its “duty” to restore order to a 
“chaotic situation”, the paper was tapping into a widespread German nationalist identity 
in Slovenia that saw itself as a civilizing and orderly element, paternalistically looking 
down upon others in the region as needing German protection and culture to advance.  
 
Germany and Yugoslavia 
Germans in Slovenia felt content belonging to Hitler’s “New Order” in Europe as 
an ally of Nazi Germany. “Yugoslavia occupies its place in Europe’s New Order, which 
it acquired in a real assessment of the political distribution of power and measures of 
strength.”396 The Mariborer Zeitung reported favorably on a speech given by Italian 
dictator Benito Mussolini and Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki that called 
Yugoslavia an important “part of this system of peace” of Axis policies in the Danube 
region.397 
                                                          
396 MZ, “Keine Änderung der Deutschen Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien”, April 1, 1939. 
 
397 MZ, “Mussolini und Teleti über den Donaufrieden”, April 20, 1939. 
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 Of course, faith in the honest intentions of Nazi Germany towards Yugoslavia for 
the “New Order” of Europe was misdirected, as Hitler’s ultimate goal with this concept 
was “not only to bolster German nationalism but to erase other peoples’ sense of national 
identity as well” – including Yugoslavia’s.398 But Germany’s relationship to Yugoslavia 
in the 1930s was important for several reasons: increased trade between the two countries 
was of mutual economic benefit; Hitler’s ulterior motives for annexing Austria and 
Czechoslovakia made friendship with Yugoslavia vital; and Hitler desired stronger 
interaction with Yugoslavia in part to, ostensibly, protect the German minorities and their 
culture in that country. The impact of the Third Reich’s increasing influence in 
Yugoslavia399 did not translate into generally better treatment of i s German minority400 – 
in Slovenia, German schools remained banned and the aut orities were highly vigilant of 
any sign of nazification among the German-speaking population.401 Indeed, 
Stojadinović’s rapprochement with Nazi Germany opened him up to cri icism from 
                                                          
398 Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 8. 
 
399 Increased trade with Germany became such a large and important factor in Yugoslavia’s economy that 
the Germans were able to influence, to a certain extent, Yugoslavia’s domestic affairs. In doing so, Hitler 
was able to keep Yugoslavia neutral while the W hrmacht invaded and occupied surrounding countries. 
Littlefield, Germany and Yugoslavia, 29. For more, see Ibid., 37-55. 
 
400 This was in spite of the fact that German diplomats had for years been warning Yugoslav authorities that 
it would be impossible for the two countries to have  good relationship if the German minorities were not 
treated better. Report of the German Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Auswärtiges Amt, July 27, 1936. 
NARA, RG-242, T-120, Roll 3107, frame E540560-E540562. 
 
401 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 133. The Nazis viewed this kind of 
treatment as “anti-German hatred”, thereby echoing the sentiment of German nationalists in Slovenia. 
Report of the Auswärtiges Amt, “Die Lage des Deutschtums im slovenischen Grenzgebiet.” NARA, RG-
242, T-120, Roll 1453, frame D600644.   
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Yugoslav nationalists, and he was “released from office” by Prince Paul in early 
February, 1939.402 
 
German Views of Slovenia and Yugoslavia up to the Nazi Invasion  
Throughout the 1930s, as Nazi Germany achieved increasing economic gains and 
foreign policy success, many Germans in Slovenia bec m  ever more supportive of the 
Third Reich and Hitler’s policies. But this increasd loyalty to Germany did not lessen 
their own devotion to Yugoslavia.403 On the seventeenth birthday of King Peter II, on 
September 6, 1939, the Mariborer Zeitung expressed “the best wishes of the entire Volk” 
to the “personal luck of the young monarch.” The paper carried on, saying “wherever the 
young King may show himself, hearts fly all over towards him” and that the “united 
nation” had “jubilated” over the “great hope” he elicited in people. “The only thing we 
can do in these eventful times” the paper declared, “is to gather loyally around the throne, 
look events cold-bloodedly in the eyes”, and be “firmly resolute” in avoiding the 
“perception of state interests in these extraordinay times.”404  
                                                          
402 Ibid., 137. The decision by Stojadinović to establish closer ties with Nazi Germany was a poor one, as it 
turned out that the immediate economic benefits to increased trade would not make it less likely for 
Yugoslavia to become a target of Nazi aggression. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 182. 
 
403 It is to be assumed that, for at least some of the more passionately nationalist Germans, professions of 
loyalty to Yugoslavia were merely window dressing i an attempt to maintain good relations between the 
Third Reich and Yugoslavia. This was confirmed in areport by the German Auswärtiges Amt from 
December of 1938 that, although noting that the “situat on of the Germans in Yugoslavia had never been 
content since the establishment of the state”, it was crucial for the Reich’s foreign policy that the minorities 
maintain good relations with the authorities so as to maintain stability. Report of the Auswärtiges Amt, “Die 
Lage des Deutschtums in Jugoslavien”, December 22, 1938. NARA, RG-242, T-120, roll 1363, frame 
D520122-D520124.  
 
404 MZ, “S.M. König Peter II. Feiert seinen 17. Geburtstag”, September 6, 1939. 
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While Nazi Germany had started the Second World Warwith the invasion of 
Poland on September 1, 1939, German-speakers in Yugoslavia had “placed (themselves) 
behind the [Yugoslav] government.” Yugoslavia’s positi n of neutrality had 
“undoubtedly the overwhelming agreement” of the peopl . “Neutrality”, explained the 
Mariborer Zeitung, “saves us from the horrors of war…Only in this way…(will) our 
Fatherland arise out of the storms of the present without trials and suffering.”405 As a 
symbol of the unity of Slavs and Germans in support of Yugoslav neutrality, the “whole 
city” of Marburg/Maribor “demonstrate(d) its loyalty for King, Dynasty, and State”, 
decking the streets and buildings in the national colors and “sea of lights.”406 
The Mariborer Zeitung’s public affirmation of loyalty to the Yugoslav monarchy 
and state was significant for two reasons. On the one hand, it served to mollify Yugoslav 
concern over the loyalty of Slovenia’s German population, many of whom were 
supporters of Nazi Germany and National Socialism.407 On the other hand, it reflected a 
continuing sense of loyal German affiliation to Yugoslavia that had been tested with the 
rise of the Third Reich and perceived anti-German social policies in Slovenia. The 
paper’s emphasis on the “whole city” of Marburg/Maribo  exhibiting their “loyalty for 
King, Dynasty, and State” highlights that this loyalt  was in large part predicated on the 
kingdom’s remaining neutral and avoiding joining the war. By so publicly and forcefully 
expressing its support of the Yugoslav king and his kingdom’s neutrality, the Mariborer 
                                                          
405 MZ, “Jugoslawiens Neutralität”, September 7, 1939. 
 
406 MZ, “Maribor manifestiert seine Treue für König, Dynastie und Staat”, September 7, 1939. 
 
407 Yugoslav apprehension of Hitler’s intentions after the outbreak of war in 1939 heightened anti-German 
sentiment in Slovenia, which bordered Austria and Italy. Anti-German demonstrations increased, as 
German nationalist activists became increasingly loud and provocative with their revisionist goals. Lumans, 
Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 120.  
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Zeitung reflects both the deeply-held anti-war and pro-Nazi sentiment among its German-
speaking readership. That the paper devoted so mucheffort to praising the young king 
and Yugoslav neutrality demonstrates both that pro-Nazi sentiment was high – if their 
loyalty to Yugoslavia were not so in doubt, the paper would not have felt the need to 
exclaim so loudly that they were not acting against its interests – and that anti-war 
feelings ran deep among Germans in Slovenia. 
 
German Identity and Nationalism on the Eve of the 1941 Invasion of Yugoslavia 
German identity in Slovenia by 1941 was split into various factions – Pan-
Germanist, National Socialist, Austrian, Catholic, indifferent, loyal to Yugoslavia, and a 
mixture of several or all of these variants.408 On the occasion of the opening of the 
Deutsches Wissenschaftliches Institut in February of 1941, the Mariborer Zeitung quoted 
in full the speech given by Reich Foreign Minister Ambassador Fritz von Twardowski.  
The paper highlighted Ambassador von Twardowski’s comments on the “spiritual-
intellectual relationship between Germany and Yugoslavia”, which he hoped would 
“strengthen” the “cooperation” between the two countries. The paper put in bold the part 
of his speech that declared that what was “worth pursuing” was “not the uniformity of 
spirit, of culture…but rather the development of originality and individuality of every 
                                                          
408 Yugoslav authorities, who had good reason to suspect National Socialist sentiment among members of 
the German community, were uncertain how many “real” N zis in Slovenia there were, and who were loyal 
citizens. Major Plhak of the Yugoslav intelligence services wrote that it was “hard to tell” who was an “ex-
Untersteiermark who is German” and “who is a ‘cross-breed’ and changes sides when it is opportune.” 




nation…Between nations of highly-developed cultures…the goal is…cooperation on the 
grounds of complete equality and mutual learning and teaching, giving and taking.”409 
 The opening of the Deutsches Wissenschaftliches Institut, financed by Germany, 
symbolizes the conflictions and contested identities among Slovenia’s German minority. 
That the new institute was funded by the Third Reich indicates the extent to which 
German money and influence had spread in Yugoslavia. The institute represented not 
only the basic fact of Yugoslavia’s Germandom, but also the nature of its presence. 
Ambassador Twardowski’s hope that the institute would “strengthen” the “cooperation” 
between Yugoslavia and Germany expresses a belief in Germans’ cultural abilities in 
science and technology which could be utilized by Yugoslavs for mutual benefit. The 
Mariborer Zeitung’s emphasis on the parts of the ambassador’s speech that touched on 
the “originality and individuality of every nation” whose goals were “mutual learning and 
teaching” reflects a strand of German identity in Slovenia that viewed their Slavic 
counterparts as culturally equal though still able to receive unique contributions from 
Germans due to their inherent characteristics. 
 When Nazi Germany began publicly talking about, and then implementing, plans 
to resettle German populations in occupied areas of Eastern Europe for the ideological 
purpose of creating a racially-pure Greater Germany, German-speaking minorities in 
Yugoslavia panicked at the idea of being removed from their homes.410 The Mariborer 
                                                          
409 MZ, “Die Kulturelle Zusammenarbeit zwischen Jugoslawien und Deutschland”, March 2, 1941. 
 
410 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 139. Hitler’s decision to resettle 
ethnic German populations in Eastern Europe came as a surprise to the minorities living there.  Annexation 
for purposes of uniting the Volk was one thing, but completing this process through forced removal from 
the places they had lived in for centuries was not something that they had contemplated. While the German 
minorities themselves were surprised and perplexed at this decision, in reality Hitler’s use for Germans 
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Zeitung published an article by Dr. Arnold Weingärtner that sought to placate German 
concerns about their Umsiedlung from Slovenia. Referring to the prior transfers of 
Germans from the Baltic and Lithuania, Weingärtner wrote that “Germany wanted to 
save all the (ethnic Germans) from a difficult-to-avoid downfall”, while removing 
potential “conflicts” between the Germans and local populations and thereby completing 
the “necessary” Nazi population and resettlement plans in Eastern Europe.411 Such 
attempts to assuage concerns of Germans in Slovenia had little success – the German 
minorities in Yugoslavia remained intensely anxious about resettlement and their fate 
through 1941.412  
 After relations between the German minorities and the Yugoslav authorities 
deteriorated through 1940413 and Yugoslavia was pressured to join the Tripartite Pact in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
abroad was based upon how they factored into his foreign policy goals. “His general aim regarding the 
minorities was to win their loyalty and then to exploit them, group by group, in the interest of his 
immediate diplomatic needs. Each minority served the Reich as circumstances required. Some, such as the 
Sudeten Germans, performed as classic fifth columns, whereas others, such as the Germans of Poland, were 
for the most part passive pawns, pretexts for aggression. These groups had already served the Reich well, 
and in the fall of 1939, other minorities were expected to contribute to the cause by resettling.” Lumans, 
Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 151-152. 
 
411 MZ, “Die letzte Deutsche Umsiedlung”, March 4, 194. 
 
412 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 139. 
 
413 Serb attacks on German minorities at meetings of the Kulturbund had to be broken up by the police, 
while police in Slovenia beat ethnic Germans in Ljubljana in April of 1940. As well, flyers began 
circulating in Slovenia that advocated death for all ethnic Germans, and by June 1940, were “warning the 
population that the ethnic Germans were a fifth column.” Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and 
the Third Reich, 139-140. These and other anti-German activities, such as “Yugoslav efforts to rid the 
country of spies and foreign propagandists”, had “met with strong German official resistance.” As well, 
Germany’s military successes in Western Europe in 1940 had made “Yugoslav military officials consider 
that although Germany military dispositions do not p int to a German attack in this direction in the near 
future, continued German successes in the West will inevitably hasten the arrival of German armies in 
southeastern Europe.” Arthur Bliss Lane to Cordell Hu l, June 4, 1940. NARA, RG-59. Yugoslav civilians, 
however, viewed a German or Italian attack in the summer of 1940 as unlikely, however, and were more 
concerned about the economy and what the post-war settlement would look like. George H. Schellens to 
Cordell Hull, June 21, 1940. NARA, RG-59. 
171 
 
early March of 1941,414 the Mariborer Zeitung reported that Yugoslavia’s joining the 
Axis powers “guaranteed Yugoslav integrity” and reassured its readers by stating that 
there would be “no foreign troops marching through Yugoslavia.”415 The Mariborer 
Zeitung’s spin of Yugoslavia’s decision to join the Axis aprotecting the country’s 
integrity and keeping “foreign troops” out attests to the enduring strength of an anti-war 
strand in identity among Slovenia’s German minority group.416 Though there was a 
significant amount of German National Socialist supporters in Slovenia who would have 
celebrated the Wehrmacht’s entrance into the country as they did after the Anschluss of 
Austria, there were still a not-inconsiderable number of Germans, whose identities were 
strongly Catholic, soft-nationalist, or otherwise uns pportive of National Socialism, that 





                                                          
414 Yugoslavia’s strong desire to stay out of the war m de them resist signing the Tripartite Pact that 
included Nazi Germany, Japan, and Fascist Italy despite outside pressure to do so until March 1941. 
Germany’s transfer of over 350,000 troops to neighboring Bulgaria made this an increasingly untenable 
position, and the government signed the agreement on March 25. Two days later, a military coup replaced 
the government. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 194-196. For a more detailed account of Yugoslavia’s 
joining the Tripartite Pact, see Littlefield, Germany and Yugoslavia, 87-130. 
 
415 MZ, “Jugoslawien ist dem Dreimächtepakt beigetreten”, March 26, 1941. 
 
416 Germans’ concern over their fate should Yugoslavia be dragged into the war was heightened after the 
new military government, which was composed of Serb nationalists, “arrested the entire ethnic German 
leadership” who then, after being released, did their best to assure the new leaders of the country of their 
loyalty. Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 140. As well, the new military 
government was strongly suspected by the German government of physically “mishandling” members of 
the ethnic German minority community in Belgrade and elsewhere. Morris to Cordell Hull, March 31, 
1940. NARA, RG-59.  
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After the Invasion  
Mussolini’s ill-advised decision to attack Greece417 on October 28, 1940, 
precipitated Nazi Germany’s invasion of Yugoslavia.418 The Wehrmacht’s invasion on 
April 6, 1941 advanced quickly, ending with the “physical destruction” of Yugoslavia by 
June.419 Though some Nazi-oriented Germans in Slovenia were actively serving the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) intelligence and military sections from the time of the Anschluss 
to the 1941 invasion,420 the majority of ethnic Germans were kept in the dark about the 
Nazis’ intentions and obeyed mobilization orders after April 6.421 The country was 
partitioned between the different Axis powers, with Nazi Germany completing the 
geographical expansion of the Greater German Reich by annexing northern Slovenia, 
whose “population according to Nazi ideology was amenable to speedy 
Germanization.”422 
German-speakers in Nazi-occupied Slovenia were re-unit d, spiritually and 
geographically, with Germandom. The now-Nazified anrenamed Marburger Zeitung 
                                                          
417 Mussolini did not consult with Hitler prior to ordering the attack. Jozo Timosevich, War and Revolution 
in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 46. 
 
418 The failure of Italian troops to make quick progress in advancing through Greece, as well as German 
need for supplies to be sent through the fastest possible route to its armies in North Africa, contributed to 
Germany’s decision to invade. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 195. 
 
419 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 197. 
 
420 In the summer of 1940, Yugoslav authorities discovered a (Nazi) German spy network in 
Marburg/Maribor, which had contacts via radio with Graz. These agents had prepared, in the days leading 
up to the invasion, a list of more than 3,500 Yugoslav citizens – mostly from Slovenia – who were to be 
immediately arrested. Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 15-16. While a small minority of nationalist 
activists participated in fifth column-like activities, the secret radio stations set up by the SD were operated 
exclusively by Reichsdeutsche, not the German minorities. Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities 
and the Third Reich, 140-141.  
 
421 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 140-141. 
 
422 This did not include the city of Ljubljana. Timosevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 61. 
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welcomed the “inevitable” result of German troops “liberating” the “Yugoslav state”, 
which had “been overthrown by the betrayal of the Belgrade war criminals in an insane 
adventure.” The paper explained to its readers that a “new time” had begun for the 
region, since “Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich is a social state in the truest meaning of the 
word. The German Volksgemeinschaft, of which we had until now been separated by the 
unbearable Versailles system, spans our beloved green Styria.”423 An announcement in 
the Marburger Zeitung on April 9 greeted the Nazi occupiers: 
Ethnic Comrades! The hour of our liberation has struck! A 22-year struggle for 
the continued existence of our Volksgruppe has concluded with the victorious 
liberating deed of our Führer. We have now the anxious hours of our life behind 
us. Joy and thanks fill our hearts. For our joy andthanks towards our beloved 
Führer and his brave and glorious Wehrmacht, we want to worthily…adorn our 
houses, windows, and businesses with our German flags, with the likeness of the 
Führer and with flowers. We have revived from struggle and misery to a new life 
of structure and service to our German Volk and our Greater German Fatherland. 
Everyone fulfill his German duty!424  
Accusing the “seven million Serbs” of exercising a “political and economic system of 
terror” against “nine million people of other ethnic groups”, the Marburger Zeitung 
framed the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia as “freeing” the populations there. The coming 
of the Nazis meant “freedom and bread for all in Adolf Hitler’s New Europe.”425 German 
occupation meant that the “22 years” that “the public use of our German mother tongue” 
was “refused” was over. “Now the time has come where we can once more openly 
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424 MZ, “Volksgenossen!”, April 9, 1941. 
 




profess our German Volkstum.”426 Marburg/Maribor and the rest of Lower Styria were 
now free.427  
As in other cases of Nazi foreign policy, the Marburger Zeitung’s interpretation 
of Germany’s invasion was not simply a reinforcement of National Socialist propaganda. 
In addition to loudly and happily declaring what it claimed to be the full voice of 
Slovenia’s German minority in approving the Third Reich’s reasons for invading and 
occupying Yugoslavia, the paper was also explaining to parts of its readership why this 
invasion was a positive and what its impact would have on their lives. In interpreting the 
Nazis’ invasion for its readership, the Marburger Zeitung thereby exposes the fault lines 
that divided German-speakers in Slovenia in their identity and nationalisms. Those 
German nationalists who were ardent supporters of National Socialism and believed in 
their belonging to the Volksgemeinschaft rejoiced at their liberation from Slavic 
overlords. Others who were not necessarily either for or against National Socialism but 
were adamant in their desire to avoid war at all costs would have been deeply uneasy 
about the repercussions that might occur after foreign troops began to occupy 
Yugoslavia. Still others, whose identities were shaped as much by their Roman 
Catholicism and affiliation to the Austria of the Habsburgs, could have been torn between 
their desire to regain their prior privileges while l ving in a German-dominated society 
and their distaste over being controlled by Nazi troops and administrators. 
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427 MZ, “Marburg Frei!”, April 11, 1941. The Nazis did ndeed view their invasion and occupation of 
Slovenia as a liberation. Since the late 1930s, the Reich Foreign Ministry had viewed the Slovene 
government and Slovene people’s actions against Germans as “terrorist activities.” Contrary to local 
German nationalists’ views of these actions (at least as espoused in the German-language press) the Nazis 
saw anti-German attitudes as permeating Slovene soci ty, from the authorities, to the press, to the loca  
civilians themselves. Memorandum from German Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Auswärtiges Amt, May 4, 
1939. NARA, RG-242, T-120, Roll 1453, frame D600645-D600651. 
175 
 
But Catholicism’s strong role among Germans in Slovenia was persistent and 
strong. On Easter, the Marburger Zeitung celebrated the Christian holiday with “the sign 
of the victorious flags of Adolf Hitler.” The paper quated Christ’s rising from the dead 
with the Nazi invasion; just as Jesus Christ’s resurrection had brought humanity out of 
the darkness and into a new age, so too did Hitler and the Wehrmacht accomplish a 
similar phenomenon in Yugoslavia and Europe.  Notably, the paper published a full-
length photograph of the Führer looking nobly into the distance, in full military uniform, 
but without any outward sign of the Nazi swastika.428  
German-speakers’ Roman Catholic identity was clearly deeply-held and 
widespread in Slovenia, as the Marburger Zeitung’s extensive efforts to relate to the 
Christian denomination evince. That the newspaper would show a full-length photograph 
of Adolf Hitler but decline to display the infamous Nazi swastika indicates that a 
considerable number of those Germans who had strong anti-Nazi views – whether due to 
their Catholicism and the anti-Christian actions that t e Nazis had taken over the previous 
several years, or some other reason – were ambivalent at best in how they felt about the 
Führer. While many Germans in Slovenia felt more stongly about their Catholic identity 
than their German nationalism, this was not the cas for many others. Though the 
overwhelming majority of Germans in Slovenia were Roman Catholic, a great many of 
them were supporters of National Socialism, and their religion did not interfere with or 
cause them to question their identifying with the extr me right-wing German nationalism 
that the Nazis espoused. 
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On the “day of fulfillment” in Marburg/Maribor, when Dr. Sigfried Uiberreither 
took over the civilian administration of the region as Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter, the 
Marburger Zeitung depicted the “indescribable joy” of the city’s population as Dr. 
Uiberreither entered the “ground of the old German city.”429 German occupation meant 
that those who had “annihilated the old monuments of German culture (and) defaced the 
centuries-old beautiful picture of German cities” had done so “only because they are 
destroying witnesses for Germandom.”430   
The Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund was replaced by the Steirischer 
Heimatbund, whose leader Franz Steindl was given the order from Hitler to “make 
(Lower Styria) German.”431 In an attempt to recruit more members for the Heimatbund, 
the Marburger Zeitung published an article from a reader that appealed to Germans’ 
regional identities: 
All of us who are Styrians love our Heimat. Our forefathers lived here, built the 
ground here, established the cities, markets, and villages and laid down the streets 
and paths between them…(Our) sons and daughters well understood this legacy, 
this holy appeal: remain true to the H imat…We had to suffer…almost 23 long 
years that the enemy ruled our country. And how he ruled! He expelled many of 
us, the town and streets decayed…and now this state th t was built on lies has 
fallen…But we, we have our Lower Styria once more in tight hands…Since we 
all want to assist and cooperate with the development of our Heimat, our Lower 
Styria….None of us will fail. We will all be there. Because our great, our beloved 
Führer Adolf Hitler calls upon us.432  
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430 MZ, “Wir Danken unserm Führer!”, April 19, 1941. 
 
431 Scherer, “Die Deutschen in der Untersteiermark, in Ober-Krain und in der Gottschee”, 131. 
 
432 MZ, “Alle zum Heimatbund!”, April 27, 1941. 
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By July of 1941, the Marburger Zeitung had begun displaying at the top of its masthead 
the Styrian lion and carrying the slogan of “official organ of the Styrian Heimatbund.”433  
 Despite the obviously-biased pro-Nazi stance of the Marburger Zeitung after 
Slovenia came under German occupation, not all Germans in Slovenia agreed that the 
coming of the National Socialist regime signaled a liberation. While the Germans of 
Slovenia became once more a part of the German Volk, the nature of what this Volk was 
not one that all approved of.  For German nationalists who cheered the rise of the Third 
Reich and eagerly awaited the revolution that would renew the nation and Volk, the 
events of April 1941 established the dominance of a German identity and nationalism in 
Slovenia that was in step with National Socialism. Other nationalists who had, as Roman 
Catholics and Austrians, contested this intra-German culture war might have been glad to 
have their prior social status and privilege restored, but not necessarily at the expense of 
the violence and atrocities that were to come. As well, fear of and desire for protection 
from communism was pervasive among the Germans in Slovenia, and was an important 
rationale for accepting the Nazis and their invasion of Yugoslavia. It is clear that, from 
the time of Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 to the Grman invasion of 1941, there were 
many Germans in Slovenia who became fervent supporters of the Third Reich and its 
ideology. As well, the Reich’s reach into German culture and society in Yugoslavia was 
long indeed.434  But this influence was never total, and both cultural and societal anti-
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434 This can be seen in the Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund, whose leadership were thoroughly Nazified 
by 1939 and actively sought to become an arm of the Third Reich. Hans Rasimus, himself an ethnic 
German who was expelled from Yugoslavia after the war, denies that the Kulturbund had any “basis for 
National Socialism” and resented that  the Yugoslav go ernment conflated its own  German minority with 
the National Socialists of the Third Reich. Rasimus, Al  Fremde im Vaterland, 490. 
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Nazi institutions remained – the Catholic Church, conservative liberalism, and a different 



















                                                          
435 For example, in Marburg/Maribor in 1940, less than lf of the city’s German population was registered 
in the Nazi-controlled Kulturbund. Of those registered, most were middle-aged (between 30 and 60) with a 
significant minority of younger men (15-30 years old). A majority were Protestant, with few Roman 
Catholic members. Vodušek-Starič, “The Beginning of the Ideological Dispute and its Consequences on 




Yugoslavia was divided by the Axis powers into three parts, being occupied by Germany, 
Italy, and Hungary. The Nazis controlled most of Slovenia north of Ljubljana, with its 
population of some 25,000 ethnic Germans, and intended annex the region to the Third 
Reich.436 The decision to consider the annexation of Slovenia as an extension of the 
Anschluss with Austria led to fierce partisan resistance from Slovenes and presented the 
local Nazi occupying force with unique problems of sabotage and disruption of a kind not 
seen in other occupied areas of Eastern Europe.437 Partisan warfare in Slovenia and 
Yugoslavia was particularly brutal, leaving repercussions for the region that would be felt 
for decades to come.438 
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Slovenia, with the Kulturbund’s own internal studies only marginally increasing the number of Germans, at 
28,075 in January 1941. Almost half of those were in rural Gottschee/Kočevje. Timosevic, War and 
Revolution in Yugoslavia, 83. Some of those Germans left under Italian or Hungarian occupation in 
Slovenia expressed their desire to be placed under German administration through waving Nazi flags, 
public proclamations, and protesting. Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 17. 
 
437 For more, see Tim Kirk, “Limits of Germandom: Resistance to the Nazi Annexation of Slovenia”, in 
The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 69, No. 4 (October 1991), 646-667. Though the Nazis 
intended to simply extend the civilian administrative area of Austria that bordered Slovenia to Lower Sty ia 
and Carinthia, this was never accomplished as partisan resistance was too fierce. But the NSDAP occupiers 
did implement the Nuremberg Racial Laws and introduced a military draft that forced Slovenes to fight for 
the Germans. Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 18. This unpreparedness is understandable in light of 
the fact that the Germans had anticipated “70-80%” of Slovenes would be “in favor of Germany” during 
the invasion, ostensibly because of anti-Serb sentiment. Report of the German Embassy in Croatia to the 
Auswärtiges Amt, “Abschliessender Bericht Über die Umsiedlung”, November 20, 1941. RG-242, T-120, 
roll 5781, frame H296639-296649. 
 
438 Partisan paramilitary groups in Slovenia fought both f r and against communists as well as Nazis. 
Timosevic, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 126-127. Tamara Griesser-Pečar has called this a “civil 
war” in Slovenia, one that led from one totalitarian regime (the Nazis and fascist Italy) to another 
(communism). See Tamara Griesser-Pečar, Das zerrissene Volk – Slowenien 1941-1946: Okkupation, 
Kollaboration, Bürgerkrieg, Revolution (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2003). Slovene history for this period had 
been largely written from the communist viewpoint, who saw those Slovenes who had fought against the 
communist partisans and then left the country after th  war not as refugees but as traitors. This 
interpretation has caused resentment among some Catholics in Slovenia, which has persisted for decades. 
For more on the experiences of these anti-communist partisans and refugees, see John Corsellis and Marcus 
Ferrar, Slovenia 1945: Memories of Death and Survival after World War II (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005). 
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 The Nazis intended to completely Germanize Slovenia, w th Heinrich Himmler, 
in his capacity as Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom, establishing a 
Staff for the Resettlement of the Population and issuing the following directives to bring 
this about: expelling en masse the population of “undesirable” Slovenes, including the 
intelligentsia and those “nationally conscious”; transferring of ethnic Germans from the 
Italian-occupied part of Slovenia and other parts of Eastern and Southeastern Europe; and 
the Germanization of those Slovenes not included in the expulsion.439 
 Annexation to the Third Reich put many Germans in Slovenia in a tight spot.440 
Similar to other regions of Eastern Europe that came under Nazi occupation, local ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
For more on partisan warfare and developments in Yugoslavia during World War II, see Lampe, 
Yugoslavia as History, 197-228.  
 
439 Timosevic, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 85. The Germans would end up expelling some 80,300 
Slovenes, only one-third of the amount they had originally planned and about 10% of the total Slovene 
population. Those expelled went to Serbia, Croatia, nd Germany, where they became forced laborers or 
were Germanized. For more, see Ibid., 86-91. Those sent to forced labor camps became part of the millions 
of forced and slave workers from Nazi-occupied areas in the Third Reich that made up a large percentag 
of the German labor force during the war. For more, see Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers: 
Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). For more on the Nazis’ racial treatment of Slavs, see John Connelly, “Nazis and Slavs: From Racial 
Theory to Racist Practice”, in Central European History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1999), 1-33. Among those 
persecuted by the Nazis in Slovenia were Gypsies and the numerically-small Jewish population of less than 
1,000. Since there were so few Jews, the NSDAP civil administration in Slovenia did not view this as a 
burning issue to be resolved, and roughly 80% of the Jewish population survived the war. See Andrej 
Pančur, “Genocide and Ethnocide: Similarities and Differences between Jewish and Slovenian 
Victimization in Slovenia”, in Anton Weiss-Wendt, Eradicating Differences: The Treatment of Minorities 
in Nazi-Dominated Europe (Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2010), 165-186. 
 
440 At the outset of the invasion, Germans were faced with what they viewed as an impossible choice: 
follow mobilization orders and fight German troops or disobey those orders and go into hiding until it was 
safe to come out. Many did flee to neighboring Hungary and other parts of Yugoslavia, while many also 
obeyed orders to mobilize. See Schieder, ed., Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, 46E-50E. The 
extent to which ethnic Germans in Slovenia collaborted with and participated in Nazi occupation 
administration and anti-partisan efforts is disputed. Stefan Karner downplays the participation of Slovene, 
arguing that many Germans – including even Nazi supporters – spoke out about the brutal, racist 
occupation policies; he claims that the “majority” of ethnic Germans in Slovenia “rejected” the occupation 
policies of the NSDAP administration, while others followed orders and still others adopted a silent 
“modus vivendi” with the local Slovene population. See Karner, Die Deutschsprachige Volksgruppe in 
Slowenien, 72-76; 94; 117-118. In contrast, Dušan Nećak  argues that “most” Germans were in fact 
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Germans were both recruited and volunteered to help t  German war effort and 
occupation.441 Germans in Slovenia who had been staunch National Socialist ideologues 
before the invasion embraced the coming of Nazi troops. Others who had been 
ambivalent or opposed to the Nazis might have been unsure what annexation would lead 
to, but were nonetheless relieved to have their prior privileges and rights – especially in 
education – restored.442  
 While ethnic Germans were either passionate or passive towards their 
membership in the Third Reich, many were still anxious about being resettled to another 
area of Greater Germany.443 In the winter of 1941-1942, the 600-year history of Germans 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sympathizers of the Nazis, citing the “80%” of “functions of the occupying administration” being 
composed of “local” Germans. See Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 14-15; 19.  
 
441 Timosevic, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 85. The Nazis raised an SS unit composed of local 
Germans, which only ended up comprising aroung 1,600 men.  Nonetheless, these Germans helped fight 
the partisans, sometimes resulting in atrocities being committed. See Nećak, “’Die Deutschen’ in 
Slowenien, 1938-1948”, 382-383. “Local” German participation in atrocities, such as the execution by 
shooting of 10 Slovene civilians for every one German soldier killed by partisans, linked all German-
speakers in Slovenia with the brutal Nazi occupation. Damijan Guštin and Vladimir Prebilič, “Die 
Rechtslage der deutschen Minderheit in Jugoslawien 1944 bis 1946”, in Manfred Kittel, Horst Möller, Jiři 
Pešek, and Oldřich Tůma, eds., Deutschsprachige Minderheiten 1945: Ein europäischer Vergleich 
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 302-303. 
 
442 While Slovenes viewed the Nazi occupation for what it was – a hostile invasion by an aggressive, racist 
regime intent on exterminating the very idea of a Slovene culture – many Germans saw it as an opportunity 
to have their former privileges restored, not necessarily agreeing with the racist and eliminationist rhetoric 
of National Socialism. Karner, Die Deutschsprachige Volksgruppe in Slowenien, 75. A similar process was 
evident in Serbia among the occupying Nazi forces and local German population. The local Germans’ 
reasons for embracing the Nazis varied, but many of them collaborated and participated in anti-partisan 
activity and racial policies which engendered intense hostility and would lead to their expulsion after the 
war. See Mirna Zakic, “The Furthest Watch of the Reich: National Socialism, Ethnic Germans, and the 
Occupation of the Serbian Banat, 1941-1944”, PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 
2011. But German-speaking Catholics in Slovenia might have been very apprehensive towards the Nazi 
occupation force, as it was started early on that “room must be made for a new mystic religion of blood and 
race as practiced by the old German race”, an action that would lead to the “abolition of Catholicism.” 
James B. Stewart to Cordell Hull, March 17, 1942. NARA, RG-59.  
 
443 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich, 143. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle 
had not planned on transferring the German population in Slovenia until after the 1941 invasion, as it was 
intended that they would “serve as intermediaries between the Reich and the local Slavic population.” 
Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 175.  Indeed, some Germans who had been supportive f the National 
Socialists became disillusioned once they came under their jurisdiction. One man, who had “always 
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in Gottschee/Kočevje came to an end after roughly 15,000 were transferred to Carinthia 
and Lower Styria from the Italian-occupied region surrounding Ljubljana, to replace the 
Slovene population that had been expelled from there.444 Despite becoming a part of the 
Third Reich, being granted Reich citizenship, and being given administrative posts in the 
occupation, German-speakers in Slovenia were still ambiguous in how “German” they 
really were. The Nazis themselves were not entirely convinced that the “local” Germans 
were equals, with one report upbraiding a lower-ranked clerk for using the term 
Reichsdeutsch instead of Volksdeutsch to describe the Germans in Slovenia.445 
For the Slovenes who were on the receiving end of the Germanization policies 
and violent reprisals of the occupying Nazi administration,446 the variants in German 
identities and nationalisms that had been present after World War I and continued 
                                                                                                                                                                             
especially sympathized with the National Socialist worldview”, was “forcibly evacuated” by Nazi 
authorities from his home in Windisch Graz in Lower Styria with his family in the middle of the night, 
never receiving an official reason for the action. Martin Barl to the German General Consulate in Zagreb, 
September 10, 1941. NARA, RG-242, T-120, roll 5781, frame H296663-H296664. 
 
444 Schieder, ed., Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, 83E. This was done despite internal reports 
showing that the Gottschee Germans were “unprepared” for such a move. Report to Sigfried Ueberreither, 
“Aussiedlungen entlängs der Save”, January 7, 1942. NARA, RG-242, T-120, roll 5781, frame H296633-
H296635. For more on the transfer of the Gottschee G rmans, see Mitja Ferenc, “Für immer 
untergegangen? Die Gottscheer im 20. Jahrhundert”, in Mitja Ferenc and Joachim Hösler, eds., 
Spurensuche in der Gottschee: Deutschsprachige Siedler  in Slowenien (Potsdam, Germany: Deutsches 
Kulturforum östliches Europa, 2011), 63-91. 
 
445 Telegram from the German Embassy in Zagreb to the Auswärtiges Amt, September 16, 1944. RG-242, 
T-120, roll 5784, frame H299179. The German-speaking population of Slovenia was granted Reich 
citizenship in October of 1941. Nećak, Die “Deutschen” in Slowenien, 18. 
 
446 Germanization measures included changing geographic l names, street signs, businesses, and other 
aspects of society from Slovene to German; Slovene first names were prohibited and German spelling used 
in public records; Slovenes were forced or compelled to join two front groups, the Carinthian Volksbund 
and Styrian Heimatbund, and were classified by five different categories, ranging from “friendly to the 
Germans” to “strongly anti-German” as well as the racial categories of “very good” to “unsuitable” for 
becoming a part of the German Volksgemeinschaft; Slovene teachers were fired, Slovene schools were
closed and re-opened with only German-language instruction, with the objective of “(preventing) the 
development of Slovene national consciousness in Slovene children..and to implant German national 
consciousness instead” – the very process that many Germans had felt the Slovene government was trying 
to accomplish in the 1920s and 1930s. Timosevic, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 91. 
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through World War II were essentially meaningless; the contested German National 
Socialist identity in Slovenia had convinced almost everyone that a German was a 
German, and all Germans were Nazis.447 In November of 1943, the Antifascist  Council 
of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) decided that all “enemies of the 
people” must be dealt with, including the Germans of the country.448  
Many ethnic Germans fled with the retreat of the W hrmacht, who fell before the 
advancing communist partisans and the Red Army. Those who remained suffered the 
“vengeance” of the local Slavic population who had en ured the harsh Nazi 
                                                          
447 Indeed, the Slovenes had called their German-speaking minority “Germans” throughout the interwar 
period, while Reich citizens called them Volksdeutsche or Auslandsdeutsche.  Today, it might be more 
appropriate to designate them as Austrians, as a ditinct German-Austrian cultural identity has become 
more prominent. Dušan Nećak, “Die ‘deutschen’ in Slowenien nach 1945 als Klassen- und Nationalfeinde: 
Ein Beispiel nationalpolitischer Stereotype”, in Andreas Moritsch and Alois Mosser, eds., Den Anderen im 
Blick: Stereotype im ehemaligen Jugoslawien (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2002), 199. For 
more on the development of Austrian identity between 1918 and 1955, see Douglas Patrick Campbell, “The
Shadow of the Habsburgs: Memory and National Identity in Austrian Politics and Education, 1918-1955”, 
PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 2006.  It is important to note that, even though the 
Nazis picked out the so-called Volksdeutsche as beneficiaries of Nazi extermination and racial policies in 
Eastern Europe, the Nazis themselves found it often difficult to determine who exactly was a German when 
they encountered the peoples of Eastern Europe. Designation could not rest solely on use of the German 
language, since many Jews and Slavs spoke German. Blood was another difficult criteria to establish, even 
more so than in the Reich. Regardless of whether they were “true” Germans, either in self-identification or 
marked as so by others, some of the ethnic Germans of Eastern Europe participated in the crimes of the 
Nazis, and all were officially beneficiaries. This does not take away from the fact that some ethnic Germans 
publicly and privately resisted and protested Nazi occupation policies. Many Volksdeutsche (who often did 
not call themselves by that name) tried to “prove” their Germanness by being good Nazis in order to gain 
certain favors, while some Nazis considered them to be “second- or third-rate Germans at best.” See Doris 
L. Bergen, “The ‘Volksdeutschen of Eastern Europe, World War II, and the Holocaust: Constructed 
Ethnicity, Real Genocide”, in Keith Bullivant, Geoffrey Giles, and Walter Pape, eds., Germany and 
Eastern Europe: Cultural Identities and Cultural Differences (Atlanta, Georgia: Yearbook of European 
Studies, 1999), 70-93. Indeed, even after some Germans from Yugoslavia had entered Germany near the 
end of the war to avoid the Red Army, they were still “(relegated) to the table with the alien workers and 
the prisoners of war.” Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 61.  
 
448 Scherer, “Die Deutschen in der Untersteiermark, in Ober-Krain und in der Gottschee”, 131. An 
exception was made for those Germans who had fought alongside the partisans against the occupiers, but 
this did not include many. See Tone Ferenc, “The Austrians and Slovenia during the Second World War”, 
in F. Parkinson, ed., Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1989), 207-233. 
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occupation.449 On May 8, 1945, partisans in Cilli/Celje shot and beat to death any 
Germans they saw on the street. The entire German population of Lower Styria was 
imprisoned in concentration camps in Tüchern/Laško near Cilli/Celje, Herberstein near 
Marburg/Maribor, and in the death camp Sterntal/Kidričevo. Thousands died of hunger, 
typhus, and dysentery.  Conservative estimates of the death toll of Germans in 
Yugoslavia after the Wehrmacht left the country are put at a minimum of 10,000, of 
which 6,000 were from Lower Styria.450  
Slovenia was the region of Yugoslavia with the most concerted effort to expel the 
German population. After being interned in holding camps, where many fell ill and died, 
most Germans were sent by train to the Austrian border. Some were sent to labor camps, 
while those in “mixed” marriages were allowed to remain.451 Reasons for the expulsion 
and forced removal of ethnic Germans from Slovenia were revenge and reparation for the 
Nazis’ occupation and treatment of Slovenes, of which local Germans had been a part; 
that German-speaking Yugoslav citizens who had beenmembers of the Kulturbund had 
“betrayed their own state”;  German industrialists and bankers were now viewed as “class 
enemies” by the communist authorities; and Slovenes were not “ready to live together 
                                                          
449 Some 80,000 Germans were officially expelled from Yugoslavia, with thousands more being 
unofficially forced out of their homes and fleeing, mostly to Austria but also Germany. Arnold Suppan, 
“Zwischen Rache, Vergeltung und ‘Ethnischer Säuberung’: Flucht, Vertreibung und Zwangsaussiedlung 
der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawien”, in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, Vol. 
51, No. 1 (2003), 74-76. These tens of thousands of Germans formed part of the estimated 15 million ethnic 
Germans who were expelled from Eastern European coutries after 1945. De Zayas, A Terrible Revenge, 1. 
For more on these refugees’ experiences while fleeing war and traveling the sometimes very long distances 
across Eastern Europe on foot, see Ibid., 39-80. Such a massive movement of so large a group of people in 
so short a time “may well constitute the greatest single movement of population” in human history. 
Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 65. 
 
450 Scherer, “Die Deutschen in der Untersteiermark, in Ober-Krain und in der Gottschee”, 132. For more on 
Germans’ experiences of the internment camps in Eastern Europe, see Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 130-
157. 
 
451 Schieder, ed., Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, 98E-101E. 
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with Germans again.”452 In the 1948 census of the Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the number of Germans in Slovenia had srunk less to than 2,000, effectively 
ending their status as an existing minority group.453 
                                                          
452 Suppan, “Zwischen Rache, Vergeltung und ‘Ethnischer Säuberung’”, 74-84. The decision to expel the 
Germans of Yugoslavia was made in November of 1944 by the communist partisans fighting against the 
Nazis. The expulsion, sometimes violently and in disorganized fashion carried out, was tacitly condone by 
the Allies. Damijan Guštin and Vladimir Prebilič, “Die Rechtslage der deutschen Minderheit in 
Jugoslawien 1944 bis 1946”, in Manfred Kittel, Horst Möller, Jiři Pešek, and Oldřich Tůma, 
Deutschsprachige Minderheiten 1945: Ein europäischer Vergleich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 
297. For more, including primary documents issued by the provisional Yugoslav government, see Ibid., 
297-346. One Slovene wrote in 1944: “As long as thee…German elements are mixed in with our 
population, they will reduce the (people’s) self-consciousness and growth, economically paralyze and with 
that, inhibit our material and cultural progress…the only remedy against this…is to draw the border 
between the Styrian Slovenes and the former Yugoslav German minority…” Expelling the Germans was 
not done because they were German, but rather becaus  they were part of Germandom, which was 
aggressive in its expansion. Nećak, “’Die Deutschen’ in Slowenien, 1938-1948”, 390-391. Marina 
Cattaruzza has argued that geo-political and diplomatic considerations on the part of the Allies, particularly 
Britain, played a part in allowing these mass expulsions and population migrations to happen. Marina 
Cattaruzza, “’Last stop expulsion’ – The minority question and forced migration in East-Central Europe: 
1918-1949”, in Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2010), 108-126. The Allies understood well the 
logistics of moving so many people at once, and the chaos that would ensure, without adequately preparing 
so such an endeavor; indeed, “they considered the anguish the displaced population would undergo to be a
salutary form of reeducation.” Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 66. For more on Allied plans for the 
population transfer of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe during and after the end of World War II, see
Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans: 
Background, Execution, Consequences (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).  The population transfer 
and migration of millions of ethnic Germans after World War II was but one large piece among many such 
events as part of a longer history of ethnic cleansing, expulsion, migration, and population transfers in 
twentieth century Europe. See Benjamin Lieberman, Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of 
Modern Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006). See also Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 108-138; and Prusin, 
The Lands Between, 201-223. 
  
453 Dušan Nećak, “Waren ‘die Deutschen’ Fremde in Slowenien nach 1945?”, in Österreichischer 
Zeitgeschichtetag 1995: Österreich – 50 Jahre Republik (Innsbruck, Austria: Studien Verlag, 1996), 189. 
The history of Germans in Slovenia has made it difficult for Austria and Slovenia to come to terms with 
their bilateral relationship and the events of 1918-1945, as has been the case to varying degrees for the 
Czech Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Some of the Germans (Austrians) who left Slovenia 
after 1945 accused the Slovenes of pursuing “genocidal” policies on the Germans of Slovenia, due to 
expulsion, economic expropriation, and imprisonment in camps. This claim was officially supported by the 
Austrian government as late as 1991. See Dušan Nećak, “Einige grundlegende Angaben über das Schicksal 
der deutschen Volksgemeinschaft in Slowenien nach 1945”, in Sudostdeutsches Archiv, Vol. 36, No. 1 
(1993), 163-171. Paul Mojzes argues that Yugoslav retaliation against its German minority population after 
the war was indeed a genocide, but has not been wished to be designated as such, as the local population 
“felt little sympathy for the German population.” Estimates range from 64,000 to 166,970 for the number of 
ethnic Germans interned in camps in Yugoslavia, with a minimum of tens of thousands dying. Paul Mojzes, 
Balkan Genocides, 109-114. Indeed, the history of the conflict over the borderlands meant that, post-1945, 
relations between Vienna and Belgrade were friendlir than between regional capitals Klagenfurt and 
Ljubljana. Moll, “The German-Slovene Language and State Border in Southern Austria”, 215. While the 
Republic of Austria recognizes Slovenes as an official minority, German-speakers are not accorded the 




Nationalism, Identity, Minorities, and Society 
It was possible, in Eastern Europe, that one need not be confined to just one identity;454 
for many German-speakers in Slovenia, it was possible to be German, Catholic, Austrian, 
and, in their own unique way, Yugoslav, all at the same time.  National activists – both 
German and Slovene – tried to mark out the German minorities as being definitively 
identified as only a certain kind of German. But the reality for many individual Germans 
was rather different. 
 German identity and nationalism in interwar Slovenia had varieties and 
transformed after internal and external conditions changed. In the immediate aftermath of 
World War I, when Austria was forced to be an independent and separate state from the 
German Republic, German nationalists in neighboring Carinthia and Lower Styria sought 
to maintain their German identity and culture in the context of Austria’s desire to 
politically and spiritually become a part of the German Reich. While some German 
nationalists maintained this stance throughout the 1920s, becoming more entrenched in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
town signs in areas of Austria with large Slovene populations has taken years to come to a workable 
solution, having in the meantime elicited strong protests from the right-wing Freiheitlichen in Kärnten and 
Jörg Haider while he was alive. See the newspaper article “Harmonie beim Ortstafel-Festakt”, Kleine 
Zeitung (Austria), August 8, 2011. The persistence of thistension between Austria and Slovenia is in 
contrast to trends in other Eastern European countries, who have begun to celebrate ethnicity as diversity 
and not as a problem to be “solved” for social cohesion. See Francis W. Carter and David Turnock, 
“Ethnicity in Eastern Europe: Historical legacies and prospects for cohesion”, in GeoJournal, Vol. 50, No. 
2/3 (2000), 109-125. 
  
454 Marsha Rozenblit’s study of the Jews of the Habsburg Empire in World War I illustrates this. Under the 
Habsburgs, the Jews of Austria had what Rozenblit describes as a “tripartite” identity: loyalty to the state, 
to the monarchy, and to the Jewish people around the world. But Jews found it difficult to maintain this 
identity after the fall of the empire, not just because the Habsburgs were no more, but because nationalist 
activists as well often defined national or ethnic belonging on the basis of race. See Marsha Rozenblit, 
Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
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their convictions after they felt singled out for persecution due to their Germanness, other 
German-speakers stressed a different type of national dentity – one that saw German 
culture as a mutual force for good, able to be a bridge between the Slavic and Germanic 
worlds so that both might prosper. Still other “Germans”, described as such by both 
German and Slovene national activists, had to be persuaded that they were a part of the 
German cultural sphere. Despite such efforts, there w r  enough “Germans” that either 
kept resisting or maintained ignorance of belonging throughout much of the interwar 
years. A strong aspect of German identity that remained latent until the rise of National 
Socialism was the Roman Catholic religion; before the Nazis came to power, there had 
been no need to fear anti-Christian persecution, as Slovenes were as devoutly Catholic as 
their German-speaking co-residents. 
As in so many other things, the coming of National Socialism as an ideology and 
political force changed everything. The Nazis offered enewal.  They promised to 
rejuvenate the German Volk, restore them to their former greatness, and make the 
German minorities a majority once more. They offered the Auslandsdeutsche continued 
privilege and dominance. National Socialism signaled the coming of victory in the great 
culture war between Germans and Slavs. German-speakers had faced what was viewed as 
an attempt to eradicate their cultural presence in Slovenia – the Nazis would not only halt 
this, but reverse it. The Nazis would protect not only Germans but all of European 
civilization from communism – an aspect of a historical, noble Germanic mission that 
some Germans in Slovenia embraced. Unlike in Austria, where the cities were largely 
left-wing bastions and the countryside largely conservative, Germans in Lower Styria, 
Carinthia, and Carniola were political conservatives and embraced the right-wing. What 
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explains this situation, where one would expect city-dwellers to be more liberal or 
socialist, is that the Germans of Slovenia were islands of Germandom surrounded by a 
sea of Slovenes. They were also largely the beneficiaries of industrialization and of 
capitalism. For them, the concept of an onrushing “horde” of barbarous, uncultured Slavs 
held real meaning, as much as the threat of international communism did. Of course, 
Germans in Slovenia could have had no idea of Hitler’s true intentions to use them as a 
pawn in his territorial ambitions. 
The extent of support for the Nazis among German-speakers in Slovenia attests to 
the enduring and deeply-felt legacy of the Habsburg Empire and World War I. German 
perceptions of social policies implemented by a Slovene government that banned the 
German language and closed German-language schools as being a “culture war” whose 
purpose was to physically and spiritually eliminate th  German presence in Slovenia was 
a continuation of the decades of prior cultural struggles that had so marked the region, 
and was itself a product of the increased nationalism that spread in the last decades of the 
Habsburg Empire.455 Just as the experiences of the Great War served to radicalize and 
heighten Slovene perceptions of Germans as oppressive overlords bent on destroying 
Slovene culture, so too was the German perspective of Slovene intentions warped by 
those same experiences.  
As well, the bloody senselessness of the industrial killing of World War I 
hardened some German-speakers into wanting to avoid n ther such war at all costs, no 
                                                          
455 This type of heightened nationalism between Germans and Slavs was largely absent in the rest of 
Yugoslavia, whose constituent parts had been under the Hungarian side of the Habsburg Empire. Being 
geographically-proximate to Austria enhanced the Nazis’ institutional reach into Slovenia as well after he 




matter the potential benefits to their own social st tus. This anti-war sentiment would 
come to the fore when a violent, revolutionary group f genocidal radical nationalists 
took power in the German Reich, with promises to purify the nation through destruction 
of others. In addition to its effects on the emotions and perceptions of Germans in 
Slovenia, the Great War had obvious geo-political consequences that had a large impact 
upon the minorities’ relationship to the majority. How the Austrian Republic treated its 
Slovene minority was out of the control of both Germans and Slovenes across the border, 
but it nonetheless served to influence minority policies. The League of Nation’s failure to 
properly enforce minority treaties in the countries of Eastern Europe did much to 
undermine faith and respect in the international community, making an embrace of Nazi 
Germany’s hostility to that body neither inevitable nor justifiable, but understandable. 
Germany’s descent into dictatorship, itself one of the consequences of the war, 
represented an extremely grave existential threat to Yugoslavia and Slovenia, who both 
reacted in ways that are understandable  – but this occurrence was, as well, out of the 
control of the residents of Lower Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola.   
Interwar Slovenia also demonstrates the power of policy, and its sometimes-
unintended consequences. By closing German-language schools and restricting who 
could teach these courses, the Slovene government believed it was acting in the national 
interest of the majority of its citizens. But one repercussion of these policy decisions was 
that German-language teachers were not there to push back against young peoples’ 
inclination towards the more radical proposals embedded in National Socialist ideology. 
The closing of these schools and course led exasperted and desperate parents to send 
their children to study in neighboring Germany and Austria – decisions that would have 
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grave implications for Yugoslavia after these young students came back from the Third 
Reich with deeply-held, radical beliefs about German n tionalism.  
As prior scholarship has shown, Germans in Slovenia reacted negatively to 
minority policies and were not entirely supportive of National Socialism. But I have 
shown what the nature of this negative reaction was and why many Germans were both 
supportive and skeptical of the Nazis. Pan-German natio alism that wanted all Germans 
united in one nation state was but one of a variety of ideologies through which German-
speakers in Slovenia identified themselves. While certain nationalist activists despaired 
the extinction of the German physical and spiritual presence in Slovenia, others merely 
wished for their children to know the language of their parents. Some German 
nationalists viewed the minority policies of interwar Slovenia as being propagated by a 
tyrannical, prejudiced Slovene government who sought the destruction of Germandom, 
but others viewed those same policies as frustrating obtuseness, a refusal to allow the 
superior Germanic culture to help advance Slovene society for all. Though many 
Germans embraced the Nazis after they came to power, thers saw a potential threat to 
their Christian identity. The persistence of non-nationalist and non-Nazi identities 
remained after 1933 through to the invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941.  
While I have argued that there were multiple German ide tities and nationalisms 
in interwar Slovenia, I cannot say for certain how many Germans were Pan-Germans, 
Catholics, Austrians, or indifferent – clearly, allof these identities, loyalties, and 
nationalisms were present, with the most prevalent one being Pan-Germanism. How 
many Germans in interwar Slovenia were Nazis and how many were not? It is  very 
difficult to come to a definitive conclusion. It is most probable that a clear majority were 
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at the least somewhat supportive of many aspects of National Socialism, though not 
enough to wholeheartedly endorse brutal treatment of Slovenes or accept removal from 
their homes for Lebensraum.  I have shown the ways in which National Socialism was 
appealing to Germans outside the Reich, as well as the ways that its appeals were 
portrayed and rejected.  
What did it mean to be German in East Central and Southeastern Europe in the 
first half of the twentieth century? One can choose n ’s own identity and even 
nationality, or have it chosen for them by others.456 The case of the Germans of Slovenia 
is a good example of the varieties of German identity and nationalism that were present 
in the successor states of Eastern Europe in the inerwar period.457  There were Pan-
German nationalists, self-identified Germans with strong regional or religious identities, 
and indifferent or apathetic German-speakers who may or may not have felt strongly 
about the German language and culture. Certain German and Slovene nationalists wanted 
to identify all German-speakers as having one, unified identity, loyalty, and nationalism. 
This outside pressure was ramped up with the coming to power of the Nazis, whose own 
views of German nationalism combined with foreign and domestic policy to devastating 
                                                          
456 The concept of being able to choose one’s ethnic ident ty, or have others choose it for you, still holds 
meaning today. In ethnically- and racially-diverse countries that are becoming ever more heterogeneous, 
such as the United States, Canada, or Great Britain, social perceptions of difference can have real-world 
impacts upon public policy and even result in violenc . See Miri Song, Choosing Ethnic Identity (Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 6-19. The rise of “multiculturalism” in European states has 
also given rise to the possibility for anti-immigrant, anti-minority prejudice to result in a resurgenc  of 
extreme, far-right political parties – with potentially unforeseen societal consequences. See Jan Nederve n 
Pieterse, “Ethnicities and multiculturalisms: politics of boundaries”, in Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and
Judith Squires, eds., Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 27-49. 
  
457 While I have placed my thesis in the context of German identity and nationalism in Eastern Europe, 
there were (and still are) as well German-speaking minorities in Western Europe. For more on the varieties 
of German identity among that population, see Stefan Wolff, ed., German Minorities in Europe: Ethnic 
Identity and Cultural Belonging (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 13-72. 
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effect. As nationalism became intertwined with the nation-state and its policies, it became 
ever more difficult to remain indifferent to one’s ethnic or national identity.  
Yugoslavia had almost no political parties that were not considered 
representative, in some way, of a particular nationl ty.458 Germans were supposed to 
vote for the German party, Croats for the Croatian p rty, and so on. When a country 
declares itself a nation-state and then pursues this declaration by means of singling out 
non-members of that nation – minorities made up an incredibly large part of Yugoslavia’s 
population – the potential for social disintegration, ethnic tension,459 and intolerance to 
increase becomes a danger to the successful functioning f that country.460 As well, the 
wider historical context of the geo-political implications of interwar Europe had a large 
impact upon Yugoslav and Slovene domestic and foreign policies, and views and 
considerations of their German minorities. This points to a broader understanding of the 
ways in which future ethnic conflict and violence can be avoided; certainly what 
heightened the mutual antagonisms and distrust between Slovenes and Germans was, 
aside from the historical context, the legal structures that forced the two ethnic groups 
into one or the other camp. In a multiethnic state, th  possibility for social and ethnic 
                                                          
458 The Democratic Party sought to broaden its appeal across ethnic lines and unite Slovenes, Croats, and 
Serbs against the Radicals, though this effort was largely unsuccessful. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 131. 
  
459 The reality of this potential can certainly be seen in the dissolution of the second Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, with its attendant ethnic cleansing, massacre , and brutal violence. Though the case of Yugoslavia, 
with its ethnic and religious problems, has been attributed to be unique to the Balkans, Cathy Carmichael 
argues that ethnic cleansing is intimately tied-up with nationalism, and not restricted to any one particular 
region in Europe. See Cathie Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans, 108-114. 
  
460 One reason why linguistically-diverse countries such as Canada and Switzerland have not seen the same 
level of political instability, ethnic cleansing, or ethnically-based social problems as Yugoslavia or Belgium 
is due to the former’s universal and inclusionary institutions; whereas both Francophones and Anglophones 
in Canada, and German-, French-, and Italian-speakers in Switzerland, can consider themselves equal 
citizens (Canadians and Swiss, respectively), Yugoslavia and Belgium have found it much more difficult to 
construct such a neutral, positive identity for its citizens. Political parties in Canada and Switzerland are, 
for the most part, not restricted by ethnicity or language, while in Belgium, for example, there are no 
country-wide political organizations that both Walloons and Flemish are l gally allowed to vote for.  
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division to erupt only increases if the various ethnicities suspect the worst intentions 
among each other. One solution, therefore, is to construct a social framework that legally 
provides for universal, united feelings of belonging, in addition to arriving at a mutually-
acceptable level of tolerance and protection of minorities. But the key in such a process is 
for all involved to act in good faith, and to believe that everyone else is doing the same.  
Admittedly, I cannot read Slovene-language sources, and as such, there may be 
additional scholarship or sources that I have been unable to include in my analysis that 
may alter my findings. Nonetheless, there is much to be researched still for this area of 
study. Future scholarship can examine more closely th  role of religion in the Germans of 
Slovenia, or among the German minorities of Eastern Europe for that matter. What 
actually changed when German-language instruction became Slovene-language? What 
were the social textures of life for German-speakers in Slovenia – what did they talk 
about in cafes, restaurants, club meetings, and journals and diaries? Of paramount 
importance in this and future studies of the region is that its history of diversity, both 
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